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ABSTRACT
The Effect of Working Memory and Math Ability on Decision Making
by
Jeremy Adam Krause
Dr. Mark H. Ashcraft, Examination Committee Chair
Professor and Chair of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Previous research has indicated that people use various strategies when making decisions.
A majority of the research has involved the idea that people use a heuristic when making
decisions. Kahneman and Tversky have illustrated that there are instances that people
respond with an answer that appears to be indicative of usage of the representativeness
heuristic. One of the purposes of the current paper is to gain insight into the actual
strategies that are used in these instances. Another purpose of the current experiment is
to see if math ability and working memory capacity influence the strategy that a person
selects to use. Experiment 1 indicated that people were more accurate on these tasks than
expected. On certain tasks, it appears that participants found a simpler strategy than the
representativeness heuristic that produces an accurate answer. In experiment 2, the
stimuli were adjusted to make sure that the simpler strategy would not work on all trials.
The reaction time and response data indicated that the representativeness heuristic was
used when other strategies failed to produce a definitive answer. It was also found that
the participants who were worse at math defaulted to the representativeness heuristic
when the simpler strategy did not result in a definitive answer and that the participants
who were better at math were more likely to respond with the correct answer regardless
of whether or not the simpler strategy resulted in a definitive answer.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The task of making a decision is common among everyday activities. Making a
decision does not always have to be some sort of challenging task; making a decision can
be as simple as choosing which route you will take to arrive at work. However, there are
some situations in which people must make decisions that may have life-altering
consequences. While it is understood that some people are better at making decisions
than others, the reason for this is not as well understood. Considering the fact that many
decisions require a person to consider probabilities and to keep track of many alternatives
at the same time, it can be deduced that both math ability and working memory capacity
can influence a person’s ability to make decisions. The purpose of the current paper is to
summarize the research in the field of decision making and to discuss how math ability
and working memory capacity are related to a person’s ability to make decisions.
Decision Making
Gilovich and Griffin’s (2002) review of the history of decision making research
indicates that one of the initial models of decision making was Simon’s (1955) model of
rational choice. The rational choice model indicates that after a person calculates the
probability of each possible outcome when making a decision, the person will choose the
outcome with the highest probability that is also the most useful. In other words, the
person not only calculates the probability of each outcome but also forms a ratio of
probability to usefulness and selects the most appropriate outcome. In the rational choice
model probability is the likelihood of the event occurring and usefulness indicates
whether or not the alternative will be applicable for the person’s individual situation. For
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example, if a person is deciding on which presidential candidate to vote for, they are
likely to look at each candidates’ position on many issues and calculate which candidate
has the highest probability of having similar views as themselves. However, the person
may find that the candidate that has the highest probability as them does not have a good
chance at winning the election (e.g., they represent a small political party). Then the
person will select the candidate that has the highest probability but also has a chance at
winning the election. The person is calculating a ratio of probability to agreement (on
issues) to chance at winning the election (usefulness).
According to the rational choice model, people are good at making decisions (Simon,
1955). The rational choice model goes on to state that when a person does make an error
in judgment the error is random, instead of systematic (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). For
the rational choice model to be correct, there are two assumptions that must be made.
The first is that people are skilled at figuring out probabilities. Not only does the person
need to possess basic knowledge on how to calculate probabilities but the person must be
able to convert these probabilities into a ratio of likelihood to usefulness. This first
assumption is based on the idea that people are fairly skilled at math, or at least skilled
enough to perform the appropriate calculations to make the correct decision.
The second assumption is that people will need to do probability calculations in
working memory and hold the probability of each outcome in working memory to
determine which of the outcomes has the highest ratio of likelihood to usefulness. This
task may be difficult and will require a large amount of working memory resources in
order to complete the task efficiently. Evidently, even one of the earliest of models of
decision making had an underlying assumption that people will have sufficient math
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knowledge and a large enough working memory capacity to be able to effectively make
decisions.
It appears that there are some flaws with the rational choice model. As stated earlier,
the rational choice model assumes that all people are good at making decisions. If all
people are good at making decisions, people that are well versed in a particular area
should do extremely well in making decisions that pertain to their area of expertise.
Meehl (1954) analyzed the decisions of clinicians and found that they did not perform as
well as decisions based strictly on mathematical formulas when making predictions or
decisions about a particular diagnosis. Meehl’s (1954) research provided evidence for
the fact that people are error prone when making decisions, even concerning topics in
which they are well versed. Since experts are prone to making errors in their area of
expertise, Meehl’s (1954) research implied that perhaps people do not use the appropriate
probability calculations when making decisions.
Later, Simon (1955) discussed that there are several cognitive limitations that arise
when people are making decisions. Both the difficulty of the task and environmental
constraints can impact a person’s ability to make a decision. While the difficulty of the
task may surpass the ability that a person possesses, the environment may not have all
necessary information to make a decision and require the person to make the decision in a
relatively short amount of time. Therefore, there are several factors that could have a
negative impact on the person’s ability to make an accurate decision.
Despite the several challenges people face when making decisions, there are many
people that are able to make correct decisions. With such challenges in mind, Meehl
(1957) suggested that statistical theories for making decisions are flawed. Meehl (1957)
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indicated that rational behavior is a result of the way a person perceives and thinks about
a decision as opposed to using calculations to make a decision. Instead, Meehl (1957)
continued to indicate that certain situations require a person to use heuristics when
making a decision due to limited computational capacity and/or environmentally caused
cognitive limitations. This thinking lead to the recognition of two types of heuristics:
heuristics that are based more on probability and statistical reasoning (more objective) or
heuristics that allow a person’s experiences to impact the way that they make their
decisions (more subjective). Much of the research on the more probabilistic and
statistical types of heuristics (more objective) was done by Tversky and Kahneman (e.g.,
1974; among other researchers) while the heuristics that allow personal experiences to
influence a person’s decision (more subjective) were researched heavily by Gigerenzer
(e.g., 1993; among other researchers). There are three main heuristics on which
Kahneman and Tversky did extensive research, representativeness, availability, and
anchoring and adjustment. In the following section, these three heuristics will be
discussed in detail followed by the Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics.
Representativeness Heuristic
The representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) is in use when a
person estimates the likelihood of an event by comparing it to the overall population of
same/similar events. An experimental example could be a situation in which a person is
supposed to verify which of two sequences of coin flips is more likely: TTTHHH or
THTHTH. A person that is strictly using the representativeness heuristic may say that the
second alternative is more likely because it appears to be more representative of the
population of events. In other words, people will think that a string of consecutive heads
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and then consecutive tails is less representative than alternating heads and tails.
According to basic probability theory, both sequences are equally likely, given an infinite
sample.
Another manner in which a person could use the representativeness heuristic is when
a person determines the likelihood of an event by comparing the event to the prototype of
similar events that are stored in memory. For example, a person might say that in the
United States there are more robins than chickens. While both of them are birds, a robin
is probably more similar to a person’s prototype of a bird that is stored in memory
(Rosch, 1975). Therefore, people can use the representativeness heuristic in two different
ways. The first is when a person makes a decision by comparing an event to what they
assume is likely of the population of events. The second is when a person determines the
probability of an event by comparing the event to the mental representation prototype.
The appeal of the representativeness heuristic is that it is less time consuming when
compared to calculating the actual probability. While the representativeness heuristic
expedites the decision making process, the heuristic is more likely to make errors than
actually calculating the probability of the event.
As stated earlier, some of the initial models in decision making assumed that people
are good at making decisions because people are efficient at calculating probabilities. To
test the idea that people are efficient probability calculators, Tversky and Kahneman
(1971) asked psychological researchers the following question:
“Suppose you have run an experiment on 20 subjects, and have obtained a
significant result which confirms your theory (z= 2.23, p < .05, two-tailed). You
now have cause to run an additional group of 10 subjects. What do you think the
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probability is that the results will be significant, by a one-tailed test, separately
for this group?”
Their logic was that if people are good at calculating probabilities, then certainly
people who spend their careers doing research would answer this question accurately, at
least according to statistical theory. The majority of the respondents answered that the
probability was approximately .85 while the correct answer, according to statistical
theory, was roughly .48. In this situation, the participants determined the likelihood of
the event by comparing it to the already significant findings in the question, instead of
calculating the actual probability of the event. Therefore, the participants determined the
likelihood of an event by making it representative of the information that they were
already given. Also, it appears that people made their decision without taking the size of
the sample into account and instead simply compared the event in question to the overall
population of events. The results of this experiment indicated that the participants were
using the representativeness heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) provided evidence
that even people that use statistics and probabilities regularly in their profession make
incorrect judgments of the probability of an event occurring, even when the scenario is
similar to something that they might run into everyday in their profession.
According to the rational choice model, people are skilled at making decisions using
probability calculations in order to come to a decision. Apparently, though, people do
not always use such calculations. To explain this phenomenon Kahneman and Frederick
(2002) discuss that there are two cognitive systems that could be used when making a
decision. The first system (System 1) is the less effortful of the two systems. System 1 is
automatic and can occur while a person is simultaneously working on another task. The
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second system (System 2) is the more effortful of the two systems and involves a slower,
more methodical process that is governed by some set of rules. The rules vary depending
on the situation. In the case of the representativeness heuristic, System 1 is utilized.
When making decisions, comparing the alternatives to a prototype or the overall
population of events is a fairly effortless process and can be done while simultaneously
working on another task.
Tversky and Kahneman (2002) tested to see if people are prone to making errors
when using System 1 and more specifically using the representativeness heuristic. The
“Linda Problem” was presented to participants to determine how efficient people were
while using the representativeness heuristic. The “Linda Problem” appears below:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy.
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Linda is a teacher in an elementary school.
Linda works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes.
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F)
Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
Linda is a bank teller. (T)
Linda is an insurance salesperson.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T & F)

Considering the two systems that a person could use to make a decision, discussed
above, there are two different ways that the “Linda Problem” could be solved. The first
(using System 2) would be to examine all of the different scenarios and calculate which
are the most likely to occur (what percentage of women in the world are psychiatric
social workers?) and then order the level of representation of each statement according to
7

these percentages. The second way would be to use System 1 and find some sort of
heuristic that could be used. Here, the representativeness heuristic could be used to judge
the character summary of Linda and see how representative the summary is for each of
the alternatives.
It appears that people use system 1 when answering questions like the “Linda
Problem”. The results of Tversky and Kahneman (2002) indicated that the alternative
labeled (T & F) was selected more often than the alternative labeled (T). According to
probability theory, it is impossible for a conjunction of multiple items to be more
probable than one of the constituents. For example, in the “Linda Problem” it is
impossible for being a bank teller and being active in the feminist movement to be more
likely than being a bank teller, because to be both she would have to be a bank teller, but
being just a bank teller does not necessitate also being part of the feminist movement.
Therefore, many of the participants must have been using the representativeness heuristic
or System 1 instead of computing the probability of each alternative to solve the problem.
The results from Kahneman and Tversky (2002) indicated that people were likely to use
heuristics and that the use of heuristics may result in people answering incorrectly. The
error in judgment that the respondents made is known as the conjunction fallacy. The
conjunction fallacy is when a person estimates that a conjunction of multiple constituents
is more likely than only one of the constituents. This type of error can only be the result
of using a heuristic because probability calculations will result in people realizing that the
conjunction of multiple constituents could not have a higher probability than one of the
individual constituents.
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Another decision making task in which participants may use the representativeness
heuristic is the coin toss task, mentioned earlier. In this task a person is asked which
string of coin tosses is more likely (ex. HTHT or TTTT). Here, using System 1 (in this
case the representativeness heuristic) would lead the person to the former alternative
because it “seems” more random. However, if a person were to use System 2 they would
find that each outcome has a 1/16 (½ x ½ x ½ x ½) chance of occurring; therefore the
alternatives are equally likely. Essentially, people are likely to pick the outcome that they
surmise is more representative of what would happen in the population instead of
computing difficult calculations to figure out which of the outcomes is more likely
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). It appears that System 2 is more accurate while System 1
is less time consuming but produces more errors.
Because System 1 is easy to use, people are also prone to using System 1 when they
are gambling. Roulette is a popular table game in which a person bets on where they
predict a small metal ball will land on a large spinning wheel. One of the types of bets
that a person can make is on which color the ball will land. Approximately half of the
spots are red and half are black. Throughout the course of the game the ball may land on
a certain color (say red) in several consecutive trials. When this situation occurs, many
people will start to place their bets on the opposite color (in this case black). This is done
under the assumption that because the ball has landed on the same color a large number
of times, the ball needs to land on the opposite color for the sample to be more
representative of the expected 50:50 ratio. This is known as the Gambler’s Fallacy. The
Gambler’s Fallacy is when a sample of observations has deviated from what should be
the norm, than the sample will automatically correct itself in later trials (Edwards, 1961).
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When a person is using the representativeness heuristic they will make a decision on the
next event based on how similar the events are to what is representative of the population
of events, which will cause them to assume that the string of events will “self-correct” to
be more representative. However, the laws of probability reject the idea the there will be
an immediate correction in the direction of the norm. The probability of the ball landing
on a particular color is identical every time the ball spins around the wheel. The
probability of where the ball will land does not change based on previous trials. Thus,
the Gambler’s Fallacy appears to be an erroneous way of thinking.
Recently, though, Hahn and Warren (2009) discussed an experiment that examined
why people were so prone to making errors when using the representativeness heuristic.
Consider the coin toss example where many people believe that a sequence of events that
appears to be irregular (e.g., THTH) is more probable than a sequence that is consistent
(e.g.,. HHHH), as seen in Kahneman and Tversky (1972). Hahn and Warren’s (2009)
idea is similar to the idea of sample size. According to the law of large numbers the more
observations a person makes, the more representative the sample is of the population
(Boring, 1941). Therefore, a small sample may not be representative of the population.
The same could be thought of with probabilities. When a person takes an infinite number
of observations the person is likely to have an equal number of each possible sequence.
However, if the person is taking a finite number of samples then the rules of probabilities
change. In other words, in an infinite sample of coin tosses a sequence of HHHH has the
same probability of occurring as HHTT. Conversely, in a finite sample, the probability of
a sequence of HHHH occurring is not the same as a sequence of HHTT. Through
rigorous calculations, Hahn and Warren (2009) found the “wait time” for various
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different sequences. “Wait time” is the average number of coin flips a person would have
to wait in order to find a particular sequence. The average wait time for HHTT was
sixteen coin tosses while the average wait time for HHHH was thirty coin tosses. This
indicates that HHTT is a more likely sequence than HHHH when there are a finite
number of coin tosses. Hahn and Warren (2009) also indicated that given a finite sample,
the more regular a sequence is (HHHH), the longer the “wait time” and the less likely the
sequence is to occur in small samples.
The findings in Hahn and Warren’s (2009) article may have more external validity
than most probability research for two reasons. First, people are never in a situation in
which they are witnessing an infinitely long sequence. Therefore, it seems that a person’s
answer when using the representativeness heuristic is more accurate than if the person
had calculated the probability of each option. Second, even if there were a situation in
which a person does see an infinitely long sequence, a person can only store a limited
number of observations in memory. Therefore, a person will only have access to several
of the trials in memory. Thus, a person’s reality will be more similar to a finite number
of trials than an infinite number of trials, meaning that some strings of coin tosses should
be more likely than other strings of coin tosses in an individual’s reality. It appears that
Hahn and Warren’s (2009) study supports the actions of the desperate gambler that places
all of his money on black after a long string of consecutive reds.
There is evidence that people make errors due to considering finite samples when it
may be more appropriate to analyze an infinite sample size (Hahn & Warren, 2009).
There is also evidence that when people are made aware of a finite sample size they still
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make errors due to the representativeness heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) gave
participants the following scenario:
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are
born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you
know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage varies
from day to day. Sometimes it might be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60
percent of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such
days?
-

The larger hospital (21)

-

The smaller hospital (21)

-

About the same (that is within 5 percent of each other) (53)

The values that are in parentheses are the number of participants that selected that
option. In this hospital scenario, a 50-50 male to female ratio for each hospital is seen as
representative. Therefore, it is logical that the number of days in which there is an
extreme number of boys born in the hospital should be about the same for each hospital.
However, statistically, when a sample is large it is more likely to be representative of the
population, while a smaller sample is more likely to have extreme scores or be
unrepresentative of the population. Therefore, basic statistics knowledge would lead a
person to indicate that the smaller hospital is more likely to record more extreme days of
male births (which is the correct answer). The results of this experiment indicate that
even though a participant is aware of the size of the sample, the participants are still
prone to errors when using the representativeness heuristic. People are not only prone to
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making errors when they are comparing a scenario to how well it represents what they
depict should happen in the population, people are also prone to making errors due to
comparing how easily a scenario can be retrieved from memory.
Availability Heuristic
Another one of the heuristics that was studied extensively by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) is the availability heuristic. The availability heuristic is used when a person is
unsure of the correct answer and, therefore, determines the likelihood of an event by how
easily similar instances or situations can be retrieved from memory (Schwartz & Vaughn,
2002). Situations, instances, or examples that are retrieved from memory more easily are
seen as more likely than those situations, instances or examples that cannot be retrieved
from memory easily. Gilovich and Griffin (2002) pointed out that the availability
heuristic could lead to errors when more salient memories are retrieved more easily than
accurate memories. For example, there are many people who are afraid to fly in an
airplane but who are not afraid to travel in a car. If you ask such people why they are
afraid to fly, they are likely to indicate that they fear a fatal airplane crash. It is a
commonly known fact that every year there are more people that die in a car accident
than there are that die in a plane accident. However, airplane fatalities tend to be big
news stories resulting in the memory of fatal airplane accidents to become more salient
than of fatal car accidents. That is what biases people to think traveling by airplane is
more dangerous than traveling by car. There have been several laboratory experiments
that test how people perform when using the availability heuristic.
A person’s decision may be biased when using the availability heuristic due to the
person choosing an alternative based on the number of instances that they can retrieve
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from memory. To determine if people make decisions on the likelihood of events based
on the number instances of each alternative that could be retrieved from memory,
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) gave participants the following question:
Consider the letter R. Is R more likely to appear in
-

the first position?

-

the third position?
o

-

(check one)

My estimate of these two values is __:1.

The participants saw this same question, separately, for five different English letters.
For all five letters, the letter appears more frequently in the third position than in the first
position among English words. However, the participants responded that the letters
appeared in the first position more frequently than in the third position. Here, people
seem to be more likely to retrieve words that start with the letter R from memory than
words that have the third letter as the letter R, resulting in participants thinking that there
are more words that start with the letter than have the letter in the third position of the
word. These results indicated that people are prone to making errors when using the
availability heuristic. The Tversky and Kahneman (1974) article also contained an
experiment that sought to determine if people will judge how common an event was
based on the salience of the event.
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) experiment, participants listened to previously
recorded lists of names. They used a 2 x 2 design in this study in which the first
independent variable was gender and the second independent variable was amount of
popularity, such that some of the names were of very famous people (entertainers) while
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the other group was less famous (public figures, e.g., William Fullbright). Essentially,
each list consisted of more of the less popular names and fewer of the very popular
names. It was found that the participants recalled more of the very famous names and
fewer of the less famous names in all conditions. It was also found that when the
participants were asked if there were more males’ or females’ names on the list, 80 out of
the 99 participants erroneously answered the gender that consisted of the very famous
names. The fact that the vast majority of participants judged the frequency of gender in
a biased way, using the availability heuristic, indicates that people may be prone to
making errors in judgment when using the representativeness heuristic. This result was
confirmed in McKelvie’s (1997) study. Not only do people make errors in judgment
based on how easily examples can be retrieved from memory, but people seemed to be
easily influenced by external cues when making a decision.
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
The final Tversky and Kahneman heuristic that will be discussed in this paper is the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) describe the anchoring and adjustment heuristic as a situation in which
a person is presented with an initial value and makes a decision by adjusting their
estimate based on the initial value. In some situations in which a person is making a
decision, the person is presented with some information that they may use as an aid in
making their decision. Many times this cue is not exactly accurate and instead should be
used as a starting point from which the respondent should adjust in order to reach their
final answer. Therefore, when people use the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, they
use the cue to anchor their decision and then they adjust. It has been found that people
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are prone to make errors when using the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, such that
people tend to err in the direction of the anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 2002).
When doing research involving the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, the difference
between the anchor and the correct answer is very important (Jacowitz & Kahneman,
1995). If the anchor is too far from the correct answer the person might not use the
anchor because it seems like blatantly irrelevant information. This indicates that people
are not too easily influenced but are still susceptible to errors when anchors are present.
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) indicated that when doing research involving the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic there needs to be an initial calibration group. The
initial calibration group is asked a series of questions in which they are told to estimate a
quantity. The participants were asked to make such estimates as the “Length of the
Mississippi River (in miles)” or the “Height of Mount Everest (in feet).” From this initial
group medians are calculated from each question. Using the answers from the initial
group low and high anchors are calculated using the 15th and 85th percentile responses for
each question. The experimental group is then given the same questions but instead the
questions are in the form of: Is the length of the Mississippi River (in miles) higher or
smaller than X and if so estimate the length of the Mississippi River. In this example, the
X is the anchor.
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) found that the anchors did influence the participants’
estimates. The results indicated that 27% of participants being shown the high anchor
had extremely high estimates compared to only 15% of the calibration group. Therefore,
anchors can cause people to make estimates that go against what they would estimate if
they were not presented with an anchor. This was not the case for the low anchors. Only
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14% of respondents gave extremely low estimates when the anchor was low, compared to
15% of people that were not presented with anchors. For all questions, the median of the
estimates from the low anchor was always lower than the median from the calibration
group and the median of high anchor estimates was higher than the median estimate by
the calibration group. Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) also indicated that “the median
subject moved almost halfway toward the anchor, from the estimate that the subject
would have made without it” (p. 1163), indicating that the participants used the anchor to
judge the estimate but adjusted the anchor only half as much as was needed in order to
make the correct estimate. It appears that for a person to make a more accurate estimate
they will need to ignore the anchor and base their estimate on their own knowledge
instead of the cue. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that the same information,
presented differently, could result in people coming up with different answers that could
bias their judgment.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had participants quickly estimate the answers to the
same math problem (8!) that was presented in a different format to each group. Some
participants were told to rapidly answer 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 while another group
was told to rapidly answer 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1. To rapidly answer the question
the participants do the first few calculations (going from left to right). These first few
calculations serve as an anchor for their estimate of what the final answer would be.
Because the first several calculations for the ascending ordered problem leads to a
smaller answer, the people that were presented with the ascending list should estimate a
smaller number than people that were presented with the descending ordered problem.

17

Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) results confirmed this in that the ascending group had
much lower estimates.
Considering the above mentioned experiments, it appears that one of the problems
with using the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is that people tend to bias their
judgment based on this heuristic. The bias in judgment in the direction of the anchor
indicates that people may not be adjusting enough. Epley and Gilovich (2006)
hypothesized that people have a range in which they are comfortable answering the
question. Once the person reaches their range of comfort, they will stop adjusting their
answer. Therefore, the person will give a high estimate when exposed to a high anchor
and give a low estimate when they are exposed to a low anchor. However, Epley and
Gilovich (2006) also found evidence that it is not insufficient adjustment that is
responsible for inaccurate estimates, but instead adjustment is indicative of how available
information, that is consistent with the anchor, is in memory. Apparently, the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic and the, aforementioned, availability heuristic are related, in that
the amount of adjustment is based on how available the anchor is in memory. In other
words, the availability heuristic is used to indicate the likelihood or accuracy of the
anchor. The higher the likelihood, the less the anchor is adjusted, the lower the
likelihood the more the anchor is adjusted.
It appears that whether the anchor is higher or lower than the actual answer is not the
only characteristic of the anchor that influences how the person responds to a question.
Janiszewski and Uy (2008) gave participants detailed real-world scenarios that either
included a rounded anchor (ex. $5,000) or a precise anchor, no more than ±3% of the
rounded anchor (ex. $5,015). The results indicated that a person’s estimate was
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numerically further from the rounded anchor than from the precise anchor. Therefore,
people adjusted their estimate more for the rounded anchors than for the precise anchors.
The representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment heuristics were
three of the more researched heuristics by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). All three of
these heuristics require fewer resources from working memory than using complicated
calculations to come to a more accurate conclusion. On many occasions, these heuristics
result in people making an accurate decision; however, as seen in the previous examples,
there are many ways in which these heuristics may result in a person making an
inaccurate decision. The heuristics are based on the assumption that people are
comparing their decisions to that of basic probability calculations. In other words,
heuristics are based on the assumption that people should use statistics to make decisions
and that when a person makes a decision that deviates from the “correct” statistical
outcome they are making an error in judgment. Other researchers, such as Gigerenzer
(1993) seem to focus decision making research on the idea that people are usually in
situations in which they are not given perfect information and therefore, cannot employ
statistical techniques to make decisions. However, even without all information required
for a person to make a completely educated decision people are still able to make correct
decisions. It appears that researchers that share the same school of thought as Gigerenzer
consider decision making to be a more subjective task while researchers like Tversky and
Kahneman view decision making as a more objective task. The Gigerenzer school of
thought thinks that the person’s experiences in the world aid them in making accurate
decisions, while people in the Kahneman and Tversky school of thought think that people
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are should act more like computation machines that solely use probability and statistical
information to come up with a final answer.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics
Many situations in which a person is making a decision can be analogous to a
detective solving a case. While detectives do not have all of the necessary information to
solve a case, detectives must use the clues that are available to them and some deductive
reasoning to solve the case. The difference between the Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
heuristics (discussed above) and the Fast and Frugal heuristics is based on Simon’s
(1956) idea of bounded rationality. Simon’s (1956) article discusses the idea that people
are more likely to use a subjective rationality than objective rationality, where objective
refers to using more statistical or probabilistic strategy and subjective refers to people
relying on personal experiences. While using a more objective rationality may lead a
human to predict the more likely alternative, subjective rationality is needed due to the
limited amount of time and information that a person may have when making a decision.
The Probabilistic Mental Model (PMM) explains that when people make judgments in
situations in which they do not have all of the necessary information, they use a
subjective rationality (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Fast and frugal heuristics fall within the PMM. The Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
heuristics do not fall within the PMM because Tversky and Kahneman assume that
people make better judgments when they ignore subjective thoughts and rely more on
objective rationality. PMM theory involves heuristics that work in situations in which a
person does not have all the information necessary to use proper calculations to solve the
problem. PMM theory also involves heuristics that are optimal in situations in which a
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person must make a decision quickly and may not have the cognitive resources available
to use more complex calculations. There are many situations in which a person must
calculate an answer but would need a calculator in order to make the calculations.
Considering that people are not always carrying a calculator that could make these
calculations (unless the iPhone has an app for that), people may not have the capacity
(either externally or cognitively) to perform the proper calculations. Gigerenzer (1993)
gave an example in order to explain PMM theory:
Which city has more inhabitants?
(a)

Heidelberg

(b)

Bonn

While there are few people that know the population of each of the two cities, people
may have knowledge about the two cities other than the population. People may use the
information that they do know as probability cues. Probability cues are pieces of
information that a person could use in order to make a decision. Probability cues vary in
terms of ecological validity, and the type of heuristic that a person uses indicates the
order in which they analyze the probability cues. When people are asked a question in
which they do not know the answer, Simon (1955) would argue that people could use a
heuristic known as satisficing to obtain an answer.
The idea of bounded rationality and the PMM lead to Simon’s (1955) idea of
satisficing. Satisficing is a combination of the words sufficing and satisfying (Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 1996). Simon’s (1955) initial idea of satisificing described how people
make decisions when they are confronted with time limitations, do not have all of the
information needed, and have a limited working memory capacity. People have learned
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to adapt to these limitations and have devised tricks to use these limitations as an
advantage instead of a disadvantage. Therefore, the original idea of satisficing involves
people accurately making decisions in situations in which the person does not have
enough information or time to calculate the correct answers using basic statistic or
probability algorithms. When a person is satisficing they must use deductive reasoning to
make a decision in situations in which there is a limited amount of time and information.
Using the above mentioned “which city has more inhabitants” problem, when a
person is satisficing they would use relevant information that they know to deduce an
answer. For example, people may know about professional soccer teams and then may
ask themselves if each of the cities has a professional soccer team. If one city does not
have a professional soccer team, while the other does, then the person may decide that the
city that has a professional soccer team is likely to have more inhabitants than a city that
does not. In this scenario, whether the city has a soccer team is known as a probability
cue, such that, while a person may not know about the population of a city, they could
use information about professional soccer teams to help them distinguish population size
between cities.
If both of the cities have a professional soccer team then the person could move on to
a different probability cue, such as: Is the city the capital of the country? A person can
come up with many probability cues in the decision making process. However, in many
situations, a person will have a limited amount of time to come to a decision, therefore
when satisficing, in Simon’s (1955) original use of the term, a person could use their
limited knowledge to deduce an answer. This idea of satisficing has lead researchers to
come up with several different Fast and Frugal heuristics.
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Several of the fast and frugal heuristics involve multiple probability cues when
making a decision. There are several steps that a person should follow when they are
using a fast and frugal heuristic (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, 2002). The first
step is to make a decision about a minimal score that must be met in order for an
alternative be chosen. In many heuristics, the minimal score would be that the
probability cue is true for one alternative but not for the other. Then the person searches
through the probability cues and chooses an alternative based on the probability cues.
Different heuristics utilize the probability cues in different ways. Gigerenzer (2008)
indicates that the fast and frugal heuristic known as satisficing stops searching through
the probability cues once a probability cue is found that differentiates between the
alternatives (as does the Take the Best heuristic). When a person is using the satisficing
heuristic, the person is searching through the probability cues in a random order in an
attempt to differentiate between the alternatives. Therefore, when a person is satisficing
they do not need to know all possible information to make a decision. In fact, the person
does not analyze all of the information to which they have access. The person stops
analyzing probability cues after the criterion score is met indicating that any probability
cues that would have been analyzed later in the serial order will never be analyzed if a
preceding probability cue distinguishes between alternatives. While this type of heuristic
appears to have many flaws, according to probability and statistical theory, the satisficing
heuristic has the ability to be accurate despite not having all necessary information and
appears to be efficient in situations that involve a limited amount of time.
According to Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, and Martignon (2002), there are three basic
building blocks for fast and frugal heuristics. The first is that there are step-by-step
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procedures. In other words, when a person is using a fast and frugal heuristic they
serially look through information. If the information is enough to make a decision then
the person stops looking through information; if the information is not enough then they
look for more information. Because people want to come to a decision quickly and do
not have enough time to look through all information, they only use as much information
as necessary to make a decision. The second building block is that there are simple
stopping rules. A simple stopping rule means that once a criterion is met the person will
stop looking for relevant information. That is, once one of the probability cues
distinguishes between the alternatives a person will make a decision and no longer look
for additional information. The final building block is one-reason decision making. Onereason decision making means that once a person has stopped looking for information a
person will make their decision based on the final piece of information that was analyzed.
This means that the person can perform any calculation or comparison using the last
piece of information that was found but will only use the last piece of information found
to make the decision.
In conclusion, fast and frugal heuristics are based on the idea that, in the real world,
when people are in a situation in which they need to make a decision, they do not have all
of the information necessary to make the decision. Along with not having all necessary
information, people usually need to make a decision in a relatively short period of time.
Essentially, when making real world decisions, people are in situations in which they do
not have sufficient information and need to make the decision quickly (Gigerenzer, et al.
2002). When the information available to a person is inadequate, it is difficult for a
person to use probability and statistical analyses in order to calculate the most appropriate
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alternative when making a decision. Therefore, people must use a heuristic that can
optimize their ability to make a quick decision when they do not have all the information
needed to make a decision.
There are several heuristics that researchers have labeled as fast and frugal heuristics.
However, research has indicated that the Take the Best heuristic has outperformed all of
the other fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, et al, 2002). Therefore, in the current
paper the only Fast and Frugal heuristic that will be discussed is the Take the Best
heuristic. In the following section the Take the Best heuristic will be discussed in depth.
Take the Best Heuristic
The Take the Best heuristic also falls within the PMM. The Take the Best heuristic is
very similar to the satisficing heuristic in that they are both used in situations in which the
person does not have all the necessary information and must rely on the use of probability
cues to make a decision. The difference between the satisficing and the Take the Best
heuristic is that in the latter, the order in which the person uses the probability cues in the
evaluation process is in a particular order as opposed to the satisficing heuristic in which
the probability cues are analyzed in a random order. The first thing that a person does
when using the Take the Best heuristic is to use the recognition principle (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein,1996). When using the recognition principle, if a person can only recognize
one of the alternatives, then that alternative is chosen. If both of the alternatives are
recognized then the person moves on to the second step. The second step is to determine
the ecological validity of each probability cue and then put them in order from highest
level of ecological validity to lowest level of ecological validity (Gigerenzer, 2008). After
the person has made the order of probability cues, the person evaluates each alternative
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based on the probability cue in order. If the probability cue differentiates between the
alternatives then a decision is made. If the probability cue with the highest ecological
validity does not differentiate the alternatives, then the person moves on to the probability
cue with the second highest ecological validity, and so on. Once a cue discriminates
between the alternatives then a person stops going through the list of probability cues and
makes a decision. If none of the cues can discriminate between the alternatives then an
alternative is chosen at random.
Using a different example, suppose a participant is asked to determine which city has
more inhabitants, Cleveland or Cincinnati. The participant may have access to several
probability cues. Assume that the participant has access to the following probability
cues: a) professional football team, b) professional basketball team, c) professional
baseball team, d) is the city a state capital and e) median household income. For the
purpose of this example, suppose that each had ecological validity values of .86, .93, .65,
.70, and .74, respectively. The ecological validity value is the probability (determined by
the decision maker) that the probability cue can distinguish between alternatives.
Therefore, the first probability cue analyzed would be to see if each city has a
professional basketball team. Currently, of the two cities only Cleveland has a
professional basketball team, therefore, the participant would decide that Cleveland has
more inhabitants than Cincinnati. Because the probability cue that has the highest level
of ecological validity (professional basketball team) distinguishes between the two
alternatives, the person would stop analyzing the probability cues and make the decision
that Cleveland has a larger population than Cincinnati.
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For the sake of the current discussion, imagine that the two probability cues with the
highest ecological validity, in the above example were reversed. In this case, the
probability cue (pro football team) is true for both cities, so the cue with the second
highest level of ecological validity is used, and so on until a probability cue that
distinguishes between the alternatives is found. While the description of the Take the
Best heuristic appears to be inferior when compared to computational formulas, the Take
the Best heuristic appears to be an extremely efficient tool.
When people are using the Take the Best heuristic they are not using all available
knowledge to make a decision. If a person is not using all of the available knowledge
than it is impossible for them to utilize proper statistical or probability theory, therefore,
the Take the Best heuristic may consistently lead people to inaccurate answers.
However, research indicates that the Take the Best heuristic is not only efficient in terms
of ease of use and not requiring a lot of time, but is also efficient in terms of accuracy.
Gigerenzer et al. (2002) compared the minimalist heuristic, Dawe’s Rule, multiple
regression and the Take the Best heuristic. The minimalist heuristic is the same exact
thing as the satisficing heuristic discussed above in that it searches through probability
cues randomly until one of them differentiates between the alternatives, after which it
stops looking for new information. Dawe’s Rule searches for all relevant probability
cues and then gives each alternative a score of 1 or 0 based on each cue. After a score
has been given to each alternative on each cue, the score from each alternative is added
together, the alternative with the highest score is used. Notice that Dawe’s Rule may
seem quick but it involves a lot of working memory capacity to keep all these scores
online, therefore, is fast, but hardly frugal. Multiple regression is a statistical technique
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in which beta weights are assigned to all variables and the variables are put into a
regression equation. Gigerenzer et al. (2002) considers each of the probability cues as a
variable and uses statistical analyses to obtain beta weights for each of the possible
probability cues. The larger the beta weight, the more important that probability cue is in
the regression equation. Therefore, to come to an answer using multiple regression the
person would multiply each probability cue by the beta weight and a decision would be
based on all of the probability cues. The Take the Best heuristic is the same as was
described above.
Gigerenzer et al. (2002) used twenty “real-world environments” and found that when
there was a training session before the experimental session, the fast and frugal heuristics
either outperformed multiple regression, or were barely behind it in terms of accuracy.
Therefore, it was found that fast and frugal heuristics can be as accurate as statistical
models. Gigerenzer et al. (2002) also found that in many situations the Take the Best
heuristic had higher levels of accuracy than the Dawe’s Rule. In one of the situations in
this experiment, Dawe’s Rule used all six probability cues while the Take the Best
heuristic only used 2.4 cues to make a decision. It appears that when the cues that have
less ecological validity are used it makes the accuracy of the decision making process
lower than when only using the probability cue that differentiates between alternatives
with the highest level of ecological validity. Gigerenzer et al. (2002) used situations in
which all of the information was known. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) used
situations that seem to be more similar to the real world; not all of the information was
known. It was found that the Take the Best heuristic works more optimally when less
information is available than when more information is available.
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It appears irrational that a heuristic in which not all of the information is used to make
a decision is better than heuristics in which all of the information is used. Therefore,
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) asked colleagues that did research in the fields of
statistics and economics to create decision making algorithms that would be more
accurate than the Take the Best heuristic. Five algorithms were made by such colleagues:
Tallying, weighted tallying, unit-weight linear model, weighted linear model, and
multiple regression. When using the tallying algorithm, probability cues that are true for
the alternative are given a score of one, if not true a score of zero is given. All of the
scores from all of the probability cues are tallied. The alternative with the highest score
is chosen. Weighted tallying is similar to tallying except that each cue has a weight given
to it that is associated with how ecologically valid the probability cue is. The score for
each cue is multiplied times its weight and then summed together. The alternative with
the highest value is then chosen. The unit-weight linear model involves three possible
scores for each probability cue. If the probability cue is true of the alternative than a
score of +1 is given, if it is false a score of -1 is given, and if the answer to the probability
cue is unknown for the alternative than a score of 0 is given. The scores are summed and
the alternative with the highest sum is chosen. The weighted linear model is the same as
the unit-weight linear model except that each cue is given a weight according to its
ecological validity. The same scoring system as the unit-weight linear model is used
except the score is now multiplied by its ecological validity weight. Like the unit-weight
model, in the weighted linear model the scores for each alternative are summed and the
alternative with the highest sum is taken. Finally, the multiple regression model creates
beta weights. These weights are not the same as ecological validity weights. Instead, a
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beta weight assesses the covariances between the probability cues and calculates the best
possible ways that the cues could be integrated together to make the best decision.
Because the Take the Best algorithm involves using fewer pieces of information than
all of the algorithms created for the Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) experiment, it is
obvious that the Take the Best heuristic is much quicker than the other algorithms. Each
algorithm had performed at peak levels (in terms of accuracy) when the value of all
possible probability cues is known. It was found that the Take the Best algorithm
performed equally if not better than all of the more complicated algorithms, in terms of
accuracy, when the values of all of the probability cues are known. The experiment also
included circumstances in which varying amount of information is known about the
probability cues. Across all levels, the Take the Best algorithm performed better than all
of the created algorithms except for the weighted tallying algorithm, in which it
performed at an equal level. Because the Take the Best algorithm can be performed at a
much quicker pace than the weighted tallying algorithm, the Take the Best algorithm is
seen as superior because the Take the Best algorithm is less time consuming than the
weighted tallying algorithm. Therefore, the Take the Best algorithm is superior to all
competitors, even when algorithms are created with the specific intention of being able to
perform at a higher level than the Take the Best algorithm.
Conclusion of Heuristics
In the previous section there were four heuristics that were discussed in detail:
representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment, and the Take the Best
heuristics. The representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment heuristic
(brought to popularity by Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) suggest that people should
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ignore all subjective information and focus solely on more objective information while
the Take the Best heuristic and other fast and frugal heuristics suggest that people can
capitalize on their subjective experiences to make accurate decisions. Gigerennzer and
Goldstein (1996) suggest that in most situations people do not have all the necessary
information in order to benefit from objective analyses and indicated that the Take the
Best heuristic is better than statistical analysis (multiple regression) when not all
information is present. While it seems that the fast and frugal heuristics are taken from a
more subjective viewpoint (when compared to the Kahneman and Tversky heuristics),
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) used formulas to prove which algorithm is superior.
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) found that the Take the Best heuristic is superior to all
other algorithms that could be created.
The purpose of the remainder of the paper is to discuss how people’s working
memory capacity and their math ability can influence how a person performs on decision
making tasks. The discussion will start by reviewing previous working memory research
then discussing how a person’s working memory capacity can influence their
performance on decision making tasks. After reviewing working memory, discussions on
how people’s math ability can influence their performance on decision making tasks will
follow.
Working Memory
While most constructs are difficult to define, it appears that the construct known as
working memory has proven to be particularly difficult to define, conceptually. There
are two main theories of working memory that are of interest to the current paper. The
first working memory model that will be discussed in this paper is the multicomponential
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model developed by Baddeley (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The other is a more general
model created by Cowan (Cowan, 1988). While both assume that working memory
consists of a limited capacity store that can only work on finite number of tasks at a given
time, there are several differences between the two models.
Baddeley’s original model claimed that working memory consists of three
components: the central executive and the two slave systems, the phonological loop and
visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The first component, the central
executive, is the largest of the three components. While in later publications the tasks
that the central executive was responsible for became more specific, initially the central
executive seemed to be a large amount of working memory resources that could be used
by either of the slave systems. In the original model, the central executive seemed to be
in charge of how and when the two other slave systems should be used. As Baddeley’s
model became more detailed, the central executive was described as being in charge of
three main tasks (Baddeley, 2001). The first task is focusing the person’s attention on a
particular task (Baddeley, 2001). In other words, the central executive has the task of
keeping a person focused on a task and preventing them from being distracted by another
task. The second main task that the central executive is responsible for is controlling a
person’s divided attention (Baddeley, 2001). This indicates that the central executive
aids people in their ability to work on multiple tasks at the same time. Therefore, the
central executive is in charge of both divided and undivided attention. The third task that
the central executive is responsible for is task switching (Baddeley, 2001). This implies
that the central executive is responsible for determining which task has the highest
priority and should be focused on at certain points in time. Essentially, the central
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executive is thought of as the largest component in the multi-component model that is in
charge of the majority of the higher level functions. However, it should be noted that
despite these recent specifications some researchers still consider the central executive to
be somewhat of a homunculus.
The second piece of the multi-component working memory model is the phonological
loop (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The phonological loop is mainly in charge of auditory
information that is currently being worked on. Essentially, the phonological loop
rehearses/stores auditory information so that the information does not fade out of working
memory before the person is done using it. Rehearsal in the phonological loop could be
thought of as repeating the information over and over. Some information is not
transferred from working memory into long term memory. For a person to keep
information online so that it can be used, it must be repeated so that it is not lost.
Therefore, the rehearsal function of the phonological loop serves to keep information in
working memory.
The third piece of Baddeley’s multi-component model of working memory is the
visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). This component’s function is to
maintain visual and spatial information for a limited amount of time. The visuospatial
sketchpad is thought to allow people to mentally manipulate the landscape of a scene
(Baddeley, 2001). For example, consider a situation when a person is mentally working
on a subtraction problem by visualizing the numbers. If confronted with a borrowing
operation, the person must mentally subtract one from the digit on the left and place a one
in front of the digit on the right. Theoretically, both of these manipulations are done
within the person’s visuospatial sketchpad. In this example, not only are the numbers
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being manipulated but the individual must remember all of the manipulations that have
been done throughout the course of the problem to solve the problem accurately.
Conrad and Hull (1964) found that when the words in a list sound similar to one
another, people have a difficult time accurately recalling the words in serial order. Also,
Baddeley, Thomson, and Buchanan (1975) found that as the length of the words
increased, the participants had a more difficult time recalling the words on the list. The
longer that the words are, the fewer times each word could be rehearsed in a limited
period of time. Therefore, the words are less rehearsed and more likely to be forgotten.
While the visuospatial sketchpad has been studied less than the phonological loop, there
has been evidence of a phonological loop. Baddeley, Grant, Wight, and Thomson (1975)
found that visually following an object caused declines in performance on other spatial
tasks. However, Brooks (1967) found that recall of spatial information was disrupted
more by a visual task than an auditory task. These studies indicate that there are both a
visual and an auditory system of working memory and that when two tasks involve the
same system there are more cognitive deficits than if the two tasks require different slave
systems.
There have been several questions about working memory that could not be answered
by Baddeley’s (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) three component model. As stated earlier, there
are a finite number of tasks or stimuli that a person can keep in working memory at a
single point in time. There are several strategies that a person can utilize in order to
increase the amount of information that could be stored in working memory at any given
point in time. One such strategy is chunking. To increase the amount of information that
can stay in working memory people can combine several individual pieces of information
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into a single, more complex, piece of information. For example, when a person is asked
to remember a string of numbers they may try to group the single numbers into more
complex numbers, like years (e.g., 1, 4, 9, and 2 can be combined into 1492). While the
concept of chunking seems very basic (e.g. Miller, 1956), Baddeley’s three component
model could not explain the process of chunking (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In many
situations, chunking converts more complex stimuli into more manageable pieces of
information by relating the information to something that is already stored in long term
memory. In the example above, 1492 is not a random year, but is stored in long-term
memory as when Columbus set sail from Spain. Therefore, another component of
working memory was required in order to answer questions about a working memory
system that could retrieve information from long term memory.
More recently, the episodic buffer was added to Baddeley’s working memory model
(Baddeley, 2001). Initially, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model assumed that each of the
two slave systems consisted of stores of limited capacity and that the main component
(the central executive) mostly dealt with controlling how much attention a task is going to
receive. However, none of these three systems is interacting with long term memory.
Not only does the episodic buffer incorporate information that is currently in working
memory with information that is in long term memory, but the episodic buffer also serves
as a translator so the information in the two slave systems can be integrated together.
Previously, it was assumed that the two slave systems were using two different types of
code resulting in the two slave systems being unable to communicate with one another.
The episodic buffer is able to integrate the information in the phonological loop and
visuospatial sketchpad.
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Cowan’s (2005) more general model of working memory assumes that working
memory is not divided into several components but instead, working memory includes a
number of processes that can keep a limited amount of information accessible for a
limited amount of time. Cowan (2005) points out that there are more types of
information than just visuospatial and auditory. Therefore, there are an infinite number
of possible slave systems that could be applicable to working memory, resulting in a
more general working memory model being more appropriate than a more specific multicomponential model. However, Cowan’s (1988) model did emphasize two main types of
information that are in working memory. The first is the information that is currently
active in working memory and the other type of information is the information that is the
focus of attention. When there are several tasks that people are working on, there could
be several pieces of information that are currently being used in working memory. Even
if a person has several pieces of information in working memory at any point in time,
only a small subset of that information could be focused on at any given point in time.
Essentially, there are many pieces of information that are active in working memory;
however, only several of those pieces of information have the attention of the person.
It appears that the main discrepancy between Cowan’s (1988) working memory
model and Baddeley’s (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) working memory model is the idea of
specific functions are assigned to specific components in Baddeley’s model but not in
Cowan’s model. Research involving working memory has indicated that verbal stimuli
and visual stimuli do not cause as much disruption with one another as stimuli that come
from the same domain. The lack of disruption is interpreted to mean that there are
multiple components of working memory. Reisberg, Rappaport, and O’Shaughnessy
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(1984) did a study in which participants used their fingers to hold information in working
memory, indicating that people can use their fingers to work on information in working
memory without interfering with information supposedly being held by the phonological
loop or visuospatial sketchpad. Reisberg et al. (1984) found evidence that there is no
limit to the number of slave systems that could be found for working memory. While
there is some doubt about the various slave systems in Baddeley’s model, Cowan’s model
is very general and non-committal. For the current paper, working memory will not be
viewed as a multi-component model, but instead the idea of a finite amount of working
memory resources will be the essential characteristic of working memory. Therefore,
instead of looking at the more general construct of working memory, it is important to
look more specifically at individual differences in working memory capacity.
Barrett, Tugade, and Engle (2004) indicated that the construct of working memory
capacity is similar to that of the function of the central executive component of
Baddeley’s working memory model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). As stated earlier, the
central executive is responsible for controlling and focusing a person’s attention.
Therefore, people with a larger working memory capacity should be better at controlling
their attention than a people with a smaller working memory capacity. Also, people with
a larger working memory capacity should be more skilled at focusing their attention on
two separate tasks at the same time than people with a smaller working memory capacity.
To test a person’s working memory capacity, there have been many working memory
span tasks that have been created. Many of the span tasks that are discussed in the
following section are testing people’s ability to focus their attention on two tasks at the
same time. Earlier it was discussed that all of the working memory models have the
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underlying assumption that there are a finite amount of working memory resources.
Therefore, when a person is working on multiple tasks, the tasks should compete for
working memory resources (depending on the difficulty, familiarity, etc. of the tasks).
The most important aspect of each of the following span tasks is that the processing
component of each task must interfere with the rehearsal component of the task (Conway,
et al., 2005). Because the tasks are competing for working memory resources, people
with smaller working memory capacities will show deficits in performance on one, if not
both, of the tasks that they are working on at the same time, while the people with larger
working memory capacities will show fewer deficits in performance.
As stated earlier, working memory span tasks involve a person working on two tasks
at the same time. More specifically, most span tasks involve maintaining information
while processing information from another task simultaneously. One version of a
working memory span task is the Operation Span (O-SPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989)
Task. In this task a person is shown a math problem with a given answer; their task is to
indicate whether or not the given answer is the correct answer for the stated math
problem. Following the response to the math problem the person is shown a word. At
the end of the math problem and word pair set, the person is asked to recall each of the
presented words. The number of math problems and word pairs in a set typically varies
between two and six pairings per set. While Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle (2005)
prefer to have the set size of the math problem and word pairings vary from set to set,
others prefer to have the size of the sets increase, progressively, throughout the task. In
the progressively increasing format of the O-SPAN, there are usually three sets of the two
math problem and word pairings, then three sets of three math problem and word
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pairings, and so on. The benefit of the format used in Unsworth, et al. (2005) is that the
participants are not able to predict the size of the subsequent set. However, the O-SPAN
task is a difficult task and is built on the idea that people are focusing their attention on
two separate tasks, if people are trying to predict how many pairings will be in the next
set than there may be a third task that the person is working on. Therefore, it makes more
sense to stick with the format in which the sets are presented in a progressively increasing
order so that there are only two tasks that are competing for working memory resources.
The Reading Span (R-SPAN) task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) was one of the
earlier working memory span tasks. In the R-SPAN the participants are told to read the
sentences out loud and are told that they are expected to recall the last word of each
sentence. At the conclusion of the set the participant is to recall the last word of each
sentence. The number of sentences progressively increased from set to set. As stated
earlier, span tasks are built on the assumption that one of the tasks involves processing
information while the other task is maintaining information. In the original R-SPAN, it is
difficult to tell if the person is actually processing the sentences or just reading the
sentences out loud while only paying attention to the final word of the sentence. To
make sure that the person is focusing attention on reading the sentences, the second
experiment of Daneman and Carpenter’s (1980) study required the participants to verify
the validity of the sentence by responding true or false at the end of the sentence. The
validation component of this experiment ensures that the participants are not only
maintaining information but are also processing information simultaneously.
While the two previously discussed span tasks are more for adults, the Counting Span
Task (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982) can also be used to test a child’s working
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memory capacity. In their original counting span task the participants were given cards
with dots on them. They were to count the dots on each card. At the end of the set, the
participants were to recall how many dots were on each card. In the more current
Counting Span Task, the participants are shown varying numbers of shapes and are told
that they will be asked to remember the number of shapes for later recall (Conway, et al.,
2005). The task starts at two counting and number recall pairs in a set, then three
counting and number recall pairs in a set and progressively increases up to five. While
this task is appropriate for children due to its low level of difficulty, the level of difficulty
will cause a ceiling effect among adults. Therefore, the experiment was altered in order
to be used on adults. On the adult version of the counting span task, an array of the same
shapes in various colors is shown. The task is to count the number of shapes in a certain
color while not being allowed to point at the array and the participants are asked to recall
the number of shapes counted for each stimulus per set. As with the children’s version,
the sets become progressively larger throughout the task.
There have been many articles that have used working memory span tasks to assess a
person’s working memory capacity and many of them have used different scoring
systems Conway, et al., 2005). Many studies used a criterion based system in which the
participant must meet a certain criterion (example: 4 out of five correct). The criterionbased system assumes that within the span task the number of items in each set
progressively increases throughout the task. If the participant were to correctly recall
every answer in the set that included two, three, and four stimuli and then answered only
three out of five correctly on the set of five pairings than the person would be given a
working memory span of four. In a criterion based system, a person is given a span score
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based on the highest number of pairings in which the person was able to meet the
criterion. While this method of scoring made it simple to group participants based on
their working memory span, there was plenty of data that the participant recorded that is
ignored because the person did not meet the criterion on those trials. Therefore, a better
method of scoring needed to be developed.
Unsworth, et al. (2005) sought to find a more appropriate method of scoring. To
ensure that the participants were paying attention to the processing component of the
task, the participants must achieve 85% accuracy on the processing component of the task
for the remainder of their data to be analyzed. A debate as to which is the best scoring
procedure for the recall portion of the task arose where half of the debate was between an
all-or-nothing versus a partial credit scoring system. As the names suggest, the all-ornothing scoring system means that credit is given only if the entire item is correctly
recalled while the partial credit scoring system still gave credit for partially correct
answers. The other half of the debate was whether all items should count for the same
credit (unit-based) or should the more difficult items be weighted so they count for more
points (load-weighted). The results of the Unsworth, et al. (2005) experiment indicated
that the partial scoring system proved to be superior over the all-or-nothing scoring
system while the unit-based system showed only moderate advantages over the loadweighted scoring system. Also the unit-based system appears to be a more objective
system than the load-weighted system. It appears that a unit-based partial scoring system
is the most appropriate system for scoring a working memory span task.
While span tasks are good at determining a person’s working memory capacity, dual
task paradigms are a good way of determining how people perform on a task when they
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are unable to devote all of their attention to that single task. In a dual task paradigm there
is a competition for working memory resources between the two tasks. The difference
between a span task and the dual task paradigm is that the researchers are more interested
in a person’s working memory capacity in the span task, while in the dual task paradigm,
researchers are more interested in determining how performance on a particular task is
influenced when a person cannot devote all of their attention to that task. The dual task
paradigm is an effective way for researchers to manipulate the working memory load of a
task.
Pashler, Harris, and Neuchterlein (2008) note that when working on multiple tasks at
the same time, a bottleneck may occur. This bottleneck causes declines in performance
on both of the tasks. Pashler, et al. (2008) found that this was also the case in decision
making tasks (Iowa Gambling Task; see Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994
for a description). They found that in the dual task block of trials, people were slower at
making decisions than in the control blocks of trials. While there is evidence that people
are slower at making decisions in dual task trials than control trials, the nature of the
Iowa Gambling Task makes it difficult to assess people’s accuracy when making
decisions in a dual task paradigm.
In the current experiment, a tone recognition task will be used in a dual task
paradigm. In some of the experimental tasks, the tone recognition task will be paired
with various decision making tasks, while in other experimental tasks, the tone
recognition task will be paired with a subtraction task (discussed in detail in the methods
section). It is important that the same secondary task is used throughout all experimental
tasks in order to maintain consistent task difficulty. Considering Baddeley’s (2001)
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multicomponent working memory model, it appears that the tone task will not interfere
with the reading associated with the decision making task more than with the math
computations associated with the subtraction task. The opposite is also true. Pashler
(1994) notes that even a simple task can cause limitations in performance on the primary
task. Since some of the tasks in the current experiment could be rather difficult, it makes
sense that the secondary task be somewhat simplistic while not interfering more with one
primary task than another primary task.
Working memory has been shown to be related to many other constructs that are used
in the field of psychology. Working memory correlates significantly with comprehension
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and general intelligence (Jensen, 1980). This indicates
that constructs that involve higher levels of processing by a person are also related to the
construct of working memory capacity. Brewin and Beaton (2002) found that people
with higher working memory spans were better at suppressing thoughts that were
irrelevant to the task at hand than low working memory span individuals. Working
memory span tasks (described above) essentially test the ability of a person to work on
two tasks at the same time. Therefore, people that have high working memory spans are
better at working on multiple tasks simultaneously than people with low working
memory spans.
There are many studies that have indicated that a person’s working memory capacity
influences their ability to work on several tasks at the same time (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001;
Kane & Engle, 2000) This has especially been seen as the case when one of the tasks
involves math (Ayres, 2001). The span tasks were built on the premise that people with
larger working memory capacities would be better at working on several tasks at the
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same time (Unsworth, et al., 2005). When a person is working on multiple tasks, each of
which requires working memory resources, a competition for the working memory
resources ensues. The more difficult the tasks are, the more resources that they require
(Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001).
Research has also indicated that people with smaller working memory spans use less
difficult strategies when working on a reasoning task than people with larger working
memory spans (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004). Knowing that people with larger
working memory spans use more complicated strategies when working on a task than
people with smaller working memory spans, Beilock and DeCaro (2007) conducted a
study in order to determine the differences in strategy use between people with high
working memory spans and low working memory spans in situations with various levels
of pressure. Beilock, Kulp, Holt and Carr (2004) illustrated that environmental pressure
can consume working memory resources, which will result in pressure and the task
competing for working memory resources. Beilock and DeCaro (2007) found that when
the situation did not involve pressure the low working memory span people used a
simpler strategy while high working memory span people used more difficult strategies.
However, when the situations did involve pressure, both the high and low working
memory span participants used the simpler strategy. While the Copeland and Radvansky
(2004) experiment implies that the size of someone’s working memory span indicates
how difficult of a strategy they will have the ability to use when working on a task, the
Beilock and DeCaro (2007) experiment indicates that in addition to this, when there is a
competition for working-memory resources people with high working memory spans
perform tasks in a similar fashion to people with a low working-memory span.
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Therefore, when tasks do not involve a competition for working memory resources,
people with high working-memory spans can use more complex strategies than people
with low working-memory spans. However, when there is a competition for workingmemory resources, people with high and low working memory spans use similar types of
strategies.
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) argue that it is not the size of working memory that is
indicative of the differences in performance, but it is the efficiency that the person has at
processing the stimuli. In other words, the differences between people in their working
memory capacity is not determined by the amount of space that is available in working
memory, but it is how efficient a person is at processing the stimuli and the type of
strategy that they can use to work on the task. A person that is more efficient uses fewer
resources to process the task while a person that is less efficient uses more resources to
process the task. Therefore, processing efficiency could be another reason that people
with larger working memory capacities have the ability to use more complicated
strategies when working on a task than people with a smaller working memory capacity.
For the reasons listed above, it is possible that working memory will have an impact on a
person’s ability to make decisions. In the following section some of the previous
decision making tasks will be discussed as well as why it is expected that these tasks will
be influenced by a person’s working memory capacity.
Working Memory and Decision Making
While many constructs (e.g. intelligence) seem to be influenced by a person’s
working memory capacity, research on how working memory affects a person’s ability to
make decisions appears to be inconclusive. However, there appears to be some clear
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evidence about the relationship between working memory load and decision making. A
researcher can manipulate working memory load in a variety of ways. Hinson, Jameson,
and Whitney (2003) manipulated working memory load by varying the number of
alternatives that are to be assessed when the participants were making their decision. In
this task a person was given an option to take less money now or more money at later
periods of time. The more alternatives that were available, the higher the working
memory load. The results of the experiment indicated that as working memory load
increased the participants became more impulsive (i.e., they preferred a smaller amount
of money immediately rather than a larger sum of money that they would have to wait
for). Therefore, the more working memory resources that a task requires, the more likely
people are to act impulsively. Whitney, Rinehart and Hinson (2008) confirmed this
finding and also found that the amount of working memory load that the task requires
determines the heuristic that the person will choose to make the decision which
ultimately determines how risky/impulsive of a decision the person will make.
De Neys (2006a and 2006b) found some interesting evidence for the role of working
memory in decision making. In De Neys’ (2006a) experiment the participants completed
a syllogistic reasoning task, which was the primary task in a dual task paradigm; the
secondary task was dot matrix recall task in which the participants were presented with a
dot matrix prior to the syllogism and then had to recreate the matrix after answering the
syllogism question. Some of the participants were not given the matrix recall task (no
load), others saw easy to recall matrices (low load), while others saw difficult to recall
matrices (high load). The participants in the low working memory load group performed
better on the reasoning task than people in the high working memory load group. Also,
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the participants were grouped based on their scores on the operation span (O-span) task.
It was found that the low span group showed greater decreases in performance with the
high load than the high working memory span group. Considering Beilock and DeCaro’s
(2007) finding, one would think that the high span group would show more declines in
performance than the low span group. The two experiments results may be different due
to Beilock and DeCaro’s experiment manipulating working memory load as a within
subjects variable and De Neys’ manipulating load as a between subjects variable.
De Neys’ (2006b) sought to gain a better understanding of when people use System 1
versus when people use System 2 to make a decision. In the first experiment in this
article participants were asked questions similar to that of the “Linda Problem” as well as
other decision making tasks. It was found that participants that answered the “Linda
Problem” correctly (presumably using System 1) took longer to give a response than
people who committed the conjunction fallacy (presumably using System 2). In the third
experiment in this article the decision making tasks were paired with a dot matrix recall
task (similar to that in De Neys 2006a).

One group of participants was asked to recall

complicated matrices while the other group was asked to recall easier matrices; therefore,
working memory load was a between subjects factor. The results of this experiment
indicated that the more difficult the secondary task was, the more likely the participants
were to fall victim to the conjunction fallacy. In this third experiment the participants
were also subjected to the O-span task. It was found that working memory capacity had a
positive relationship with their scores on the “Linda Problem”, indicating that the higher
a person’s working memory capacity is, the more likely they are to give a correct
response to problems like the “Linda Problem”.
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These experiment by De Neys (2006a and 2006b) have several implications. The first
article (2006a) indicated that people with higher working memory spans are better at
reasoning tasks than people with lower working memory spans. Also, this article
illustrates that the amount of working memory resources that the task requires impacts
how well a person performs on reasoning tasks. The second article (2006b) looks more at
participants’ performance on decision making tasks by using tasks that are in classic
decision making research. It was found that people that have higher working memory
capacities are less prone to making errors in decision making tasks. The results from this
experiment also indicate that the amount of resources that the task requires impacts task
performance. It was also found the people in the low load group made fewer errors, in
accordance with the conjunction fallacy, than people in the high load group. It was found
that the two groups did not differ in terms of working memory capacity, therefore, the
differences in responses between the working memory load groups was due to the load of
the problems and not due to differences in capacity.
These articles seem to integrate the research from Copeland and Radvansky (2004)
and Beilock and DeCaro (2007). Remember Copeland and Radvansky’s research
indicated that people with higher working memory capacities could use more
complicated strategies when working on a task than people with lower working memory
capacities, which was supported by the ideas in both of the De Neys (2006a and 2006b).
Beilock and DeCaro found that higher capacity people use more complicated strategies
when the working memory load of the task is low but revert to more simplistic strategies
(like low span participants) when the task had a high working memory load. It is
hypothesized that if working memory load was manipulated as a within subjects variable
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in the De Neys studies that the high span group would regress to perform in the same
matter as the low span participants. The De Neys articles theorize that people use
heuristic responding as the default response, but will use more complicated strategies in
situations when they have the available knowledge or resources to do so, which seems to
coincide with the results of the Beilcok and DeCaro study.
While there appears to be clear evidence that the amount working memory load can
influence how a person makes decisions, the evidence is not as straight forward for
working memory capacity. Brőder (2003) had subjects participate in a fairly complicated
stock market game and found that neither working memory capacity nor working
memory load influenced the strategy that a person used to arrive at a decision. The fact
that working memory load did not influence the person’s decision making strategy is
counterintuitive to the previously mentioned research. Considering Copeland and
Radvansky’s (2004) finding that working memory capacity influences strategy use, it is
of interest that Brőder (2003) did not find that strategy use is a function of working
memory capacity. However, Brőder’s (2003) task seemed very complicated. As
discussed earlier, Beilock and DeCaro (2007) found that when the situation consumes a
substantial amount of working memory resources, even the high working memory span
people opt for more simple strategies. Because Brőder’s (2003) task was so difficult, it
may have forced high working memory span participants to regress to simpler strategies,
which may be why no difference was observed between the span groups.
In many situations in which people must make a decision, people need to make
probability judgments. Dougherty and Hunter (2003) provided participants with a menu
and then indicated what a group of regular customers ordered from the menu of thirty-
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two items over a 74 day period. The participants were then shown a regular customer
paired with a menu item and were asked to judge the probability of the person ordering
that item. Later, the participants were shown each menu item, one at a time, and asked to
judge the probability that the menu item was ordered. A judgment was determined to be
subadditive if the sum of the person’s judged probabilities deviated from one hundred.
While this is hardly a decision making task, this experiment is showing how well people
can make judgments of probabilities. It was found that working memory capacity was
significantly correlated with probability judgments, such that people with higher working
memory capacities were less subadditive (deviated less from 100) than people with lower
working memory spans. As discussed earlier, many heuristics require people to make
probability judgments. Therefore, working memory capacity should have an influence on
a person’s ability to make a decision when using heuristics. In a second experiment,
Dougherty and Hunter (2003) asked participants to make judgments on how likely a
person was to be from a particular state under different time constraint conditions.
Participants were to use knowledge of the populations of the state in order to make this
judgment. It was found that when there was no time constraint, the correlation between
working memory span and the judgments was not significant. However, this correlation
was significant when there were time constraints.

When there was no time constraint

the participants must have regressed to performing in the same manner as lower working
memory span people, but when there was a time constraint the high working memory
span participants could use more complicated strategies than the low span people. This
seems to go against the findings of Beilock and Decaro (2007). Dougherty and Hunter
discussed that the results from their experiment also indicate that working memory span
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has an impact on the number of alternatives that a person can compare when making a
decision.
Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger and Harbison (2008) discuss that a person’s working
memory capacity determines the upper limit of alternatives that a person can maintain at
any point in time. Therefore, when there are a lot of alternatives that must be analyzed in
order to make a decision, people with a higher working memory span will have a clear
advantage because they have the ability to analyze more options than people with lower
working memory spans. Salthouse (1992) found a negative correlation between working
memory capacity and processing speed, such that as working memory capacity increased,
the amount of time that it took to process the task decreased. This negative correlation
implies that people that have a higher working memory span should be able to come up
with more alternatives than people with lower working memory spans. Therefore, when
there is a limited amount of time to make a decision, people with higher working memory
spans will have more information to utilize than people with lower working memory
spans.
Several of the decision-making tasks that are found in the classic decision making
literature appear to be vulnerable to differences in a person’s working memory capacity.
For the purposes of this paper, people are making a decision any time that they are asked
to choose between several options. In these situations people should calculate the
likelihood for each of the options and then choose the option that is best for them
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). As discussed above, there are many situations in
which a person does not have all of the necessary information and has a limited amount
of time to make a decision. In the following section, each of the above detailed heuristics
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will be discussed again to determine how a person’s working memory capacity can
influence their performance. Instead of presenting the same reason that working memory
capacity will influence a person’s performance for each heuristic, it should be assumed
that the reasons that working memory capacity could influence people’s decision making
performance are similar for all heuristics.
Representativeness Heuristic and Working Memory
Recall that, the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) is when
a person determines the likelihood of an event based on how similar the event is to the
population of similar events. In many of the experiments on the representativeness
heuristic, the participant must choose from an array of options. The “Linda Problem” is
an example of a task in which people use the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and
Kahneman’s, 2002 “Linda Problem” can be found on page six of this paper).
Remember, participants in the “Linda Problem” experiment are asked to put the
options in order of how much they represent the character sketch of Linda. Therefore,
the participants will need to keep the order of the options online in working memory and
update the list after each subsequent option is read. The tasks of (1) reading and
analyzing each option and (2) storing and updating the order of the options will compete
for working memory resources. This competition should result in people with larger
working memory spans performing better on this task than people with smaller working
memory spans. The competition for working memory resources may cause the people
with smaller working memory spans to rely on the representativeness heuristic while the
people with larger spans may attempt a more difficult strategy, such as utilizing statistical
or probability theories.
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Another finding in the “Linda Problem” is that people are prone to making the
conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy may be due to people with low working
memory spans going to a default heuristic instead of carefully thinking about each of the
options. People with higher working memory spans may have more working memory
resources available to work on the “Linda Problem” and could use those resources to
check for errors, like the conjunction fallacy. Therefore, it is possible that when decision
making tasks result in a competition for working memory resources, the participants that
have a high working memory capacity will have a distinct advantage and will perform at
higher rates of accuracy than people with low working memory capacities. Because the
difficulty of a task like the “Linda Problem” is high, people with higher working memory
spans should be able to use more complicated strategies than people with lower working
memory spans (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007).
There are many experiments that have found that the more that something is practiced
the more automatic the task becomes (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). When
something is done automatically it requires fewer working memory resources (Spelke,
Hirst, & Neisser, 1976). Therefore, when people have a lot of experience in a certain
field, the decision that they make in their field should become somewhat automatic, or at
least require fewer working memory resources. Tversky and Kahneman (2002) discussed
an experiment in which they gave physicians a scenario and asked them to rate the
options in terms of how representative they are of the scenario; similar to the format used
in the aforementioned “Linda Problem”.
Tversky and Kahneman (2002) presented physicians with a series of scenarios. The
physicians task was to rank a list of diagnoses from most to least likely. The results
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indicated that roughly 20% of the time the physicians chose the option that consisted of
the conjunction of the unlikely and likely subcomponent over the option that only
consisted of the unlikely subcomponent. As stated earlier, the combination of two
subcomponents is never as likely as just one of the individual subcomponents. Because
the physicians in this experiment should have an expertise in answering these types of
questions, it would make sense that when working on this task these physicians should
have working memory resources left-over that would be able to find the error in judgment
and make a correction. Instead, it seems that the physicians became reliant on the
heuristic. It is possible that physicians with a higher working memory capacity would be
less likely to fall for the conjunction fallacy than the physicians with lower working
memory capacities. Differences in performance may not be due to people with higher
working memory capacity having a “fact checker” but instead it may be that people with
higher working memory spans are using different strategies than people with lower
working memory spans. Because this type of task should be automatic for physicians the
task should not have a high level of difficulty, therefore, people with higher working
memory capacities will be able to use more complicated strategies for making a decision
than the lower span people. Research is needed to determine why it is that physicians
responding in accordance with the conjunction fallacy.
Tversky and Kahneman (2002) indicated that expertise did not prevent people from
using heuristics instead of more complex strategies, instead there must be some other
factor that influences the type of strategy a person will use when making a decision.
Copeland and Radvansky's (2004) finding that people with larger working memory
capacities are able to use more complex strategies than people with smaller working
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memory capacities combined with the Tversky and Kahneman (2002) finding has led to
the idea that it is not a person's expertise that predicts the type of strategy a person will
use, instead it is their working memory capacity.
As discussed earlier, there are two different systems that a person can use when
making a decision. System 1 is less effortful and allows people to work on multiple tasks
at the same time, therefore requiring fewer working memory resources. System 2 is more
effortful, involves more complicated calculations, and requires more working memory
resources. Considering that people with higher working memory capacities can utilize
more complicated strategies than people with lower working memory capacities, it
appears that people with higher working memory capacities are better able to use System
2 while people with lower working memory capacities will be more likely to use heuristic
based strategies ( System 1). Consider the coin tossing example discussed earlier.
Suppose that a participant is asked to determine which sequence of coin tosses is more
likely: HTHT or HHTT. When the people with lower working memory capacities would
make a decision as to which coin toss sequence is more likely they would probably use
System 1 for making a decision and claim that the first sequence (HTHT) is more likely
because it appears more similar to the population of events. However, a person with a
higher working memory span will be more likely to utilize System 2 and, thus, may use a
more complicated calculation. A person with a higher working memory span might be
able to use the appropriate calculation of ½ x ½ x ½ x ½ for each of the two alternatives
(HTHT and HHTT), indicating that both of the alternatives are equally likely. Therefore,
it is possible that because the people with higher working memory capacities are more
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likely to use a more complex strategy, this will make them more accurate than those
people with lower working memory capacities, who are more likely to use System 1.
Availability Heuristic and Working Memory
It appears that a person’s working memory capacity may also influence their ability to
use the availability heuristic in order to make a decision under uncertainty. Again, when
people are using the availability heuristic they judge the likelihood of an event by how
easily instances similar to that event could be retrieved from memory. Similarly to the
representativeness heuristic, people that have higher working memory capacities will be
more likely to have a “fact checking” type of function and use more complicated
strategies while people with lower working memory capacities will not have a “fact
checking” function because they will rely on the less complicated System 1. In addition
to that advantage, when using the availability heuristic people with higher working
memory capacities will have another advantage over people with lower working memory
capacities.
There are several experiments that indicate that people with higher working memory
capacities are better at ignoring irrelevant information. For example, Kane and Engle
(2003) used a Stroop task and found that participants with low working memory spans
exhibited longer reaction times and had higher error rates than the participants with
higher working memory capacities. Due to the simplicity of the task, it is clear that the
participants lost sight of the goal of the experiment (naming the color of the font) and
instead switched to the more automatic task (reading the word on the screen aloud) while
the higher span participants did not lose sight of the goal of the experiment.
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As discussed earlier, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) presented participants with lists
of male’s and female’s names of varying popularity and the goal of the participants was
to not only recall as many names as they could but to also determine whether there were
more male or female names presented on the list. The results indicated that the
participants determined the frequency of the gender names by the popularity of the names
on the list instead of by the number of names on the list. Apparently, the participants
were forgetting the goal of the task and instead were basing their decision on popularity
of the names. Therefore, people with higher working memory capacities should be better
at determining the frequency of each gender in this task than people with lower working
memory capacities. Even though it is easier for a person to remember a more popular
name than it is for them to remember a less popular name, people with higher working
memory capacities should have an easier time of ignoring the irrelevant information
(popularity of name) and focus more on the relevant information (the number of names in
each gender). Thus, the idea that people with higher working memory capacities are able
to ignore irrelevant information and focus on the task at hand may also be a factor when a
person is using the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic and Working Memory
Now consider the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. In many
experiments people are placing too much emphasis on the anchor and are therefore
adjusting their answer in the direction of the anchor. Therefore, it may be beneficial to
ignore the anchor and focus their attention on their estimate instead of the anchor. It is
possible that the people with a higher working memory capacity will be better at ignoring
the anchor than people with a smaller working memory capacity. In the 8! example listed
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above, people with higher working memory capacities should be more likely to ignore the
order of the presentation of the question (1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 versus 8 X 7 X
6 X 5 4 X 3 X 2 X 1) and focus more of their attention on the math problem. Low
working memory span people will most likely rely too much on the anchor. While the
first several calculations would serve as an anchor for the low working memory span
people, the high working memory span people would be able to make greater adjustments
to the anchor because they would (a) get through more of the calculations than the lower
span people and (b) be able to adjust their answer more appropriately because they would
pay more attention to all of the numbers, overall, instead of being hyper-focused on the
anchor (first few calculations).
Take The Best Heuristic and Working Memory
Working memory span tasks (e.g., Turner & Engle, 1987), essentially, determine how
well a person is at working at multiple tasks concurrently (Unsworth, et al., 2005). When
a person is using the Take the Best heuristic they must think of as many probability cues
as possible, order them in terms of ecological validity, and then assess the alternatives
based on the probability cues (in order). For a person to use the Take the Best heuristic,
they must work on several tasks concurrently. Because people with higher working
memory spans are better at working on multiple tasks at the same time, it is possible that
people with a higher working memory capacity should be better at using the Take the
Best heuristic than people with a lower working memory span.
Salthouse’s (1992) experiment found a positive correlation between working memory
capacity and processing speed. Remember, when using the Take the Best heuristic
participants’ search their memory for probability cues that will help them make a
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decision. Considering Salthouse’s (1992) findings, it would make sense that people with
higher working memory spans will be able to find more probability cues than people with
a lower working memory span. The more probability cues that a person has access to
increases the likelihood of having a probability cue that has a high level of ecological
validity that distinguishes between the alternatives. Therefore, people with higher
working memory spans are likely to have access to more probability cues that will allow
them to make better decisions than people with lower working memory spans
Summary of Working Memory and Heuristics
It appears that there are several ways that a person’s working memory capacity can
influence their ability to make decisions. A person’s working memory capacity
influences how many items a person can keep online at any point in time and also
influences the type of strategy a person can use when working on a task. Working
memory capacity not only influences whether or not a person will be able to ignore
irrelevant information but also influences how many tasks a person can work on
simultaneously. Many of the heuristics that have been discussed in this paper appear to
have a mathematical component. In the following section there will be a description of
why it is thought that mathematical ability can influence a person’s decision making
ability.
Math Ability and Decision Making Ability
Obviously a person who performs at a higher level on standardized math tests is more
skilled at math than people that score lower on standardized math tests. Research has
also indicated that as math ability increases so does the number of math classes taken at
both the high school and college levels (Hembree, 1990). Therefore, people who are
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more skilled at math are exposed to a wider variety of math topics and acquire a greater
number sense than people who are less skilled at math. While many students are exposed
to basic probability theories in grade school, many students do not take advance
probability or statistics courses, which indicates that many people probably do not have a
firm understanding of probabilities or statistics. Many of the heuristics (that are
described above) appear to be influenced by basic probability and statistical theorems.
Hypothetically, people who are exposed to these types of mathematical courses should be
better prepared to make decisions than people who have not been exposed to such
classes. Also, because people who are better at math take more math classes they use
their math skills much more frequently than people who are not as skilled at math,
indicating that people who are better at math have a lot more practice at math than people
who are not as skilled at math. Therefore, math should become a more automatic process
and should consume fewer working memory resources for people who are more skilled at
math than for people who are less skilled at math.
Consider the representativeness heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) presented
participants with a question involving the number of male and female babies born in two
different hospitals (see page 10). A basic statistics course will teach students that the
larger the sample size, the more likely it is to be representative of the population. The
reverse also must be true; the smaller the sample size the less likely it is to be
representative of the population. Therefore, the answer to the above scenario is
obviously the smaller hospital. However, without being exposed to a basic statistics
course the answer is not obvious. Even for people who have taken a basic statistics
course the answer may not be obvious. However, to a person who has taken several
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statistics courses, the answer should be obvious. In fact, someone without knowledge of
statistics is likely to answer that the hospitals will record an equal number of such days,
indicating that there is a fifty-fifty chance. As indicated above, most decisions require a
person to choose between alternatives and a person must decide which scenario is more
likely. These types of decisions become increasingly more difficult without a basic
knowledge of statistics and probability.
Now, consider the coin toss example and the idea of the gambler’s fallacy. Based on
an infinite number of coin tosses, which sequence is more likely: HTHT or HHTT? Basic
knowledge of probability will teach someone that to solve this problem one must
multiply the ratio of the number of observations to the number of possible outcomes for
each individual coin toss. Therefore, the math calculation is the same for each sequence (
½ x ½ x ½ x ½ ), indicating that each sequence has a 1 in 16 chance of occurring. While
the solution to this problem may seem simple to people with a basic knowledge of
probability, people who have not been taught the basic principles of probability will be
forced to use the representativeness heuristic to solve the problem and will come to the
decision that the HTHT sequence is more representative of the population of events than
HHTT and is, therefore, more likely.
The anchor and adjustment heuristic appears to be mathematical in nature at its core.
Essentially, a person is making judgments based on a numerical answer to a stated
problem. People who have taken more math classes are exposed to numbers more often,
should become more confident in their estimation abilities and therefore should do better
on estimation tasks. People who have better estimation skills, and have taken more math
classes should also have a better number sense. In other words, people who are better at
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math should have a better understanding of numbers resulting in them having a greater
ability in judging distances, lengths, and other essential estimation abilities. Because
people who are better at math should have a better number sense, they should have a
greater sense of how much to estimate answers and should therefore not be as influenced
by the anchor as much as people who have less of a number sense. It is assumed that
people who are better at math will have more accurate answers and will be less
influenced by the anchors than people who are worse at math.
The Take the Best heuristic is based entirely on a person’s ability to rank order
probability cues in terms of ecological validity. Therefore, a person must estimate
(online) how often a certain concept distinguishes two alternatives from one another.
Consider the number of inhabitants of Cleveland and Cincinnati example discussed
above. First the person searched for various probability cues that may be able to
distinguish the number of inhabitants in one city from the number of inhabitants in
another city. After finding the probability cues, the person needs to estimate how
efficient each cue is at predicting the number of inhabitants of cities, in general.
Basically, a person needs to determine the probability that the cue can distinguish
between cities. Therefore, a person must have a basic understanding of probability
theory in order to rank each of the probability cues appropriately. The efficiency of using
the Take the Best heuristic is dependent on how well a person can rank the cues in order
of ecological validity. Due to the need of basic probability knowledge in order to use the
Take the Best heuristic, and the idea that people that are better at math are more likely to
take a probability course, it is possible that people that are better at math will be more
efficient at using the Take the Best heuristic than people that are worse at math.
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Conclusion
The current paper has reviewed several of the decision making heuristics. Within this
paper there was a distinction made between the more objective heuristics (e.g., Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974) and the more subjective heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996). Both
types of heuristics assume that when people are using a heuristic they are using a more
simple strategy to make a decision than calculating the probability of each alternative.
The distinction between the types of heuristics is found more in the way that people’s
decisions are evaluated. The proponents of the more objective heuristics seem to judge
people to be poor decision makers because people have a tendency to make decisions that
violate probability and statistical theory; the proponents of the more subjective heuristics
appear to feel that people’s subjective rationality aids them in their ability to make
decisions and that people are good decision makers. Therefore, the distinction between
the types of heuristics is not in the underlying cognitive processes used to make decisions
but instead is the way decision makers are evaluated on their decisions.
While there has been an extensive amount of research on the representativeness,
availability, anchoring and adjustment, and the Take the Best heuristics, research on why
some people are better at making decisions than others has been lacking. The current
paper discussed two constructs, working memory capacity and math ability, and how
these two constructs may influence a person’s ability to make decisions. While it may be
that all people use heuristics regardless of their working memory capacity or math ability,
it is of interest to see if these constructs are factors that a) determine whether or not
people use heuristics or b) determine how well people can use these heuristics.
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There are several reasons that a person’s working memory capacity may influence a
person’s ability to make decisions. First, it appears that people with higher working
memory spans are able to use more complicated strategies when working on a task than
people with lower working memory spans (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004). One of the
basic assumptions of decision making heuristics is that heuristics are easier than making
calculations. Therefore, people with higher working memory spans may be able to use
the more complicated, yet more accurate, calculations, while people with lower working
memory spans will need to use easier, yet less accurate, heuristics.
When a person is using calculations to make a decision they are using a more precise
strategy which should result in a higher level of accuracy than people that use a heuristic.
Therefore, people with higher working memory spans will make more accurate decisions
but may need more time to make a decision than lower working memory span people. As
the task of making a decision becomes more and more difficult, people with higher
working memory spans may regress to use heuristics, like the lower working memory
span people. The remainder of the ways that working memory affects decision making,
discussed in this section, are based on the assumption that the task is difficult enough that
all people (low and high span) will be using a heuristic to make a decision.
Another reason that working memory capacity can affect a person’s performance on a
decision making task is that people with higher working memory spans are more skilled
in working on multiple tasks at the same time than people with lower working memory
spans. Aside from the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, in all of the decision making
heuristics that have been discussed in this paper, people need to analyze several different
options (or probability cues) simultaneously. Therefore, people with higher working

64

memory spans should be better at using these heuristics than people with lower working
memory spans.
The current paper also discussed the idea that people with higher working memory
spans may have resources in working memory that are left-over from working on the
decision making task, while people with low working memory spans will not. People
with higher working memory spans could use this left-over capacity to serve as a “fact
checker” which will prevent them from making mistakes (i.e., the conjunction fallacy)
while people with lower working memory spans may still make this type of mistake.
People with higher working memory spans are also better at ignoring irrelevant
information (Kane & Engle, 2003). Therefore, people with higher working memory
spans will be better at using heuristics that involve information that is not relevant to
make the correct decision than people with lower working memory spans.
A person’s math ability may also influence their ability to make decisions. People
that are better at math are likely to take more math classes than people that are not good
at math (Hembree, 1990) and are, therefore, exposed to more types of math and are more
practiced at math tasks. People that are better at math are more likely to take advanced
statistics and probability classes. Considering that most decisions could be made more
accurately with knowledge of statistics and probability, people that are better at math
should also be better at making decisions.
In conclusion, the current paper has discussed research that leads to the deduction that
people that have higher working memory spans should be better at making decisions than
people with lower working memory spans. It can also be deduced that people that are
better at math should also be better at making decisions than people that are worse at
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math. It is important to empirically test these possibilities to gain a better understanding
of how people make decisions as well as understand what characteristics are important
for a person to make accurate decisions.
Experiment
Research has indicated that people are prone to making errors when making decisions
(Tversky & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; etc.). However, the
literature is unclear on both why people are bad at making decisions and why some
people are better at making decisions than others. Research has indicated that a person’s
working memory capacity dictates the type of strategy that they can use (Copeland &
Radvansky, 2004). Research has also indicated that working memory capacity and the
amount of working memory resources that a task demands interact to determine the type
of strategy that the person will use to make a decision (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). Many
decisions that people make seem to require some sort of math knowledge [e.g. the coin
tossing example (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and the hospital scenario (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), discussed above]. Therefore, it is hypothesized that both math ability
and working memory capacity will influence a person’s ability to make decisions. Many
heuristics have been discussed in the current paper creating an entire line of research; the
first experiment in the current line of research will focus on the representativeness
heuristic. Considering that mathematical computations are required to find the correct
answer in the scenarios in which Kahneman and Tversky (1972) state that people use the
the representativeness heuristic, it was logical to start this line of research with the
representativeness heuristic. In the current experiment, participants will be making
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decisions that are generally associated with the representativeness heuristic. Participants
will be grouped based on their working memory capacity and math ability.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
A total of 118 participants were recruited for this experiment. Thirteen of those
participants were removed from the analysis due to not meeting the minimum
requirements (discussed later). Therefore, the data from 105 participants were used in
this experiment. There were forty-five male participants and sixty female participants.
The average age of the participant was 20.25, ranging from eighteen to forty-seven. The
ethnic breakdown was as follows: ten classified themselves as African-American (9.5%),
fifteen classified themselves as Hispanic/Latino (14.3%), one classified herself as Native
American (1%), twenty classified themselves as Asian/Pacific Islander (19%), fifty-seven
classified themselves as Caucasian (54.3%), and two classified themselves as bi-racial
(1.9%).
Materials and Procedure
Participants responded to a (11-item) subject information sheet that asked them for
demographic information as well as questions about their previous math experience. The
participants also participated in the O-span Task (discussed earlier; Turner & Engle,
1989), the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), a series of
questions like the hospital problem (discussed above) in a dual task paradigm, a series of
questions in which participants read a character description and were asked to judge if the
person was more likely to be an engineer or a lawyer in a dual task paradigm, and a series
of questions in which the participants were asked to judge which sequence of coin flips
was more probable (as described above).
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Subject Information Sheet
The subject information sheet asked participants various questions about their
background such as: Age, gender, number of math classes taken in high school and
college, their grades for both their high school and college math courses, what types of
math classes they have taken, their college rank, and their ethnicity.
Operation Span Task
In the current experiment, a modified version of the Turner and Engle (1989) O-span
task was used. In this task, the participants were shown a math problem with a given
answer. Their task was to press the left mouse key if the given answer was correct for the
stated equation or the right button if the given answer was wrong. After the participants
responded to the math problem they were shown a word. The participants were to
remember the word until a prompt asked them to recall all the words that were presented
to them. The number of math problem and word pairs in a set increased progressively
throughout the task. The participants started with two pairs in a set and progressed all the
way through six pairs in a set. There were three trials for each set size. An example of a
trial with a set size of two would be: (5 X 2) + 1 = 11, CARE, (10 / 1) – 5 = 7, ARM,
Type in the 1st word, Type in the 2nd word. In this example the math problems, words,
and recall prompts were centered on separate screens using E-prime software (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). To answer the given example correctly, the participants
must click the left mouse key for the first math problem, the right mouse key for the
second math problem, and then type in “Care” at the first recall prompt and “ARM” in
the second recall prompt. The participants used a standard QWERTY keyboard to type
in their responses. Incorrectly spelled responses were still counted as correct as long as
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the incorrect spelling did not form a completely different word. Also, homophones of a
given word (e.g., typing “eight” when the given word was “ate”) were accepted as correct
responses. All of the math problems and words to be recalled were randomly selected
separately for each participant.
There were several differences between the original Turner and Engle (1989) Ospan and the O-span task that was used in the current experiment. First, in the original Ospan, the stimuli were presented on a projection screen and the subjects were required to
read the equations and words aloud. In the O-span in the current experiment, the
participants were presented with the stimuli on a computer screen and were not asked to
read all equations and words aloud. Also, all responses were made via a computer mouse
and keyboard in the current experiment, while in the original O-span the responses were
made in a paper and pencil format. Also, the original O-span was presented in a group
format while in the current experiment participants were run individually. In the current
O-span task, the maximum set size was six equations and word pairings in a set while the
maximum in the original O-span was five pairings in a set.
Essentially, the O-span task was testing a person’s ability to work on multiple tasks at
the same time. In this task, a person must calculate answers to math problems while
rehearsing words for later recall. To make sure that the participants were really working
on the math problems, participants must have answered 85% of the math problems
correctly to be included in the study. If a person achieved 85% correct on the math
portion of the task then one point will be given for each word that was correctly recalled
in the correct position. All of the correct responses, in the word recall task, were summed
to determine the participants’ working memory span score. For a response to be
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considered correct, the word must be recalled in the order it was presented. A total of
sixty-six words were presented to participants, therefore, the highest possible score was a
sixty-six.
WRAT
The Math Computation Subtest from the WRAT 4 (fourth edition) was used in this
experiment. This subtest consisted of forty math problems. There are eight lines on this
test with five questions on each line. The problems increase in difficulty throughout the
test, such that the first problem is the easiest ( 1 + 1 = ____) and the last problem is the
most difficult [(r² - 5r - 6) / (r + 1)]. This subtest served as a test of math ability.
Dual Tasks
The remainder of the tasks in this experiment were done in a dual task paradigm. All
primary tasks were paired with a secondary task known as the tone identification task.
Prior to all of the dual tasks, the participants were trained on the tone identification task.
There were six tones that were used in this study, three that were classified as high and
three that were classified as low. The three high tones were at the frequencies of 1760,
1860, and 1960 Hertz (Hz) while the low frequency tones were at 440, 340, and 240 Hz.
In a tone identification task used by Schumacher and Schwarb (2009), participants were
told to respond “low” to a 440-Hz tone and “high” to a 1760-Hz tone. To make the task
slightly more difficult (require more working memory resources), there were three tones
in each category instead of one. The participants were trained to determine which of the
tones were high and which are low. The participants did not move on to the experimental
task until they proved that they understood the difference between the low and high tones
(must answer at least 80% of tone test questions correctly). The participants were
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allowed three attempts at the tone identification test. If they could not get at least 80%
correct on any of the three tests then they were dismissed from the experiment. Only one
participant could not get at least 80% correct on any of their three attempts and was
dismissed.
In the dual task trials, the tones were presented on a separate computer than the
primary tasks. The participants used a computer mouse to respond to the tones. The left
mouse button was labeled “High” and the right mouse button was labeled “Low”. For the
primary task, the participants responded vocally, into a microphone. The microphone
was used solely for collection of reaction time data. After a response was made, a prompt
for the experimenter to type in the participants’ response was presented on the screen.
The typed in responses were shown on the screen as the experimenter was typing the
responses. The typed in responses will be used for error rate analysis. While the
participants were responding to the primary task the tones were presented at random
intervals.
In most dual task paradigms there are three separate blocks of trials for each primary
task. The three blocks of trials are one block in which the participant is to respond to the
primary and secondary task, one in which the participant only responds to the primary
task, and a final block in which the participant responds only to the secondary task.
Considering that all of the primary tasks are paired with the same secondary task, in the
current experiment, for each different primary task there was not a block of trials in
which the participant only responded to the secondary task.
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Hospital Problems
The participants were presented with twelve problems that are similar to the hospital
in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) article. One of the three problems is an exact copy of
the question asked by Tversky and Kahneman (1974):
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are
born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you
know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage varies from
day to day. Sometimes it might be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60
percent of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such
days?
-

The larger hospital

-

The smaller hospital

-

About the same (that is within 5 percent of each other)

The remainder of the problems in this task consisted of scenarios that are similar to
the hospital problem, in that in each of them the participants needed to pay attention to
the size of the samples (groups) in order to obtain the correct answers. The problems that
are similar to the hospital problem were manipulated for difficulty. In these problems
there were two levels of difficulty. For the easiest problems, percentages in the
description were always even decades. As indicated by Janiszewski and Uy (2008)
people paid more attention to the more precise numbers than the more rounded ones.
Since these problems involved rounded percentages they should have been seen less
salient and therefore, should have been less distracting as irrelevant information. The
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most difficult problems had very precise percentages (rounded to the hundredth of a
decimal place) and have sample sizes that were not rounded to the nearest decade (e.g.,
an ice skating rink that has roughly 728 patrons per day). The logic was that the more
salient the irrelevant information was, the more difficult it would be for the participants
to ignore the information. For a complete list of the problems see Appendix A.
In each trial, the description of the scenario was presented on the first screen. After
the participant had finished reading the description they were to say the word “next” out
loud. After they said “next” the researcher pressed the space bar on a keyboard and then
the question appeared on the screen beneath the description of the scenario. The reaction
times consist of the time it took from the presentation of the question to the time the
person spoke the answer out loud.
These problems were in a dual task paradigm where the secondary task was tone
identification (discussed above). There were two blocks of trials: the dual task block and
the decision-making-only block. In the decision making only block of trials the
participants still listened to tones but were told that all of the tones should be classified as
high, that way they can focus all of their attention on the hospital problems. In each
block of trials, each participant saw two trials at each level of difficulty, for a total of four
trials per block. Both error rates and reaction times were analyzed in mixed model
ANOVA.
It is hypothesized that the high math ability participants will have taken more math
classes, resulting in a better understanding of probability theory, which will allow them to
be more accurate and use the representativeness heuristic less than the low math ability
participants. Since it is hypothesized that the low math ability participants are more
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likely to use the representativeness heuristic, their reaction times should be faster than the
high math ability participants.
Career Identification Task
The Career Identification Task was popularized by Kahneman and Tversky (1973).
Kahneman and Tversky presented participants with scenarios in which 70% of the sample
is lawyers and 30% of the sample is engineers. Then the participants were given
character descriptions and asked to determine the likelihood that the person in the
description is an engineer. In this task, people should have used the aforementioned
percentages to assess how likely the person is to be an engineer but instead, it was found
that people ignored the prior probabilities and focused more on the character description.
Therefore, it was assumed that people were using the representativeness heuristic to solve
the problem.
In the current experiment participants were given character descriptions, presented
individually, and asked the probability that that person was one of the 30 engineers in a
sample of 100 people or one of 70 lawyers in a sample of 100. These problems were
presented in the same type of dual-task scenario as the previous task. Again, there were
two blocks of trials: The dual task, and the career identification-only task.
Pilot data was collected which asked participants what they thought were
characteristics of engineers and lawyers. The most frequently recorded terms that were
used for each occupation were used to create the character sketches. As in the hospital
problems task, this task also had a difficulty manipulation. For the easy level, the
character sketches included only one career stereotype and several other characteristics
that were not stated by the pilot data to be a stereotype of an engineer or a lawyer. For
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the difficult problems, the character sketches included three career stereotypes and
several other characteristics that were not stated by the pilot data to be a stereotype of an
engineer or a lawyer. There were both positive and negative career stereotypes.
According to the pilot data, examples of career stereotypes are that engineers are good at
math and are handy. An example of a positive career stereotype for an engineer would be
that “in college, Jon tutored other students in math”. An example of a negative career
stereotype for a lawyer would be “Sam hates to do home repairs” (see Appendix B for
examples of these questions). The former example is a positive characteristic because
engineers are good at math while the latter is a negative stereotype for a lawyer because
since engineers are handy and Sam hates doing home repairs than he must not be an
engineer and the only other option is a lawyer. There were an equal number of
characteristics (either career stereotypes or filler) in each character sketch. In the same
logic as the Janiszewski and Uy (2008) article, the more descriptive or precise something
is the more salient that should be. Considering that the character sketch is irrelevant
information, the more salient it is the more distracting it should be. Therefore, the more
characteristics there were in a character sketch, the more difficult it should have been for
the person to ignore the character sketch and estimate the correct probability.
As in the hospital problems task, career identification was also done in a dual task
paradigm. The secondary task in the dual task paradigm was the tone identification task
(discussed above). There were two blocks of trials: the dual task block and the decisionmaking-only block. In the decision making only block of trials the participants still
listened to tones but were told that all of the tones should be classified as high, that way
they can focus all of their attention on the hospital problems. In each block of trials, each
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participant saw four trials at each level of difficulty, for a total of eight trials per block.
Both error rates and reaction times were analyzed in mixed model ANOVA.
In each trial, the character sketch was presented on the first screen. After the
participant had finished reading the sketch they were to say the word “next” out loud.
After they said “next” the researcher pressed the space bar on a keyboard and then the
question appeared on the screen beneath the character sketch. The reaction times consist
of the time it took from the presentation of the question to the time the person spoke the
answer out loud.
It is hypothesized that the high working memory span participants are better at
ignoring irrelevant information so they will have higher rates of accuracy than the low
working memory span participants. Since the low working memory span participants are
worse at ignoring irrelevant information, it is hypothesized that the low working memory
span will be more likely to use the character sketch to calculate a probability, therefore,
the low working memory span participants will be more likely to use the
representativeness heuristic on this task. It appears that ignoring the irrelevant
information may be quicker than using the representativeness heuristic on this task,
therefore, it is hypothesized that the high working memory span participants will be
quicker on this task than the low working memory span participants.
Coin Tossing Task
As Kahneman and Tversky (1972) indicated, people have a tendency to predict that
an alternating coin flip sequence (e.g., THTH) is more likely than a consistent sequence
(e.g., TTTT). In the current experiment, participants were exposed to different stimuli in
which they were asked to predict which of two coin flip sequences was more likely.
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Each participant saw four trials in both the control and dual task blocks of trials. There
were four levels of difficulty in each block of trials. Difficulty was manipulated by the
number of tosses in a sequence. In each block there was one trial that involved one, two,
four, and six tosses per sequence. An example of a question is: If you were to flip a coin
4 times which of the following sequences is more likely (H = heads and T = tails). They
were then presented with three options, one that seemed representative of the overall
population of events (i.e., H T H T), one that grouped the heads together and the tails
together (i.e., H H T T) and one option that said Equal. The correct answer in each trial
was “Equal”, the answer indicative of using the representativeness heuristic was the one
that appeared representative of the overall population of events, and the wrong answer
was the option that grouped the heads and tails together. See Appendix C for examples
of these questions.
As in the two previously mentioned tasks, the coin tossing task was presented in a
dual task paradigm. The dual task block of trials consisted of one trial of each difficulty
level while simultaneously discriminating between low and high tones. Before the
control block of trials the participants were told that each tone was a high tone and to
respond accordingly while also responding to the four trials (one at each level of
difficulty). Both error rates and reaction times were analyzed in mixed model ANOVA.
It is hypothesized that people that are better at math will have a better understanding
of probability theory and will be more likely to answer these questions correctly. It is
also hypothesized that the low math ability participants will be more likely to use the
representativeness heuristic than the high math ability participants. Because the low
math ability participants are more likely to use the representativeness heuristic, the low
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math ability participants should respond to the questions more quickly than the high math
ability participants.
Weighted Coin Tossing Task
The weighted coin tossing task was similar to the coin tossing task. Like the coin
tossing task, there were four levels of difficulty (one, two, four, and six tosses in a
sequence) in both the control and dual task block of trials. The difference between the
weighted coin tossing task and the coin tossing task was that in the weighted coin tossing
task the participants were instructed that the coin was weighted such that the 60% of the
time the coin would land on heads and 40% of the time it would land on tails. Therefore,
to obtain the correct answer the participant should calculate the probability of each
sequence. If a sequence were H T H H, the participant should do the following
calculation: 3/5 x 2/5 x 3/5 x 3/5. This calculation should be done for each sequence in a
trial and the sequence that has the higher probability should be selected. The trial that
had the lower probability appeared more representative of the overall population of
events (see above) and was therefore indicative of a person using the representative
heuristic. The final option was the word equal, which was always the incorrect answer.
See Appendix D for examples of these questions. As in the previous three tasks, the
weighted coin tossing task was also in a dual task paradigm. The dual task block of trials
consisted of one trial of each difficulty level while simultaneously discriminating
between low and high tones. Before the control block of trials the participants were told
that each tone was a high tone and to respond accordingly while also responding to the
four trials (one at each level of difficulty). Both error rates and reaction times were
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analyzed in mixed model ANOVA. The hypotheses for the weighted coin tossing task
are the same as they are for the coin tossing task.
Exit Survey
Following all of the tasks, the participants were interviewed in order to gain some
insight into the strategies that they used on the various tasks. The exit survey gave an
example of each type of question and after each example was read aloud to the
participant the participant was asked to recall the answer that they gave. Next, the
participants were asked the strategy that they used to arrive at their answer. Some of the
participants’ responses were vague, therefore the researchers were trained to ask followup questions so that the participants could clearly indicate the strategy that they used.
See Appendix E for a copy of the exit survey.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Before the results of Experiment 1 are detailed, it may be beneficial to point out a few
things. Many of the hypotheses of Experiment 1 were not met. In fact, for some of the
hypotheses the exact opposite was true (e.g. the low working memory span participants
were more accurate than the high working memory span participants). This may have
been because the hospital problems and career identification task questions tricked
participants to respond in a certain way (discussed later). Also, a large percentage of the
participants that were removed from the analyses due to not answering eighty-five
percent of the math problems correct on the operation span task would have been
classified as low math ability participants. It appears that this criterion altered the sample
so that there were not as many low math ability participants in the sample as there are in
the population. In Experiment 2, the criterion that a participant must correctly answer
eighty-five percent of the math problems on the operation span task was removed to
create a more representative sample.
The most beneficial finding from Experiment 1 was from the exit interviews. The
exit interviews indicated that on the weighted coin tossing task, the participants were
counting the number of heads in each sequence to answer the questions. Experiment 2
was created to determine what strategy a participant would use when this strategy did not
work. The remainder of this section will detail the results of Experiment 1.
It was hypothesized that there would be a significant positive correlation between
math ability and working memory span. This hypothesis was supported by a significant
correlation between scores on the Wide Range Achievement Test and scores on the
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Operation Span Task, r(103) = .248, p = .011. The correlation indicates that as scores on
the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test increased, scores on the
Operation Span Task also increased. Considering the significant correlation between
math ability and working memory span, it was hypothesized that if the participants were
split into high and low math ability groups that the high math ability participants would
have higher working memory span scores than the low math ability participants. It was
also assumed that if the participants were split into high and low working memory span
groups that the high working memory span participants would have higher math ability
scores than the low working memory span participants. Before addressing these
hypotheses, the procedure that was used to group the participants into high or low
working memory span group and high or low math ability group will be discussed.
Math Ability was determined by scores on the math subsection of the Wide Range
Achievement Test (version 4). For the Wide Range Achievement Test, there was a
sample mean of 32.21, a median of 32, and a standard deviation of 4.24. A median split
procedure was used to place participants into the high or low math ability group. Those
participants that earned a score at or below the median were placed in the low math
ability group, while those that scored higher than the median were placed in the high
math ability group.
The participants’ working memory span was determined by the Operation Span Task.
For the Operation Span Task, there was a sample mean of 54.10, a median of 55 and a
standard deviation of 7.39. A median split procedure was used to group participants into
the low or high working memory span group. The participants that scored at or above the
median were placed in the high working memory span group, while the participants that
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scored below the median were placed in the low working memory span group. All of the
analyses reported in the following sections are based on the above mentioned criteria for
math ability groups and working memory span groups.
Using the aforementioned criteria, the working memory span groups were compared
in terms of math ability and the math ability groups were compared in terms of working
memory span. While there was no difference between the working memory span groups
in terms of their math ability t(103) = -1.43, p = .16, there was a difference in the math
ability groups in terms of their operation span scores, t(103) = -2.77, p = .007. The low
math ability group scored lower on the operation span task (52.22 words recalled
correctly) compared to the high math ability group (56.10). This indicates that the high
math ability participants had higher working memory spans than the low math ability
participants.
In the current experiment there were several different tasks. The design, method of
analysis, and method for detecting extreme scores varied for each task. Therefore, before
the results for each task are discussed, a brief synopsis of the design, method of analysis,
and process for detecting extreme scores will be discussed.
Hospital Problems
For the hospital problems, each participant completed two difficult and two easy
problems in both the control and dual-task blocks of trials, for a total of eight trials. Each
trial consisted of a problem in which the participant had to make a judgment as to which
scenario was more probable (see methods section for an example of the scenarios). The
correct answer in each problem was the scenario that consisted of the smaller sample.
The three options the participants had to choose among were each of the mentioned
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scenarios (e.g., the large hospital and the small hospital) and an option labeled “Equal”.
A response of equal was considered to be evidence that the participant was using the
representativeness heuristic. The difficulty of the problem was manipulated by whether
the size of the samples and the numbers in the percentages were rounded numbers or
more “precise” numbers. The problems consisting of all rounded numbers (i.e.,
percentages rounded to the nearest unit digit and sample sizes rounded to the nearest
decade or half-decade) were considered the easy problems, while the problems that
consisted of more “precise” numbers (rounded to the nearest hundredth for the
percentages and sample sizes that were rounded to the nearest unit digit) were considered
the difficult problems. To analyze the hospital problems data, several analyses of
variance were calculated. For this task, a separate analysis of variance was calculated
with the dependent variables reaction time, accuracy, and responses consistent with the
representativeness heuristic. Also, Stuart-Maxwell tests for homogeneity of marginal
distributions were calculated. Stuart-Maxwell tests can be thought of as a within-subjects
chi square. These were calculated to see if the participants were using different types of
responses within each difficulty level and between each difficulty level. The response
tendencies can be found in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
Analysis of Variance
Accuracy
A 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty)
mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with accuracy as the dependent
variable. There was a main effect for difficulty, F(1, 101) = 23.78, p < .05, ηp2 = .187.
Ironically, the difficult problems (25.8%) were answered correctly more often than the
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easy problems (12.4%). Janiszewski and Uy (2008) found that the differences between
the anchor and the participants’ responses were smaller when problems involved more
precise numbers than when problems involved more rounded numbers. The fact that
people responded closer to the anchor when the anchor was a more precise number
indicates that the participants were more likely to use a heuristic when problems involved
more precise numbers than rounded numbers. This idea led to the hypothesis that people
would be more likely to use the representativeness heuristic when the problems involved
more precise numbers than when they involved more rounded numbers. In the current
task, it appears that people viewed the more precise numbers as more important for the
task and therefore used an algorithmic strategy more when the numbers were precise than
when the numbers were rounded.
Representativeness Heuristic
A 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty)
mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with usage of the representativeness
heuristic as the dependent variable. Again, there was a main effect for difficulty, F(1,
101) = 23.78, p < .05, ηp2 = .191. The representativeness heuristic was used more often
on the easy problems (54.3%) than on the difficult problems (40%). Since the
representativeness heuristic is thought to be a less cognitively demanding strategy that is
used to solve a problem, this finding is further evidence that the less precise the numbers
were in the scenarios the less likely the participants were to strain themselves
(cognitively) on the task. The hypothesis that participants would use more complex
strategies on the easy problems while utilizing a less cognitively demanding strategy
(representativeness heuristic) on the difficult problems was rejected by this finding.

85

The main effect of working memory span group reached marginal significance, F(1,
101) = 3.29, p = .073, ηp2 = .032. This main effect indicates that the high working
memory span participants (53.4%) used the representativeness heuristic more often than
the low working memory span participants (40.9%). Copeland and Radvansky (2004)
showed that people with higher working memory spans could use more complicated
strategies than low working memory span participants. The results from the current
experiment seem to be the opposite of Copeland and Radvansky’s (2004) findings.
However, the representativeness heuristic may be a more logical strategy than other
strategies that are used in this task. This will be discussed in more detail in the discussion
section. Also, there was a marginally significant task x difficulty x working memory
group x math ability group interaction, F(1, 101) = 3.61, p = .060, ηp2 = .035 (see Figures
1a and 1b).
Reaction Time
For the reaction time data, a reaction time was considered an outlier if it fell two and
a half standard deviations above or below the mean of the math ability group from the
condition the reaction time is from. Also, if a reaction time was quicker than 250
milliseconds then the trial was considered a microphone error and treated as if it were an
outlier. The outliers were removed within each condition within the 2 (math ability
group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty) and replaced with the
mean of the math ability group from that condition (for a list of the outliers see Table 4).
A 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2
(difficulty) mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with reaction time as the
dependent variable. There was a main effect of difficulty, F(1, 88) = 9.34, p < .05, ηp2 =
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.096. This indicates that the easy problems were responded to more quickly (12482
msec) than the difficult problems (13555 msec). Considering that the representativeness
heuristic was used more often on the easy problems than on the difficult problems and
that using the representativeness heuristic is thought to be a quick process, it is logical
that the easy problems were answered quicker than the difficult problems.
It was also found that there was a main effect of working memory span groups, F(1,
88) = 5.44, p < .05, ηp2 = .058. This main effect indicates that the low working memory
span participants (13664 msec) took longer to respond to the questions than the high
working memory span participants (12372 msec). Considering that the high working
memory span participants used the representativeness heuristic more often, it is intuitive
that they also have quicker reaction times.
Stuart-Maxwell Tests
A Stuart-Maxwell test was done to determine if the distribution of responses (correct
answer, representativeness heuristic answer, or wrong answer) by the participants was
different within the easy and difficult problems and to see if the pattern of responding
was different between the easy and difficult problems. The pattern of results for all
participants, χ2(2) = 323.10, p < .05, indicated that there is not marginal homogeneity
between participants’ responses on the easy and difficult problems. This means that the
distribution of scores between the easy and difficult problems is different among the
types of responses. The source of this difference appears to be that while on the easy
problems the participants used the representativeness heuristic significantly more than
being correct or being wrong; on the difficult problems participants used the
representativeness heuristic slightly more than they were wrong but much more
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frequently than using a strategy resulting in the correct answer. Also, the
representativeness heuristic was used more on the easy problems than the difficult
problems. The low math ability participants, χ2(2) = 187.94, p < .05, showed extremely
similar patterns of responses except that on the difficult problems the low math ability
participants answered the problems incorrectly more than used the representativeness
heuristic. The high math ability participants, χ2(2) = 135.20, p < .05, used the
representativeness heuristic more than any other strategy on both the easy and difficult
problems but the discrepancy between using a strategy resulting in the correct answer and
using the representativeness heuristic was smaller for the difficult problems than for the
easy problems.
Summary
The independent variable that seemed to have the largest impact performance of the
hospital problems was the difficulty of the problem. However, the impact of the
difficulty factor was the opposite of what was predicted. It was hypothesized that the
participants would be less accurate, more likely to use the representativeness heuristic,
and quicker on the difficult problems than on the easy problems. However, the
participants were more accurate on the difficult problems than the easy problems,
responded with an answer indicative of using the representativeness heuristic more for
the easy problems than the difficult problems, and were quicker on the easy problems
than the difficult problems. This indicates that when the problems involved more precise
numbers participants spent more time on them resulting in more accurate responses.
When the problems involved rounded numbers people were more likely to go through the
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problems more expeditiously resulting in them using what appears to be the
representativeness heuristic, or wrong answer for low working memory span participants.
The working memory span group factor also influenced performance on the hospital
problems. While the high working memory span participants were quicker to solve the
problems, they were also more likely to use the representativeness heuristic. This implies
that while one of the benefits of having a high working memory span is that you process
tasks quickly, one of the risks is overlooking more accurate answers and instead utilizing
only the first strategy that comes to mind. It was interesting that the low working
memory span participants were wrong so frequently. This implies that they were using a
different strategy to answer these problems. The working memory span group by math
ability group by difficulty by task interaction (see Figures 1a and 1b) appears to have
reached marginal significance due to the low span/high math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic more than the low span/low math ability participants on the
control problems but the low span/low math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic more than the low span/high math ability participants on the
dual task problems.
Career Identification Task
In the career identification task participants were presented with several character
sketches. After they read each character sketch, they were presented with a question
regarding the probability that the man was either an engineer or a lawyer. The
participants were to respond in the form of a number. For the answer to be considered
correct the participant must have responded with the number that was stated in the
question. There were several conditions that needed to be met for a response to be
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considered indicative of using the representativeness heuristic. If the characteristics in
the character sketch represented the career stated in the question, then a number larger
than the number in the question was considered indicative of using the representativeness
heuristic. If the characteristics in the character sketch were incongruent with the career in
the question, then a response of a number smaller than the number in the question was
indicative of usage of the representativeness heuristic. All other types of responses were
considered incorrect. The difficulty of the problem was manipulated by the number of
career stereotypes that were in the character sketches. The easy problems only had one
career stereotype while the difficult problems had three career stereotypes. For this task,
a separate analysis of variance was calculated with the dependent variables reaction time,
accuracy, responses consistent with the representativeness heuristic, and the difference
between the correct score and the stated answer. For a breakdown of how participants
responded to the various stimuli see Tables 5, 6, and 7.
Analysis of Variance
Representativeness Heuristic
A 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty)
mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with usage of the representativeness
heuristic as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect for difficulty,
F(1, 100) = 12.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .108. This main effect illustrates that participants used
the representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems (56.7%) than on the easy
problems (50.5%). Also, the difficulty by math ability group interaction was marginally
significant, F(1, 100) = 3.09, p = .08, ηp2 = .03 (see Figure 2). This interaction indicates
that the low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic considerably
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more on the difficult problems (59.5%) than the easy problems (50.5%) while the high
math ability participants only used the representativeness slightly more on the difficult
problems (53.9%) than the easy problems (50.9%).
Difference
Unique to the career identification task, participants were able to answer on a
continuous scale of measurement, as opposed to the multiple choice format for all of the
other decision making tasks. A difference score was calculated by taking the absolute
value of the difference between the response and the correct answer. A 2 (math ability
group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty) mixed model analysis
of variance was calculated with the difference score as the dependent variable. There
was a main effect of difficulty, F(1, 100) = 9.49, p < .05, ηp2 = .087. This main effect
indicated that the participant’s responses were further from the correct answer for the
difficult problems (26.8) than the easy problems (24.4).
Reaction Time
For the reaction time data, a reaction time was considered an outlier if it fell two and
a half standard deviations above or below the mean of the working memory span group
(low or high) for that condition. Also, if the reaction time on a trial was quicker than 250
milliseconds then it was considered a microphone error and treated as if it were an
outlier. The outliers were removed within each condition from the factorial design
discussed above and replaced with the mean of the working memory span group for that
condition. For a list of the outliers, see Table 8.
The main effect for task reached significance, F(1, 96) = 8.89, p < .05, ηp2 = .085.
This main effect indicates that the dual task trials (3867 msec) were responded to quicker
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than the control trials (4224 msec). This may be due to the fact that the participants were
slightly more accurate on the control trials (26.4%) than the dual task trials (24%), F(1,
100)= 1.08, p = .30, and the participants used the representativeness heuristic slightly
more on the dual task trials (54.2%) than on the control trials (53%), F(1, 100) = .329, p
= .568. This indicates that the representativeness heuristic may result in quicker but less
accurate responding. The task by math ability group by working memory span group
interaction reached significance, F(1, 96) = 4.33, p < .05, ηp2 = .043 (see Figures 3a and
3b). In this interaction, for the control block of trials, the reaction times of the low
working memory span participants is the same, regardless of math ability but of the high
working memory span participants the ones with high math ability were quicker than the
ones with low math ability. In the dual task block of trials, of the low working memory
span participants the ones with high math ability were quicker than those with low math
ability while the reaction times of the high working memory span participants was the
same regardless of math ability. Therefore, on the control trials math ability influenced
the high working memory span participants only, but only influenced the low working
memory span participants on the dual task trials.
The difficulty factor interacted significantly with working memory span groups, F(1,
96) = 19.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .170. This interaction illustrates that the difficulty of the
problems had exact opposite effects on the high working memory span participants as it
did on the low working memory span participants. While the low working memory span
participants answered the easy problems (3791 msec) quicker than the difficult problems
(4169 msec), the high working memory span answered the difficult problems (3950
msec) quicker than the easy problems (4270 msec). This was not supported by the
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representativeness heuristic responding data. Actually, even though it was not at all
significant, F(1, 100) = .006, p = .938, the low working memory span participants used
the representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems (56%) than the easy
problems (50%) and the high working memory span participants also used the
representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems (58%) than the easy problems
(51%). Therefore, high working memory span participants were quicker on the trials in
which they were more likely to use the representativeness heuristic while the low
working memory span were quicker on the trials in which they were less likely to use the
representativeness heuristic.
Summary
As in the hospital problems task, the difficulty of the problems is the factor that
influenced performance the most. However, among the data from the career
identification task, the main effects of difficulty coincided with the hypotheses. The
participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems than the
easy problems and reported answers that were further from the correct answer on the
difficult problems than on the easy problems. Difficulty also interacted with math ability
on the representativeness heuristic such that the low math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic much more on the difficult problems than the easy problems
while the high math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic only slightly
more on the difficult problems than the easy problems. The fact that the participants took
longer to respond to the control trials than the dual task trials seemed slightly confusing
until it was found that the participants were slightly more accurate on the control trials
and used the representativeness heuristic slightly more often on the dual task trials. Also,
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the task by math ability by working memory capacity interaction within the reaction time
data clearly indicated that a person’s math ability and the amount of working memory
resources needed to complete the task influences low working memory span participants
and high working memory span participants differently. Apparently when the task
consumes more working memory resources, math ability influences the low working
memory span participants’ reaction time but not the high working memory span
participants’ reaction time. However, when the task consumes less working memory
resources, math ability influences the high working memory span participants’ reaction
time but not the low working memory span participants’ reaction time.
Coin Toss Task
In the coin tossing task, each participant was presented with four coin tossing
questions in each of the dual and control blocks of trials. In each block, they were asked
a question about sequences of one, two, four, and six tosses. Each stimulus gave them
three options for possible outcomes. Aside from the one toss outcomes, each trial
consisted of one correct answer (“Equal”), one answer that seems representative of the
overall population of events (e.g. “HT”), and one wrong answer (e.g. “HH”). For the one
toss sequences, it was impossible to have an answer that was representative of the overall
population of events so there was one correct answer (“Equal”) and two incorrect
answers (“T” or “H”). For this task, a separate analysis of variance was calculated with
the dependent variables accuracy, responses consistent with the representativeness
heuristic, and reaction time. Also, Stuart-Maxwell tests for homogeneity of marginal
distributions were calculated. Stuart-Maxwell tests can be thought of as a within-subjects
chi square. These were calculated to see if the participants were using different types of
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responses within each difficulty level and between each difficulty level. See Tables 9,
10, and 11 for a breakdown of participants’ responses.
Analysis of Variance
Accuracy
For the coin tossing task, it was hypothesized that people who were better at math
would answer more questions correctly than people who were worse at math. To test this
hypothesis a 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 4
(number of tosses) mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with accuracy as the
dependent variable. It appears that the current hypothesis was not validated, such that,
there was no difference between the math ability groups in terms of their accuracy rates
on the coin toss problems, F(1, 98) = .161, p = .69. However, it does appear that the
difficulty level of the problems was manipulated successfully, as the number of coin
tosses in a sequence did produce a significant main effect, F(3, 294) = 13.58, p = 0.00,
ηp2 = .122. When there was only one coin toss, participants were extremely accurate
(90% correct), while when there were two, four, or six coin tosses participants were much
less accurate (68.4%, 71.3%, and 69.6%, respectively). Rather than stating the correct
answer, “Equal”, the participants were responding with the representativeness heuristic
option 24.6%, 22.7%, and 22.7% of the time for two, four, and six toss sequences
respectively. The remainder of the time the participants were responding in a manner
that was incorrect and were not utilizing a strategy similar to the representativeness
heuristic (7%, 6.6%, 6%, and 7.7%, for one, two, four, and six toss sequences,
respectively).
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Representativeness Heuristic
A 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (task) x 2 (difficulty)
mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with accuracy as the dependent
variable. The task (control or dual) by number of tosses interaction was marginally
significant, F(2, 198) = 2.795, p = .064, ηp2 = .027, see Figure 4. It appears that for the
two toss sequences participants used the representativeness heuristic more in the control
trials (28.4%) than in the dual task trials (20.7%). However, on the four toss sequences,
the participants used the representativeness heuristic in the dual task trials (27.2%) more
than in the control trials (18.2%). On the six toss sequences, the participants used the
representativeness heuristic (roughly) equally in the control trials (23.1%) and in the dual
task trials (22.2%).
Reaction Time
The analysis of variance of the reaction time data for the coin tossing task required
outliers to be removed for each condition in the 2 (Task: control and dual) x 2 (Math
Ability: High or low) x 2 (Working Memory Group: Low or High) x 4 (Coin Tosses: 1, 2,
4, and 6) factorial design. Scores were considered to be outliers if they were two and a
half standard deviations above or below the mean of the math ability group for that
condition. Outliers were removed from each condition in the above mentioned 2 x 2 x 2
x 4 factorial design. Also, if a reaction time fell below 250 msec it was considered a
microphone error and treated as an outlier. In each condition, the outliers were replaced
with the mean of that condition from the math ability group from which the outlier was
found (see Table 12).
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The time it took participants to answer the questions was influenced by both factors
that manipulated the difficulty of the problem. In terms of math difficulty, the more
difficult (determined by number of tosses) the sequences were, the longer the participants
took to answer the question, F(3, 244) = 24.33, p < .05, ηp2 = .299. This increase in time
was fairly linear; the average reaction time (in milliseconds) was 4324, 5079, 5623, and
6011 for one, two, four, and six coin tosses, respectively.
There was a main effect for the task factor, F(1, 99) = 5.06, p = .03, ηp2 = .051. This
main effect illustrated that the participants were quicker to reply to the coin toss
sequences in the control block of trials (5066 msec) than in the dual task block of trials
(5453 msec). This suggests that solving the coin toss questions requires working memory
capacity.
One hypothesis of the current study was that the high math ability participants should
be quicker at answering the problems than the low math ability participants. In support
of this hypothesis, it was found that the high math ability participants were quicker at
answering the coin toss sequences (4822 msec) than the low math ability participants
(5697 msec), F(1, 100) = 1576.51, p = 0.00, ηp2 = .94. Since both the high and low math
ability groups had such high accuracy rates, it seems that the high math ability people
were quicker at calculating the answers than the low math ability participants.
Math ability interacted with both factors that determined the difficulty of the problem
(task and number of tosses). For the task factor, while the low math ability participants
solved the coin toss sequences quicker in the control block of trials (5322 msec) than in
the dual block of trials (6061 msec), the high math ability participants recorded roughly
the same reaction time in the control trials (4799 msec) as in the dual task trials (4845
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msec), F(1,99) = 3.91, p = .05, ηp2 = .038. This indicates that the amount of working
memory resources the task required influenced the performance of the low math ability
participants but not the high math ability participants, which is consistent with the result
that the high math ability people had higher working memory spans than low math ability
participants (stated above).
The math ability factor also interacted significantly with the number of coin tosses in
the sequences, F(3, 244) = 3.92, p < .05, ηp2 = .048. This interaction indicated that the
low math ability group increased in reaction time as the number of coin tosses in a
sequence increased more than the high math ability group, see Figure 5. This is another
example of how the difficulty of the problem influenced the low math ability participants
more than the high math ability participants.
Stuart-Maxwell Tests
Stuart-Maxwell tests were done to determine if the pattern of responding (correct
answer, representativeness heuristic answer, or wrong answer) was different within the
two, four, and six toss sequences and between the two, four, and six toss sequences. The
Stuart-Maxwell test that included all of the participants, χ2(2) = 179.96, p < .05, indicated
that there is not marginal homogeneity between participant’s responses on the two, four,
and six toss sequences. The source of this difference appears to be that the participants
were correct on more trials than they were wrong or used the representativeness heuristic
on all sequence lengths.
Analysis consisting only of the high math ability participants, χ2(2) = 91.5, p < .05,
showed a similar pattern of results, such that, the high math ability participants used a
strategy to obtain the correct answer on a higher percentage of trials than using the
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representativeness heuristic or a strategy resulting in a wrong answer. Of all of the coin
sequences, the high math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic on the
highest percentage of trials on the two toss sequences. The low math ability participants,
χ2(4) = 91.35, p < .05, were correct on a higher percentage of trials than using the
representativeness heuristic or using a strategy that resulted in a wrong answer on all
sequence lengths. Of all sequence lengths, the low math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic most on the six toss sequences.
Summary
As with the hospital problems and career identification task, the difficulty factor
seemed to be the factor with the largest influence on performance on the coin tossing
task. The participants were extremely accurate on the one toss sequences. While the
participants were also fairly accurate on the two, four, and six toss sequences, they also
used the representativeness heuristic on over twenty percent of the trials on each of those
sequence lengths. Also, the time it took participants to answer the questions increased as
the number of tosses in the sequence increased. This increase in reaction time across the
lengths of coin toss sequences was found in both the low and high math ability
participants, with the low math ability participants’ reaction time increasing more than
the high math ability participants. This seems to imply that the representativeness
heuristic is not a quicker strategy than calculating the answer.
Weighted Coin Toss Task
As in the coin toss task, in the weighted coin toss task, participants were exposed to
four coin tossing sequences in each block (control and dual) of trials. The sequences
included one, two, four, or six tosses. Each stimulus was presented with three choices.
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Aside from the one toss sequences, each trial consisted of one correct answer (the one
with the highest probability), one answer that seems representative of the overall
population of events (e.g. “HT”), and one incorrect answer (“Equal”). For the one toss
sequence, it was impossible to have an answer that was representative of the overall
population of events so there was one correct answer (the one with the highest
probability) and two incorrect answers (the other coin toss sequence and “Equal”). For
this task, analyses of variance were calculated on the accuracy, responses consistent with
the representativeness heuristic, and the reaction time data. Also, Stuart-Maxwell tests
for homogeneity of marginal distributions were calculated. Stuart-Maxwell tests can be
thought of as a within-subjects chi square. These were calculated to see if the
participants were using different types of responses within each difficulty level and
between each difficulty level. See Tables 13, 14, and 15 for a breakdown of participants’
responses.
Analysis of Variance
Accuracy
There was a main effect for number of coin tosses in a sequence, F(3, 96) = 10.86, p
< .05, ηp2 = .253. The participants answered accurately 81.3%, 74.6%, 58.1%, and 93.4%
of the time for one, two, four, and six toss sequences, respectively. This means that the
participants answered more accurately for the easiest and most difficult problems and
answered less accurately on the medium levels of difficulty. Usually, as problems
become more difficult, participants decrease in accuracy, but this was not the case in the
current experiment. The fact that participants were decreasing in accuracy as the number
of tosses in a sequence increased implies that the participants were using some sort of
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computational based strategy for the one, two, and four toss sequences. The fact that
accuracy increased on the six toss sequences implies that the participants defaulted into a
heuristic-like strategy that resulted in high levels of accuracy.
The main effect for working memory span groups reached marginal significance, F(1,
32) = 3.35, p = .077, ηp2 = .095. It appears that the low working memory span
participants (84.6%) answered the problems correctly more often than the high working
memory span participants (69%). It was assumed that participants with a higher working
memory span would be more accurate on this task than people with low working memory
but the data appears to imply otherwise. It appears that the low working memory span
participants were more likely to use the heuristic-like strategy. This heuristic-like
strategy must require fewer working memory resources and result in high levels of
accuracy.
Representativeness Heuristic
Similarly to the analysis for the accuracy of the weighted coin toss problems, there
was also a significant main effect of number of tosses in the representativeness heuristic
usage data, F(2, 64) = 4.44, p < .05, ηp2 = .122. Participants used the representativeness
heuristic 15.3% and 19.1% of trials on the two and four toss sequences, respectively, but
only 3.9% of the time on the six coin toss trials. Considering that the participants were
more accurate on the six toss sequences than on the two and four toss sequences and that
the participants used the representativeness heuristic less often on the six toss sequences
than on the two and four toss sequences it appears that the students must have used a
different strategy on the easy problems than on the difficult problems. Because accuracy
increased and representativeness heuristic usage decreased on the most difficult level of
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difficulty, the participants must have used the heuristic-like strategy on the most difficult
problems.
Reaction Time
Similarly to the coin tossing task, the analysis of variance of the reaction time data for
the weighted coin tossing task required outliers to be removed for each condition in the 2
(Task: control and dual) x 2 (Math Ability: High or low) x 2 (Working Memory Group:
Low or High) x 4 (Coin Tosses: 1, 2, 4, and 6) factorial design. Scores were considered
to be outliers if they were two and a half standard deviations above or below the mean.
Also, if a reaction time fell below 250 msec it was considered a microphone error and
treated as an outlier. In each condition, the outliers were replaced with the mean of that
condition from the math ability group from which the outlier was found (see Table 16).
There was a significant main effect for the difficulty of the problems (number of
tosses in the sequences), F(3, 90)= 7.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .203. This main effect showed that
the participants were quickest at the one toss sequences (8838 msec). There was a small
increase in reaction time from the one toss sequences to the two toss sequences (9383
msec) followed by a steep increase in reaction time on the four toss sequences (11519
msec). Finally there was a decrease in reaction time from the four toss sequences to the
six toss sequences (9226 msec). Considering the accuracy data (discussed above) it
appears that aside from the six toss sequences, the quicker the participants were at
responding to the questions, the more accurate the participants were. The decline in
reaction time for the six toss sequences implies that the participants used a more
algorithmic strategy on the one, two, and four toss sequences and then used a heuristiclike strategy on the six toss sequences.
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Stuart-Maxwell Tests
Stuart-Maxwell tests were done for all participants, the high math ability participants,
and the low math ability participants. Stuart-Maxwell tests were done to determine if the
pattern of responding (correct answer, representativeness heuristic answer, or wrong
answer) was different within the two, four, and six toss sequences and between the two,
four, and six toss sequences.

For the analysis that included all of the participants, χ2(4)

= 63.50, p < .05, the participants used a strategy resulting in the correct answer more
than the representativeness heuristic or a strategy that resulted in the wrong answer on all
sequence lengths. The sequence length that the participants were least likely to use the
representativeness heuristic was the six toss sequences.

A similar pattern of results was

found for the low math ability participants for all toss sequences, χ2(4) = 41.30, p < .05,
as found for all the participants. However, the low math ability participants used a
strategy resulting in a wrong answer more on the four toss sequences than on any other
sequence length. The high math ability participants, χ2(4) = 24.01, p < .05, used a
strategy resulting in the correct answer on a higher percentage of trials than any other
strategy on all sequence lengths. However, the high math ability participants were wrong
or used the representativeness heuristic on the four toss sequences than on any other
sequence length.
Summary
In a similar manner to all of the other tasks in this experiment, the difficulty factor
appeared to have the largest effect of all of the factors. The most interesting finding of
the weighted coin tossing task data was that the participants were most accurate, quickest,
and used the representativeness heuristic on the six toss sequences. It was expected that
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on the most difficult trials participants would be most likely to use the representativeness
heuristic. It would appear that the participants found a quick strategy that resulted in the
correct answer.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Raghubar, Barnes, and Hecht’s (2010) review paper on the relationship between
working memory and math ability concluded that regardless of the difficulty of the math
task, working memory capacity is related to math ability. The current experiment
supports this claim by illustrating a positive correlation between working memory
capacity and math ability. While the correlation was significant, the correlation did not
seem to be very strong (r=.248). In order to gain a better understanding of the
relationship between math ability and working memory capacity two t-tests were also
done. First the participants were split into working memory span groups (based on the
median split described in the previous section) and scores on the math subsection of the
Wide Range Achievement Test were used as a continuous dependent variable. It was
found that the working memory span groups did not differ in terms of math ability.
However, when math ability groups were created using a median split, there was a
difference between the math ability groups in terms of working memory span. These
findings indicate that while math ability and working memory span are related, it is easier
to predict someone’s working memory capacity when their math ability is known than it
is to predict their math ability when their working memory span is known.
For the remainder of the experiment one discussion section the data pertaining to the
decision making tasks will be discussed. This will begin with a discussion of how
working memory capacity influenced decision making. Therefore, the discussion will
focus mainly on performance on the hospital problems task and the career identification
task. Next, there will be a discussion on how math ability influenced performance on the
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decision making tasks, therefore, this part of the discussion will focus on the coin tossing
task and the weighted coin tossing task. Also, the data from the exit survey will be
introduced and discussed in this section. Because the participants’ responses were
converted into categorical data, the data consists of comparing percentages and did not
seem appropriate for the results section.
Of all of the decision making tasks that were assessed in the current experiment, the
career identification task is the task which people seemed to be most susceptible to using
the representativeness heuristic. According to our analysis of variance, participants used
the representativeness heuristic more often on the difficult career identification problems
than they did on the easy problems. While participants’ reaction times on the difficult
problems were not significantly different than the easy problems [F(1, 100) = .144, p =
.705], the participants were slightly quicker on the easy problems (4031 msec) than the
difficult problems (4060 msec). As discussed above, System 1 is in use when someone
uses a heuristic because it is a less cognitively demanding and quicker strategy. System 2
usually involves more complex algorithms and therefore is more cognitively demanding
and takes more time than a heuristic. The finding that participants were slightly slower
on the types of problems that they were more likely to use the representativeness heuristic
indicates that the representativeness heuristic may not be a problem solving strategy that
utilizes System 1. Instead, the representativeness heuristic may be as, if not more,
complex as other strategies that participants utilize.
The self-report data for the career identification task yielded some interesting
findings. While it was hypothesized that the low working memory span participants
would be more likely to use the representativeness heuristic than the high working
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memory span participants, more of the high working memory span participants (75%)
reported using the representativeness heuristic than the low working memory span
participants (60%). While the main effect of working memory span was not found to be
significant, F(1,100) = .101, p = .751, it was found that the high working memory span
participants used the representativeness heuristic (54.6%) on more trials than the low
working memory span participants (52.7%). It is interesting that the group that used the
representativeness heuristic more (high working memory span participants) was quicker
on the difficult problems than the easy problems and used the representativeness heuristic
more on the difficult than the easy problems. Considering that most difficult problems
should demand more resources, the most difficult problems should also demand more
attention and take longer to solve. It appears that the among the high working memory
span participants the representativeness heuristic is a simpler strategy. This was
evidenced by the fact that when the task became more difficult and the high working
memory span participants defaulted to the simpler strategy.
The low working memory span participants did not show a similar pattern of
responses. The low working memory span participants used the representativeness
heuristic more on the difficult problems but were also slower on the difficult problems.
Remember, for the career identification task, to use the representativeness heuristic the
participant must use the career stereotypes to determine the career of the person. To get
the correct answer the participants must ignore the career stereotypes and state the
number that is in the question. It appears that the low working memory span participants
initially use the number in the question on all trials. On the easy trials, the low working
memory span participants were satisfied with the answer that this strategy yields. On the

107

difficult problems, the career stereotypes are so enticing that the low working memory
span participants were not satisfied with their initial strategy and instead used the
representativeness heuristic. The fact that the low working memory span participants are
using two strategies on the difficult problems and only one on the easy problems would
explain why they take longer on the trials that they are more likely to use the
representativeness heuristic (difficult problems) than when they do not use the
representativeness heuristic (easy problems). The high working memory span
participants must use the representativeness heuristic to start on all trials and on the trials
that contain more stereotypes they are more confident in their answer and respond
quicker but are less confident when there are fewer stereotypes and take longer to decide
if the representativeness heuristic will result in the correct answer.
According to the exit survey, on the career identification task a lager percentage of
the low working memory span participants (24%) reported using a strategy resulting in
the correct answer (stating the number that is given in the question) than the high
working memory span participants (17%). While not significant, F(1,100) = .118, p =
.732, the low working memory span participants were correct on a higher percentage of
trials (26.4%) than the high working memory span participants (23.9%). This seems
counterintuitive to the findings of Copeland and Radvansky (2004) that people with a
higher working memory capacity could use more complicated strategies than people with
a lower working memory capacity. One possible explanation is that the career
identification task involves a situation in which the representativeness heuristic requires a
more complicated strategy than using a strategy that results in the correct answer.
Considering the format of the questions, the correct answer is readily available. If people
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could not think of a way to solve the problem, then stating the only readily available
answer may be simpler than trying to calculate the probability that the person in the
description has a particular career. It appears that the high working memory span
participants were trying to use the career stereotypes to calculate some sort of answer to
the problem while the low working memory span were looking for the simplest answer
that did not involve any sort of calculation. If this is the case, it would support the
findings of Copeland and Radvansky (2004) and indicate that the career identification
task is a situation where the representativeness heuristic is neither the quickest nor
simplest readily available strategy. The idea that the representativeness heuristic is a
more difficult strategy than answering correctly would explain why both the high and low
working memory span groups took longer to respond to the types of problems in which
they were more likely to use the representativeness heuristic.
For the career identification task, it was hypothesized that high working memory span
participants would be better at ignoring the irrelevant information (career stereotypes)
resulting in higher rates of accuracy. Considering that the high working memory span
participants were more prone to using the representativeness heuristic than the low
working memory span participants, apparently high working memory span participants
are not as good as the low working memory span participants at ignoring irrelevant
information. However, these questions do seem to have an element of trickery.
Considering that the majority of the information in the questions is irrelevant, the
participants may have assumed that there would be no reason to ask such a question if the
majority of the information was irrelevant. Therefore, the way that people respond to
these questions may not be indicative of decision making strategies. However, it is
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interesting that the high working memory span participants were quicker on the trials that
they were more likely to use the representativeness heuristic on while the low working
memory span participants were slower on the trials in which they were more likely to use
the representativeness heuristic. This would indicate that for the high working memory
span participants the representativeness heuristic is a less cognitively demanding process
than algorithmic strategies. It appears that the low working memory span participants
must initially use a more complicated strategy on all trials but when that strategy does not
result in an answer that they are satisfied with they then switch to a different strategy.
Apparently, the high working memory span participants are more skilled at quickly
finding the strategy they are most satisfied with than the low working memory span
participants.
On the hospital problem task both the high and low working memory span groups
used the representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems than on the easy
problems. This was confirmed by the Stuart-Maxwell Test. The Stuart-Maxwell test
indicated that the high span, χ2(2) = 158.13, p < .05, used the representativeness heuristic
on a higher percentage of easy problems than difficult problems but still used the
representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems than any other strategy. The
low working memory span, χ2(2) = 169.46, p < .05, used the representativeness heuristic
more than any other strategy on the easy problems but used a strategy resulting in the
wrong answer, presumably the “law of small numbers” (discussed later), on the difficult
problems. Interestingly, the low working memory span participants were quicker on the
easy problems than the difficult problems while the high working memory span
participants were quicker on the difficult problems than the easy problems. Therefore,

110

the high working memory span participants were quicker on the problems that they used
the representativeness heuristic on while the low working memory span participants were
slower on the trials in which they used the representativeness heuristic. This is similar to
the findings from the career identification task.
These findings can mean one of two things. First, it may mean that the
representativeness heuristic is a less cognitively demanding procedure for some people
but not for others. Second, it may mean that the representativeness is not always the first
strategy that people try. It may be that on all trials the low working memory span
participants initially tried to use an algorithm and were able to use an algorithm correctly
on the easy problems. However, on the difficult problems the low working memory span
participants failed to figure out how to use an algorithm, so they defaulted to the simpler
representativeness heuristic. The high working memory span participants may have been
able to differentiate the difficult problems from the easy problems and initially tried an
algorithm on the easy problems and the representativeness heuristic on the difficult
problems. As with the career identification task, it appears that the high working memory
span people quickly determine the strategy that they will use and stick with it while low
working memory span people will work through several strategies before selecting an
answer that they are satisfied with. From this finding, one could assume that working
memory span may be related to how confident a person is in their strategy selection.
Working memory span also appeared to affect performance on the weighted coin
tossing task. The low working memory span participants were more accurate than the
high working memory span participants on the weighted coin tossing task. Even though
the main effect of working memory span groups was not significant among the
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representativeness heuristic data, the high working memory span group (16.2%) used the
representativeness heuristic on a higher percentage of trials than the low working
memory span group (9.4%), F(1, 32) = 1.76, p = .194. Also, the high working memory
span participants (8846 msec) were marginally significantly faster than the low working
memory span participants (10638 msec), F(1, 32) = 3.70, p = .06, ηp2 = .104. As with the
career identification task, the participants appeared to find a strategy that was even
simpler than the representativeness heuristic. The participants could simply count the
heads in each sequence to infer that the sequence that contained more heads was more
probable. Again, as Copeland and Radvansky (2004) illustrated, people with higher
working memory capacities can use more difficult strategies to solve problems. This
“count the heads” strategy and the possible shortcomings of using this strategy will be
discussed in more detail in the discussion of differences in performance between the math
ability groups.
The current experiment appears to illustrate that the high working memory span
participants are quicker on trials in which they are more likely to use the
representativeness heuristic and the low working memory span are slower on the trials
that they used the representativeness heuristic. While the representativeness heuristic has
been thought to be a quicker strategy, it appears that is only the case for the high working
memory span participants. It appears that the high working memory span participants are
able to quickly discover the strategy that they find most appropriate to solve the problem
and only utilize that strategy. The low span participants appear to start with the same
strategy on all problems and if the initial strategy that they chose does not result in a
desired outcome then they default to an easier strategy, in this case, the
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representativeness heuristic. This indicates that, when making decisions, people that
have a high working memory span are quicker at choosing the strategy that they will use
to answer the questions.
For the career identification task, it was hypothesized that there would be differences
in performance between the working memory span groups. While there were differences
between the working memory span groups, there also appeared to be some differences in
performance between the math ability groups. Among the representativeness heuristic
data, the problem difficulty by math ability interaction reached marginal significance.
Upon inspection of the 95% confidence intervals within this interaction, it became clear
that while the high math ability participants’ performance on the easy and difficult
problems was not significantly different from one another, the low math ability
participants used the representativeness heuristic significantly more on the difficult
problems (59.5%) than on the easy problems (50.5%). If the representativeness heuristic
is a quicker strategy than the low math ability participants should have quicker reaction
times on the difficult problems than on the easy problems. The low math ability
participants displayed similar reaction times on the easy and difficult problems and were
accurate on a similar percentage of the easy and difficult problems. This implies that
among low math ability participants the representativeness heuristic in not a less
cognitively demanding strategy.
The main hypothesis for the hospital problems involved the math ability groups. It
was hypothesized that the high math ability participants will be more likely to have an
understanding of the “law of large numbers” making them more likely to answer these
questions accurately than the low math ability participants. The exit surveys indicated
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that only fourteen percent of the high math ability participants answered correctly (in
accordance with the “law of large numbers”) while sixteen percent of the low math
ability participants stated in the exit interview that they answered correctly. Fifty-one
percent of the high math ability participants stated in the exit interview that they used the
representativeness heuristic while only thirty-seven percent of the low math ability
participants stated that they used the representativeness heuristic. While the high math
ability participants were more likely to use the representativeness heuristic, the low math
ability participants seemed to utilize a different strategy that resulted in the wrong
answer.
Forty-four percent of the low math ability participants claimed to use a strategy in
which they identified the scenario that had a larger sample and selected that scenario.
This “law of small numbers1” strategy was used by only twenty-seven percent of the high
math ability participants. This was confirmed by the Stuart-Maxwell test (discussed
above). The Stuart-Maxwell test indicated that while the high math ability participants
used the representativeness heuristic on the majority of both the easy and difficult
problems, the low math ability group used the representativeness heuristic more on the
easy problems but chose the larger sample more often on the difficult problems. This
indicates that the low math ability participants switched from using the representativeness
heuristic on the easy problems to using the “law of small numbers” strategy on the
difficult problems.

1

Apparently, even though the high math ability participants were

This strategy was coined the Law of Small Numbers because the Law of Large Numbers points out that
the larger the sample the more representative it is of the population while the low math ability
participants appear to think that the smaller the sample the more representative it is of the
population.
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more likely to use the representativeness heuristic than the low math ability participants,
the high math ability participants still had a better understanding of probability theory
than the low math ability participants.
The current experiment illustrated that math ability influences performance on
the coin tossing task. It appears that the difficulty of the problems influenced the high
math ability participants and the low math ability participants differently. The data
indicated that as the number of coin tosses in a sequence increased, the low math ability
participants’ reaction time increased more than the high math ability participants. This
indicates that the difficulty variable influenced performance for the low math ability
participants more than for the high math ability participants. While both the low and high
math ability groups were accurate on this task, the reaction time data implies that the high
math ability participants’ cognitive processes remained consistent across levels of
difficulty while the low math ability participants’ cognitive processes were contingent on
the level of difficulty of the task.
Again, the participants seemed to be extremely accurate on the coin tossing task.
According to the exit survey data, more of the low math ability participants (83%)
claimed to use the correct strategy than the high math ability participants (76%). Also, a
higher percentage of the high math ability participants (18%) claimed to use the
representativeness heuristic than the low math ability participants (13%). This confirmed
the Stuart-Maxwell test findings (described above) that the low math ability participants
used a strategy resulting in the correct answer more than the high math ability
participants. Considering that knowing how to calculate the correct answer to the coin
flip sequences requires an understanding of probability (a topic that people that are better
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at math should be more familiar with), the high math ability participants should have
been more likely to use the correct strategy than the low math ability participants. The
fact that low math ability participants were more accurate than high math ability
participants may indicate that participants were using a strategy that results in the correct
answer other than calculating the probability of each sequence.
Initially, the weighted coin tossing task was created to be a more math intensive task
than the coin tossing task. It was hypothesized that to answer correctly students would
need to calculate the probability of each sequence. For the six toss sequences, the
participants would need to multiply six fractions together in order to calculate the
probability of each sequence. Even for people that have an extremely high level of math
ability, this could be a fairly daunting task. Since there was such a high accuracy rate on
the six toss sequences of the weighted coin tossing task, the participants must have been
using a strategy other than calculating the probability of each sequence. Upon analysis of
the exit survey data it became evident that the alternative strategy involved participants
counting the number of heads in each sequence and responding with the sequence that
contained more heads. A higher percentage of high math ability participants claimed to
use this “count the heads” strategy (78%) than low math ability participants (67%). It
appears that as math ability increases so does the ability to find an alternate algorithm
that results in a correct response. Also, more high working memory span participants
(76%) claimed to use the “count the heads” strategy than the low working memory span
participants (68%). This indicates that as working memory capacity increases, so does
the ability to find an alternate algorithm which results in a correct response. Combining
this finding with Copeland and Radvansky’s (2004) finding, it appears that not only does
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having a higher working memory span allow people to use a more complicated strategy
to solve a problem but it also allows them to develop an alternative strategy that results in
accurate responses.
It appears that math ability has a large influence on making decisions. While people
that are better at math used the representativeness heuristic more often on the hospital
problems task, the high math ability participants did appear to have a better
understanding of probabilities than low math ability participants. Also, according to the
exit survey data for the weighted coin tossing task, it appears that high math ability
participants are more likely to find an alternative strategy that results in accurate
responses. Apparently math ability not only influences a person’s ability to make
calculations but it also influences strategy selection and knowledge base that aids in
estimating probabilities to make decisions.
It is interesting that the participants found a more accurate strategy (“count the
heads”) than the representativeness heuristic that is simpler than the algorithmic strategy.
As discussed earlier, there was some evidence that when the representativeness heuristic
is used it is not the initial strategy that was used. Considering that on the problems in
experiment one the “count the heads” strategy resulted in a correct answer, it would be
interesting to see if participants would take longer and respond with answers consistent
with using the representativeness heuristic on problems in which the “count the heads”
strategy did not result in a definitive answer. If participants took longer and were more
likely to use the representativeness heuristic on problems in which the “count the heads”
strategy did not work then there would be evidence that the representativeness heuristic is
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not a strategy that participants use from the onset of the task but is instead more of a
contingency plan if other strategies to find the answer fail.
A major flaw of the current experiment was that a large percentage of the participants
that did not meet the criterion to have their data used in the study would have been
classified as low math ability. Remember, if the participants did not answer eighty-five
percent of the math problems on the operation span task correctly they were removed
from the analyses. This is standard operating procedure in working memory studies (i.e.,
Unsworth, et al., 2005). In the current study, thirteen participants were removed from the
study for not achieving a minimum score of eighty-five percent on the processing portion
of the operation span task. Of the thirteen participants that were removed, ten of them
earned scores on the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test that would
have placed them in the low math ability group (according to the above mentioned
median split criteria). One would think that if the low math ability participants that did
poorly on the OSPAN were removed from the analysis that there would be no differences
between the math ability groups in terms of working memory span. Despite a substantial
portion of the low math ability participants being removed from the analysis, the high
math ability group had significantly higher working memory spans than the low math
ability participants.

This indicates just how much the math ability groups differed in

working memory span. However, the math ability variable may have interacted
differently with other variables on the decision making tasks had more of the low math
ability participants qualified for the study. In the future, not using the eighty-five
percentage cut-off should be used in studies that are analyzing the effect of math ability
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because the cut-off dilutes the effect by removing many of the low math ability
participants from the study.
The data from the career identification task and the hospital problems indicated that
people with a high working memory span and high math ability were more likely to use
the representativeness heuristic. This may have more to do with the questions than the
participants’ working memory span and/or math ability. For the career identification
task, the participants may have been confused due to the task consisting of “trick
questions”. To answer the questions correctly the participants needed to ignore the
information in the character sketch and reply using basic probability knowledge. This
makes the entire character sketch useless when solving the problem. There is a chance
that participants have basic probability knowledge but assumed that the entire purpose of
the character sketch was to use the information available to make a probability judgment.
Fichhoff and Bar-Hillel (1984) surmised that utilizing all of the information in a problem
is an automatic problem solving strategy. To answer the career identification task
problems, participants must suppress an almost reflexive behavior. The career
identification problems appear to be trick questions because these questions are testing a
participant’s ability to suppress a reflexive behavior and not their ability to make a
decision. Because the problems were trick questions, it is difficult to claim that this task
is a decision making task and therefore makes it difficult to make claims about decision
making strategies from this task.
For people to answer the hospital problems correctly they must have a basic
understanding of the law of large numbers. Considering the large percentage of low
working memory span participants that stated in the exit interview that they responded
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with the scenario that involved the larger sample, it appears that the low working memory
span participants did not have the knowledge that was needed to answer these problems
correctly. Therefore, the hospital problems and the career identification task did not
seem to provoke the cognitive processes that are indicative of making decisions but
instead seem to either trick the participants or are above the ability levels of many of the
people that participated in this experiment.
While the career identification task and the hospital problems did not appear to be
decision making tasks, both of the coin tossing tasks did seem elicit decision making
strategies in participants. Even though the coin tossing and the weighted coin tossing
task elicited decision making strategies in participants, the participants did not use the
representativeness heuristic as much as anticipated. It may be that the task was too
simple. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) stated that among all possible sequences of six
coin tosses only H T T H T H (and, presumably, it’s opposite: T H H T H T) appear
really random. They also discussed that sequences of fewer than six tosses may not
appear random at all. If the tosses did not appear to be random then participants would
be less likely to use the representativeness heuristic and instead use a different strategy
(i.e., the “count the heads strategy”) that many participants claimed to use on the
weighted coin tossing task. Therefore, the differences in representativeness heuristic
usage between the math ability groups from the coin tossing task and the weighted coin
tossing task may not have been clear because the coin tossing sequences in the
experiment may not have appeared random enough. Experiment 2 takes this into account
and uses sequences of six, eight, ten, and twelve coin tosses per sequence in both the coin
tossing task and the weighted coin tossing task.
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As discussed above, on the weighted coin toss task, many of the participants admitted
to using a “count the heads” strategy. In the first experiment, all of the trials in the
weighted coin tossing task had one sequence that had more heads than the other
sequence. In the next experiment, in both the coin tossing task and the weighted coin
tossing task, half of the trials had both sequences with the same number of heads while
the other half of the trials consisted of two sequences that did not have the same number
of heads as one another. This was done to determine which strategy a person would use
when the “count the heads” did not result in a definitive answer. It was hypothesized
that there will be longer reaction times and higher usage of the representativeness
heuristic when the trials have the same number of heads in each sequence than when the
trials do not have the same number of heads in each sequence. If this is the case, there
will be evidence that the representativeness heuristic is used when participants have
attempted other strategies that did not work and then defaulted to a strategy that gives
them a reasonably correct answer.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 2
The participants in experiment one stated that they were using a strategy other than a
computational strategy or the representativeness heuristic to respond to the questions in
the weighted coin tossing task. This strategy entailed participants counting the number of
heads in each sequence and then selecting the sequence that contained more heads.
Therefore, this strategy was dubbed the “count the heads” strategy. The purpose of
Experiment 2 is to assess what the participants would do when the “count the heads”
strategy no longer resulted in a definitive answer. For Experiment 2, the coin tossing task
and the weighted coin tossing task were manipulated to analyze what strategy would be
used if the “count the heads” did not result in a definitive answer. Because the dual task
paradigm did not seem to have an effect in experiment one, it was not used in experiment
two.
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CHAPTER 6
METHODS
Participants
The participants were recruited from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV)
using the Psychology Department’s subject pool. Forty participants were tested in this
experiment. The mean age of the participants was 20.28. Nine of the participants were
male and the remaining thirty-one were female. Seven of the participants identified
themselves as African-American, six identified as Hispanic/Latino, nine identified
themselves as Asian/Pacific Islander, while the remaining eighteen identified themselves
as Caucasian.
Materials and Procedure
Participants responded to a (11-item) subject information sheet that asked them for
demographic information as well as questions about their previous math experience. The
participants also participated in the Operation Span Task (discussed earlier; Turner &
Engle, 1989), the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), and
two blocks of trials in which the participants were asked to judge which sequence of coin
tosses was more probable.
Subject Information Sheet
The subject information sheet asked participants various questions about their
background such as: age, gender, number of math classes taken in high school and
college, their grades for both their high school and college math courses, what types of
math classes they have taken, their college rank, and their ethnicity. The questions were
the same as Experiment 1. To keep the time of the experiment under an hour, in the
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current experiment the subject information questionnaire was presented on the computer
instead of a paper-pencil format, as in experiment one.
Operation Span Task
The Operation Span Task is the same as described in Experiment 1 and was used to
separate the participants into either the low or high working memory span group. The
were two differences between the Operation Span Task in Experiment 1 and the
Operation Span Task in Experiment 2. The first was that in Experiment 2 participants
that did not correctly answer at least 85% of the math questions were not removed from
the analysis. The reason that this criterion was not used was to ensure that a large percent
of the low math ability participants were not removed from the analysis. The second
difference was that the highest possible score on the word recall task was sixty in
Experiment 2 while it was sixty-six in Experiment 1.
WRAT
In Experiment 1, the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test 4th Ed.
was used. In the current experiment the math subsection of the Wide Range
Achievement Test 3rd Ed. was used. The tests have the same number of questions (40)
but the third edition seems to have more difficult problems than the fourth edition.
Hopefully, a more difficult test will differentiate the math ability groups better.
Weighted Coin Tossing Task
The weighted coin tossing task had the same format as in Experiment 1. There are
two differences between the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment 1 and in
Experiment 2. First, in Experiment 1, the participants saw four questions: one involving
two sequences with one toss per sequence, one with two tosses per sequence, one with
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four tosses per sequence and one with six tosses per sequence. In the current experiment,
the participants saw four questions but one contained six tosses per sequence, one
contained eight tosses per sequence, one with ten tosses per sequence, and one contained
twelve tosses per sequence. As discussed in the discussion section of the previous
experiment, the reason that there are more tosses per sequence is that Kahneman and
Tversky (1972) noted that coin toss sequences that involve fewer than six tosses cannot
appear random. Therefore, if there are fewer than six tosses in a sequence then it is
unlikely that participants will use the representativeness heuristic. The second difference
between the weighted coin tossing task in the current experiment and the weighted coin
tossing task in Experiment 1 is that in Experiment 2 half of the trials involved two
sequences that has the same number of heads in each sequence (even) while the other half
of the trials involved two sequences that did not have the same number of heads in each
sequence (uneven; see Appendix F for an example of an even and an uneven trial). The
trials that involved eight or twelve tosses in a sequence had an equal proportion of heads
in each sequence while the trials that involved six or ten tosses in a sequence did not have
the same number of heads in each sequence. As stated in the discussion section from
experiment one, many of the participants claimed to use the “count the heads” strategy.
The purpose of manipulating the congruency of the number of heads in each trial was to
see what strategy the participants would use when the “count the heads” strategy does not
result in a definitive answer.
In this task, on the even trials, the correct answer was the option labeled equal, the
representativeness heuristic answer was the option that appeared representative of the
overall population of events, and the wrong answer was the remaining option. For the
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uneven trials, the correct answer was the option that had the greater probability after
doing the calculation described in Experiment 1, the representativeness heuristic answer
was the option that seemed representative of the overall population of events, and the
wrong answer was the option labeled equal.
Coin Tossing Task
The coin tossing task is similar to Experiment 1. Just as the weighted coin tossing
task was changed from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, the coin tossing task was changed
in the same manner. Instead of there being one trial with one, one trial with two, one trial
with four, and one trial with six tosses per sequence, there was one trial with six, one trial
with eight, one trial with ten, and one trial with twelve tosses per sequence. Also, half of
the trials consisted of the options having the same number of heads in each sequence
while the other half consisted of options that have a different number of heads in each
sequence. In the coin tossing task the trials that had six or twelve tosses in a sequence
had the same proportion of heads in each sequence while the trials with eight or ten tosses
in a sequence did not have the same proportion of heads in each sequence. The reasoning
for this manipulation is the same as discussed above for the weighted coin tossing task.
In this task, the correct answer is the option labeled equal, the representativeness heuristic
answer was the option that seemed representative of the overall population of events, and
the wrong answer was the option in which the heads and the tails were grouped together.
See Appendix G for examples of these problems.
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CHAPTER 8
RESULTS
As in Experiment 1, there was a significant positive correlation between working
memory capacity and math ability, r(40) = .393, p < .05. The correlation indicates that
as scores on the math subsection of the Wide Range Achievement Test increased, scores
on the Operation Span Task also increased. Also, as in Experiment 1, participants were
grouped based on their performance on the math subsection of the Wide Range
Achievement Test and their scores on the Operation Span task. For the math subsection
of the Wide Range Achievement Test, the median of the participants’ scores was 29.5.
Participants that scored twenty-nine or below were place in the low math ability group
while participants that scored thirty or above were placed in the high math ability group.
For the Operation Span task the median of the participants’ scores was forty-five. The
participants that earned a score of forty-five or above were place in the high working
memory span group while the participants that earned a score of forty-four or below were
placed in the low working memory span group. Considering there was a significant
correlation between working memory span and math ability, it was of interest to see if the
math ability groups differed in terms of working memory capacity and if the working
memory span groups differed in terms of math ability. As in Experiment 1, there was a
difference between the math ability groups in terms of their operation span scores, t(38) =
-3.56, p < .05, such that the high math ability participants (48.1 words recalled correctly)
scored higher on the operation span task than the low math ability participants (41 words
recalled correctly). Unlike Experiment 1, there was a difference between the working
memory span groups in terms of their scores on the math subsection of the Wide Range
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Achievement Test, , t(38) = -3.37, p < .05, such that the high working memory span
participant (31.81) answered more items correctly than the low working memory span
participants (27).
Coin Tossing Task
In the coin tossing task, each participant was presented with four coin tossing
questions; one that involved six tosses per sequence, one that involved eight tosses per
sequence, one that involved ten tosses per sequence, and one that involved twelve tosses
per sequence. Each stimulus gave them three options for possible outcomes. Each trial
consisted of one correct answer (“Equal”), one answer that seems representative of the
overall population of events (e.g. “H T H H T H T T”), and one wrong answer (e.g. “H H
H H T T T T”). For this task, a separate 2 (math ability group) x 2 (working memory
span group) x 4 (number of tosses in a sequence) mixed model analysis of variance was
calculated with the dependent variables accuracy, responses consistent with the
representativeness heuristic, and reaction time. Also, a separate 2 (math ability group) x
2 (working memory span group) x 2 (proportion of heads in a sequence: even or different
number of heads in a sequence) mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with the
dependent variables accuracy, responses consistent with the representativeness heuristic,
and reaction time. Stuart-Maxwell tests for homogeneity of marginal distributions were
calculated. Stuart-Maxwell tests can be thought of as a within-subjects chi square. These
were calculated to see if the participants were using different types of responses within
each difficulty level and between each difficulty level. See Tables 17, 18,19, 20, 21, and
22 for a breakdown of participants’ responses.
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Analysis of Variance
Accuracy
The main effect of math ability group reached significance, F(1,36) = 5.18, p < .05,
ηp2 = .126. The high math ability participants (52.3%) were more accurate at the coin
tossing task than the low math ability participants (21.7%). Considering the drastic
differences in performance between the math ability groups on this task, math ability
appears to influence participants’ performance on the coin tossing task.
Representativeness Heuristic
The main effect of math ability reached significance, F(1,36) = 3.98, p = .05, ηp2 =
.100. This main effect indicates that the low math ability participants (71.7%) used the
representativeness heuristic more often than the high math ability participants (43.8%).
The main effect of working memory span reached marginal significance, F(1, 36) =
3.085, p = .088, ηp2 =.079. The high working memory span participants used the
representativeness heuristic (70%) more often than the low working memory span
participants (45.4%). While both math ability and working memory span influenced how
often people used the representativeness heuristic on this task, it appears that math ability
had a larger influence. It is also interesting that being better at math makes people less
likely to use the representativeness heuristic but having a higher working memory span
makes people more likely to use the representativeness heuristic.
It was of interest that the number of coin tosses in a sequence did not reach
significance. As stated earlier, because participants from Experiment 1 claimed to use
the “count the heads” strategy, half of the questions would involve sequences that had the
same number of heads in a sequence and half involved sequences that had a different
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number of heads in a sequence. While, among the representativeness heuristic data, the
number of tosses in a sequence did not reach significance, F(3, 108) = 1.44, p = .234, ηp2
=.039, there was a marginally significant difference in performance between the trials
that had the same number of heads in each sequence and the trials that had a different
number of heads in each sequence. The participants used the representativeness heuristic
more on the trials that had a different number of heads in each sequence (64.9%) than on
the trials that had the same number of heads in each sequence (50.5%), F(1, 36) = 3.88, p
= .057, ηp2 =.097. This is the exact opposite of what was expected. It appears that the
“count the heads” strategy was not used on the coin tossing task.
Reaction Time
For the coin tossing task, outliers were removed from each condition in the 2 (Math
Ability: High or low) x 2 (Working Memory Group: Low or High) x 4 (Coin Tosses: 6, 8,
10, and 12) factorial design. Scores were considered to be outliers if they were two and a
half standard deviations above or below the mean. Also, if a reaction time fell below 250
msec it was considered a microphone error and treated as an outlier. In each condition,
the outliers were replaced with the mean of that condition from the math ability group
from which the outlier was found. See Table 23 for a breakdown of the outliers.
Within the reaction time data the number of tosses by working memory span groups
interaction reached marginal significance, F(3, 108) = 2.55, p = .06, ηp2 =.066, see Figure
6. In this interaction the high working memory span participants increased in a nearly
linear pattern from the six toss sequences (5592 msec) through the eight toss sequences
(6012 msec) to the ten toss sequences (6740 msec). The high working memory span
participants were quicker on the on the twelve toss trials (5871 msec) than the ten toss
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trials. The low working memory span participants’ reaction time did not have a
distinctive pattern. The low working memory span participants increased in reaction time
from the six toss sequences (6109 msec) to the eight toss trials (7167 msec) and then
were quicker on the ten toss sequences (5608 msec). Finally the low working memory
span participants took longer on the twelve toss sequences (8277 msec) than the ten toss
sequences. The high working memory span participants reaction times are indicative of
using an algorithm for the six, eight, and ten toss sequences and then using a heuristic for
the twelve toss sequences, the low working memory span participants do not seem to be
using a consistent strategy across trials.
Stuart-Maxwell Tests
Stuart-Maxwell tests were done to determine if the pattern of responding (correct
answer, representativeness heuristic answer, or wrong answer) was different within the
six, eight, ten, and twelve toss sequences and between the six, eight, ten, and twelve toss
sequences. The Stuart-Maxwell test that included all of the participants, χ2(2) = 56.78, p
< .05, indicated that there is not marginal homogeneity between participant’s responses
on the six, eight, ten, and twelve toss sequences. The source of this difference appears to
be that the participants used the representativeness heuristic more than any other type of
strategy on the eight ten and twelve toss sequences and used representativeness heuristic
or a strategy that resulted in the correct answer equally on the six toss sequences.
The low math ability participants, χ2(2) = 26.99, p < .05, showed similar patterns of
results. There were two main differences between the low math ability participants and
the overall sample of participants. The first was that the low math ability participants
used the representativeness heuristic more than a strategy resulting in the correct answer
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on the six toss sequences. The second difference was that the discrepancy between the
number of times representativeness heuristic was used and the number of times a strategy
resulting in the correct answer was used on the twelve toss sequences was larger for the
low math ability participants than when all the participants were involved in the analysis.
The high math ability participants, χ2(2) = 34.38, p < .05, showed a different pattern of
results. On the six and twelve toss sequences, the high math ability participants were
correct more than using the representativeness heuristic while on the eight and ten toss
sequences the high math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic more
than they used a strategy resulting in the correct answer. It appears that the data for the
high math ability participants supports the marginally significant main effect for the
proportion of heads among the accuracy data.
It was of interest to see if the participants used different strategies on the problems
that had the same number of heads in a sequence and the problems that had more heads in
one sequence than the other sequence. When all of the participants were in the analysis,
χ2 (2) = 12.05, p < .05, on both the trials that had the same number of heads in a sequence
and the trials when one sequence had more heads in a sequence than the other,
participants used the representativeness heuristic more than any other strategy. However,
it appears that people used the representativeness heuristic more on the trials in which
there were more heads in one sequence than the other. The low math ability participants,
χ2 (2) = 12.58, p < .05, used the representativeness heuristic more on both types of trials
while the high math ability participants, χ2 (2) = 2.03, p > .05, NS, used the
representativeness heuristic more on the trials in which there was an unequal proportion
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of heads in the sequences, but were correct more often than used the representativeness
heuristic on the trials that had an equal proportion of heads in each sequence.
Summary
Math ability had a large influence on performance on the coin tossing task. The high
math ability participants were more accurate and used the representativeness heuristic
less than the low math ability participants. It was interesting that the Stuart-Maxwell test
indicated that the low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic more
on all types of problems while the high math ability participants seemed to use the
representativeness heuristic more on the trials with an unequal proportion of heads in the
sequences and a strategy resulting in the correct answer more on the trials that had an
equal proportion of heads in the sequences. While math ability appeared to influence the
strategy that people used, math ability did not appear to influence how long it took for
participants to solve the problems.
Weighted Coin Tossing Task
As in the coin tossing task, in the weighted coin tossing task each participant was
presented with four coin tossing questions; one that involved six tosses per sequence, one
that involved eight tosses per sequence, one that involved ten tosses per sequence and one
that involved twelve tosses per sequence. For the trials in which the proportion of heads
was the same in both sequences, the option that consisted of the word “Equal” was the
correct answer, the option that consisted of the heads and tails grouped together (i.e., H H
H T T T) was considered the wrong answer, and the option that looked random (i.e., H T
T H T H) was considered indicative of the participant using the representativeness
heuristic. For the trials in which one sequence had a higher proportion of heads than the
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other sequence, the option that looked random (i.e., H T T H T H) was considered
indicative of the participant using the representativeness heuristic, the option that
consisted of the heads and tails grouped together (i.e., H H H H T T) was considered the
correct answer, and the option with the word “Equal” was the considered the wrong
answer. On the weighted coin tossing task, on each trial the participants were told that
the coin was weighted so that sixty percent of the time it would land on heads and forty
percent of the time it would land on tails. For this task, a separate 2 (math ability group)
x 2 (working memory span group) x 4 (number of tosses in a sequence) mixed model
analysis of variance was calculated with the dependent variables accuracy, responses
consistent with the representativeness heuristic, and reaction time. Also, a separate 2
(math ability group) x 2 (working memory span group) x 2 (proportion of heads in a
sequence) mixed model analysis of variance was calculated with the dependent variables
accuracy, responses consistent with the representativeness heuristic, and reaction time.
Stuart-Maxwell tests for homogeneity of marginal distributions were calculated. StuartMaxwell tests can be thought of as a within-subjects chi square. These were calculated to
see if the participants were using different types of responses within each difficulty level
and between each difficulty level. See Tables 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 for a breakdown
of participants’ responses.
Analysis of Variance
Accuracy
There was a significant main effect for number of tosses in a sequence, F(3, 108) =
9.28, p < .05, ηp2 = .205. The participants were more accurate on the six (79%) and ten
(68%) toss trials than on the eight (43%) and twelve (27%) toss trials. On the eight and
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twelve toss trials there were the same number of heads in each sequence in the trials
while there was a different number of heads in each sequence on the six and ten toss
trials. When the data was collapsed such that the accuracy on the six and ten toss trials
were combined and the accuracy on the eight and twelve toss trials were combined there
was a significant main effect for proportion of heads between sequences, F(1, 36) =
21.59, p < .05, ηp2 = .375. This main effect indicated that the participants were more
accurate on the trials in which one sequence had a higher proportion of heads than the
other (73.3%) than on the trials in which both sequences had the same number of heads
(35.3%). The main effect of proportion of heads in a sequence implies that when the
count the heads strategy did not work (on the sequences with equal proportions of heads)
they were less accurate than on the trials in which the “count the heads” strategy did
result in a definitive answer (trials with uneven proportions of heads in a sequence).
Representativeness Heuristic
There was a marginally significant main effect for number of tosses in a sequence,
F(3, 108) = 2.67, p = .05, ηp2 = .068. The participants used the representativeness on
19%, 35%, 31%, and 49% of the six, eight, ten, and twelve toss sequences, respectively.
For the analysis involving the proportion of heads per sequence, the participants used the
representativeness heuristic more on the trials in which there were the same number of
heads in each sequence (42%) than on the trials in which there was a different number of
heads in each sequence (25%), F(1, 36) = 6.15, p < .05, ηp2 = .146. This indicates that on
the weighted coin tossing task, participants relied more on a heuristic when counting the
number of heads in a sequence did not result in a definitive answer than when it did result
in a definitive answer. There was also a marginally significant interaction between the
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math ability groups and whether there was the same number of heads in each sequence,
F(1, 36) = 3.16, p = .08 ηp2 = .081. According to the 95% confidence intervals the low
math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the problems that
had the same number of heads in a sequence (55%) than on the trials that had a different
number of heads in each sequence (27%). However, according to the 95% confidence
intervals the high math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic roughly
the same percentage of trials that had the same number of heads per sequence (28%) as
they did on the trials that had a different number of heads in each sequence (23%). This
implies that the high math ability participants used the same strategy on all trials and the
low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic on the trials that the
count the heads strategy did not result in a definitive answer while they used the count the
heads strategy on trials in which the “count the heads” strategy resulted in a definitive
answer.
Reaction Time
As with the coin tossing task, for the weighted coin tossing task, outliers were
removed from each condition in the 2 (Math Ability: High or low) x 2 (Working Memory
Group: Low or High) x 4 (Coin Tosses: 6, 8, 10, and 12) factorial design. Scores were
considered to be outliers if they were two and a half standard deviations above or below
the mean. Also, if a reaction time fell below 250 msec it was considered a microphone
error and treated as an outlier. In each condition, the outliers were replaced with the
mean of that condition from the math ability group from which the outlier was found.
See table 24 for a breakdown of the outliers.
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There was a significant main effect for number of tosses in a sequence, F(3, 108) =
8.03, p < .05, ηp2 = .182. The participants were quicker on the six (9196 msec) and ten
(9747 msec) toss sequences than on the eight (13303 msec) and twelve (14150 msec) toss
sequences. This main effect is explained by the main effect of proportion of heads in a
sequence (see below). There was also a marginally significant number of tosses per
sequence by math ability group by working memory span interaction, F(3, 108) = 8.03, p
= .059, ηp2 = .066 (see Figure 7a and 7b). This interaction appears to reach marginal
significance due to the strong main effect of the proportion of heads in a sequence.
For the analysis consisting of the proportion of heads factor, there was a main effect
of the proportion of heads in a sequence, F(1, 36) = 23.42, p < .05, ηp2 = .394. The
participants were quicker on the trials that had a different number of heads in each
sequence (9471 msec) than the trials that had the same number of heads per sequence
(13726 msec). This supports the hypothesis that participants tried the count the heads
strategy but when that did not result in a definitive answer a different strategy was then
used.
There was also a significant math ability group by working memory span group by
proportion of heads per sequence interaction, F(1, 36) = 5.51, p < .05, ηp2 = .133, see
Figures 8a and 8b. For the low math ability participants, neither the high nor low
working memory span participants appear on the uneven problems than the even
problems. For the high math ability participants, while the high working memory span
participants recorded similar reaction times on both the even and uneven problems, the
low working memory span participants were quicker on the uneven problems than on the
even problems. Therefore, as problems increase in difficulty, working memory span
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appears to affect performance for the high math ability participants but not the low math
ability participants.
Stuart-Maxwell Tests
Stuart-Maxwell tests were done to determine if the pattern of responding (correct
answer, representativeness heuristic answer, or wrong answer) was different within the
two, four, and six toss sequences and between the six, eight, ten, and twelve toss
sequences. The Stuart-Maxwell test that included all of the participants, χ2(2) = 53.45, p
< .05, indicated that the participants used a strategy resulting in the correct answer more
than the representativeness heuristic on the six and ten toss sequences but used the
representativeness heuristic more than a strategy resulting in the correct answer on the
eight and twelve toss sequences. This same pattern was found for the low math ability
participants, χ2(2) = 26.23, p < .05, and the high math ability participants, χ2(2) = 28.03, p
< .05.
The Stuart-Maxwell tests were also done comparing the trials that had the same
number of heads in each sequence to the trials that had a different number of heads in
each sequence. When all the participants were involved in the analysis, χ2(2) = 24.47, p
< .05, the participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the trials that had the
same number of heads in each sequence but used a strategy resulting in the correct
answer more on the trials that had more heads in one sequence than the other. The
discrepancy between using a strategy resulting in the correct answer and using the
representativeness heuristic was larger on the problems in which there were more heads
in one sequence than the other than in the trials in which there were the same number of
heads in each sequence. The patterns for the low math ability patterns, χ2(2) = 11.26, p <
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.05, were nearly identical. However, there were very different patterns for the high math
ability participants. The high math ability participants, χ2(2) = 13.9, p < .05, used a
strategy resulting in the correct answer more than the representativeness heuristic on both
types of problems. The discrepancy between the percentage of trials that the high math
ability participants used the representativeness heuristic and the percentage of trials that
they were correct was larger on the uneven trials than on the even trials. However, the
high math ability participants illustrated that they have a strong understanding of
probability theory and use this understanding to answer the problems correctly, regardless
of the difficulty of the problem.
Summary
The overall sample participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the
problems that had the same number of heads in a sequence than on the problems in which
one sequence had more heads than the other sequence. While the low math ability
participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the trials with the same number
of heads in each sequence than on the trials that had more heads in one sequence than
another, the high math ability participants used a strategy resulting in the correct answer
than any other strategy regardless of whether the sequences had the same number of
heads or not. This appears to mean that when the low math ability participants could not
use the “count the heads” strategy that they were likely to default to the
representativeness heuristic. However, when the “count the heads” strategy did not work
for the high math ability participants they used a different strategy that resulted in the
correct answer.
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CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION
There were two main purposes of Experiment 2. The first is to see if there would be
math ability effects if the coin toss sequences appeared more random than they did in
Experiment 1. The second was to see how participants would react if the “count the
heads” strategy no longer resulted in a definitive answer. On the coin tossing task, the
high math ability participants were more accurate than the low math ability participants.
Also, the low math ability participants answered with responses in line with usage of the
representativeness heuristic more often than the high math ability participants.
Considering that the coin toss sequences looked more random in Experiment 2 than in
Experiment 1, it appears that the randomness of the sequences induced the effects that we
had originally predicted, that the high math ability participants would be more accurate
and less likely to use the representativeness heuristic than the low math ability
participants.
Also, on the coin tossing task participants used the representativeness heuristic more
on the trials that had a different number of heads in each sequence than on the trials that
had the same number of heads in each sequence. It was hypothesized that if participants
were using the “count the heads” strategy that they would default to the
representativeness heuristic on the trials that had the same number of heads in each trial
because the “count the heads” strategy would not result in a definitive answer. Therefore,
it appears that participants were not using the count the heads strategy on the coin tossing
task.
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The weighted coin tossing task was originally thought to be more math intensive than
the coin tossing task. However, Experiment 1 illustrated that the participants were using
the “count the heads” strategy to arrive at a correct answer. This “count the heads”
strategy is simpler than calculating the probability of each sequence. On the weighted
coin tossing task in Experiment 2 it was found that the participants used the
representativeness heuristic more on the trials that had the same number of heads in each
sequence than on the trials that had a different number of heads in each sequence. Also,
participants took longer on the trials that had the same number of heads in each sequence
than on the trials that had a different number of heads in each sequence. These findings
imply that participants initially tried to use the “count the heads” strategy and then
defaulted to the representativeness heuristic when the “count the heads” strategy did not
result in a definitive answer.
In the representativeness heuristic data, there was also a math ability by proportion of
heads in a sequence interaction. This interaction indicated that the source of the main
effect of the proportion of heads factor could be found among the low math ability group
data. The low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic more on the
trials that had the same number of heads in a sequence compared to the trials that had a
different number of heads in a sequence, while the high math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic in both types of trials roughly the same percentage of times.
In fact, the interpretation of the Stuart-Maxwell test pointed out that the high math ability
used a strategy resulting in the correct answer more regardless of the proportion of heads
in a sequence while the low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic
more often when there were the same number of heads in each sequence but appeared to
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use the “count the heads” strategy on the problems in which one sequence had more
heads than the other. Because the high math ability participants seemed to use the same
strategy consistently across trials and because they were more accurate, the high math
ability participants seem to have a better understanding of probability theory than the low
math ability participants, resulting in high math ability participants making better
decisions than low math ability participants.
The participants’ performance on the coin tossing task clearly indicates that people
that are better at math have a better understanding of probability theory. The weighted
coin tossing task presented participants with a situation in which the basic probability
knowledge needed is readily available. The calculation that is needed to utilize this
knowledge was fairly daunting, therefore, the participants found an easier strategy
(“count the heads”) to arrive at the correct answer. When this strategy did not
differentiate the sequences, the low math ability participants defaulted to using
representativeness heuristic while the high math ability participants continued to get the
majority of the questions correct. This implies that when people do not have the skill set
to arrive at an answer the representativeness heuristic is utilized in a similar fashion to the
Take the Best heuristic. As stated earlier, when using the Take the Best heuristic people
rank strategies to find an answer in terms of ecological validity and then use each strategy
in turn until a definitive answer is found. The results from Experiment 2 imply that the
representativeness heuristic is deemed to have low ecological validity and is only used
when all other possible strategies fail to result in a definitive answer.

142

CHAPTER 10
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The premise of the current study was to see if math ability and working memory span
influence a person’s ability to make decisions. The decision making tasks were based on
Kahneman and Tversky’s research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, & 1973). The logic behind the premise was that people that are good at math have
a better understanding of probability theory. This better understanding of probability
theory gives people that are good at math the ability to determine which outcomes are
more likely, resulting in people that are good at math being better at making decisions
than people that are bad at math. Also, people that have a higher working memory
capacity are less distracted by irrelevant information and should, therefore, be better at
focusing on the information necessary to make correct decisions than people with a lower
working memory capacity.
In Experiment 1, participants were extremely accurate on both the coin tossing task
and the weighted coin tossing task. It was surmised that participants were accurate
because coin tossing sequences of six or fewer cannot appear random enough to trigger
participants to use the representativeness heuristic. This was taken into account in
Experiment 2 and the sequences were not only longer but precautions were taken to make
them appear more random than they appeared in Experiment 1. Experiment 1 also
indicated that there may be a strategy other than an algorithmic calculation or the
representativeness heuristic that people may be using on these tasks. In Experiment 1, on
the weighted coin tossing task, participants clearly indicated that they were counting the
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number of heads in each sequence and selecting the sequence that had more heads as the
more probable sequence.
In Experiment 2, usage of the “count the heads” strategy was taken into account when
designing the stimuli. On the coin tossing task in Experiment 2, the high math ability
participants were more accurate and were less likely to use the representativeness
heuristic than the low math ability participants. Apparently, when the trials appear
random, math ability influences a person’s ability to make accurate decisions. On the
weighted coin tossing task in Experiment 2, participants used the representativeness
heuristic more on the trials that had the same number of heads in each sequence than on
the trials in which one sequence had more heads than the other sequence. Also,
participants were quicker on the trials with an unequal proportion of heads between
sequences than on the trials that had an equal proportion of heads between sequences.
The longer reaction times on trials in which participants used the representativeness
heuristic implies that participants initially tried to use the “count the heads” strategy and
when that did not result in a definitive answer the participants then used the
representativeness heuristic.
Interestingly, the high math ability participants used a strategy resulting in the correct
answer more than any other strategy regardless of the proportion of heads in a sequence.
However, the low math ability participants appeared to use the count the heads strategy
more on the trials with an unequal proportion of heads between sequences but used the
representativeness heuristic on the trials that had an equal proportion of heads between
sequences. Apparently, participants that are better at math used their knowledge of
probability to figure out the answer when the “count the heads” strategy did not work
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while the low math ability participants used the representativeness heuristic when the
“count the heads” strategy did not work. These findings imply that people that are better
at math are also better at making decisions.
In Experiment 1, the results from the career identification task and the hospital
problems seemed fairly inconclusive. This may be because these tasks appear to be
“trick” questions. The questions in the career identification task involved detailed
descriptions of people. All of the information given was irrelevant considering the
correct answer and was there for the sole purpose of distracting the participants from
using a more accurate strategy. The hospital problems task required people to have a
basic understanding of the law of large numbers to arrive at the correct answer. This
seemed to be too much to ask of the participants in this experiment, most notably for the
low math ability participants. The purpose of the current study was to gain insight into
the cognitive processes that people use when making decisions. Considering that the
career identification task appears to dupe participants and that the students did not have
the knowledge base to do the hospital problems task effectively, these two tasks did not
appear to give insight on the cognitive processes involved in making decisions.
While performance on the hospital problems did not appear to be indicative of a
decision making process, performance on the hospital problems did give some insight
into how the characteristics of a stimulus can trigger people to use a particular strategy to
answer the question. When the hospital problems were easy, participants sped through
the problems and utilized the simplest strategy possible. However, on the difficult
problems, participants paid more attention to the question and utilized a more algorithmic
type of strategy. Apparently, when a problem appears to be easy, people tend to not pay
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much attention to the task and deploy a simple strategy but when the problems are more
difficult, the participants may pay more attention to the question, resulting in them using
a more complicated strategy. Considering that the high working memory span
participants were both quicker and more likely to use a simple strategy, it appears that
having a high working memory span may result in people being overconfident in their
simple strategy and may need to slow down and focus more of their attention on a task
before responding.
Aside from determining how math ability and working memory capacity influence
decision making, the current experiments are unique for two reasons. First, the
experiments in the current paper are the first to manipulate the difficulty of the stimuli in
decision making tasks. In Experiment 1, on the hospital problems, the difficult problems
consisted of more precise numbers than the easy problems. This manipulation clearly
indicated that when the problems were easy that participants paid very little attention to
the task, resulting in them using a simple (heuristic) strategy. On the difficult problems,
participants spent more time working on the problem which resulted in more accurate
responses. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1971) experiment showed that expert statisticians
are vulnerable to using the representativeness heuristic in hospital-type problems.
However, the population sizes in their experiment involved rounded numbers. The
results of the current experiment indicate that the expert statisticians in Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1971) experiment may have sped through the questions, resulting in usage
of the representativeness heuristic. Apparently, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1971)
findings clearly showed how to trick experts into responding in a certain manner instead
of indicating how people make probability based decisions.
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On the career identification task, the difficult problems had more career stereotypes
than the easy problems. Participants’ probability estimates were closer to the correct
answer on the easy problems than on the difficult problems. Also, participants used the
representativeness heuristic more on the difficult problems than on the easy problems.
For the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment 2, the difficulty of the trials was
manipulated by whether or not the “count the heads” strategy would differentiate between
the two sequences. The low math ability participants used the representativeness
heuristic more on the problems that had the same number of heads in each sequence but
not on the trials in which one sequence had more heads than the other sequence. For both
the career identification task and the weighted coin tossing task in experiment 2, when
the problems were more difficult, participants were more likely to use the
representativeness heuristic. It appears that people attempt a different strategy than the
representativeness to solve problems but default to the representativeness heuristic when
the problems become too challenging to calculate the correct answer.
The second unique aspect of the current experiment is that reaction times were
collected. As discussed throughout this paper, research has indicated that heuristic
strategies are quicker than using an algorithm to calculate the correct answer. However,
before the current experiment, there has not been any empirical evidence that supported
that using heuristic-based strategies was quicker than using computation-based strategies.
The results from the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment 2 clearly indicated that
participants were quicker on the trials that they used the “count the heads” strategy than
on the trials that they used the representativeness heuristic. Theoretically, counting the
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number of heads in both of the sequences should take longer than deciding which of the
sequences appears to be more random.
It seems nonsensical to believe that it would take a person less time to count the
number of heads in each sequence, compare the two numbers, and finally select the
sequence that has more heads than it would take to identify the sequence that appears
more random. As stated earlier, Kahneman and Fredrick (2002) proposed a model in
which there were two systems that are utilized when making a decision. System 1 is a
less effortful and quicker system, while System 2 is more effortful and takes longer to
compute the answer. From these descriptions, it appears that the “count the heads”
strategy is a more effortful strategy than the representativeness heuristic. If the “count
the heads” strategy is more effortful, then why does it take participants less time to use
the “count the heads” strategy than the less effortful representativeness heuristic?
Considering that on half of the trials the “count the heads” strategy was an effective
strategy and on half of the trials it was ineffective, clearly, the participants initially
attempted to use the “count the heads” strategy and defaulted to the representativeness
heuristic when the “count the heads” strategy failed.
This finding has a major implication. It appears that the representativeness heuristic is
not the initial strategy that people utilize. Instead, the representativeness heuristic is used
in a manner similar to the Take the Best Heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Apparently, people identify all possible strategies that can be used to solve the problems.
The strategies are then placed in order based on their ecological validity. People then use
the strategy with the highest ecological validity. If the strategy with the highest
ecological validity fails, then they move on to the strategy with the second highest
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ecological validity, and so on. The data from the weighted coin tossing task in
Experiment 2 supports the idea that people initially used the “count the heads” strategy.
When the “count the heads” strategy failed to differentiate between the two sequences,
the participants moved on to the next strategy. Because the participants attempted the
“count the heads” strategy before attempting the representativeness heuristic, participants
took longer on the trials that they responded consistently with the representativeness
heuristic than on the trials that they responded consistently with the “count the heads”
strategy. This does not imply that the representativeness heuristic requires System 2
processing. Considering that the “count the heads” strategy still seems fairly simple, the
fact that the representativeness heuristic took longer than the “count the heads” strategy
implies that System 1 processes are not done simultaneously but are instead done serially.
Considering that the representativeness heuristic is not the initial strategy used, it
appears that the ordering of the strategies, in terms of ecological validity, is what
separates a good decision maker from a poor decision maker. In Experiment 2, the high
math ability participants were more accurate on the coin tossing task. Also, in
Experiment 2, on the weighted coin tossing task the low math ability participants used the
representativeness heuristic when the “count the heads” strategy did not work while the
high math ability participants continued to answer the problems correctly when the
“count the heads” strategy did not work. Considering, that the “count the heads” strategy
was a quick strategy that resulted in the correct answer, it is logical to rank that strategy
highest, in terms of ecological validity. It appears that the high math ability participants
ranked an algorithmic strategy second, while the low math ability participants ranked the
representativeness heuristic second, in terms of ecological validity. Considering that high
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math ability participants have a better understanding of probability, it is logical that high
math ability participants would be better at ranking decision making strategies in order of
ecological validity than low math ability participants. The data from Experiment 2
supports this logic.
It appears that math ability does influence people’s ability to make decisions. In the
future, research should use decision making tasks that are more indicative of decisions
that people make in their day-to-day activities. For example, Sheldrick (2004) used a
task called “Chicken” in which participants were placed in front of a computer and were
asked to decide whether a car should stop or continue driving through an intersection as
the traffic light turned from green to yellow. Another example of everyday decisions
would be Langer and Tubman’s (1997) research that assessed participants’ ability to
make risky sexual decisions. It is hypothesized that people that are better at math are
better at judging all types of probabilities, including those that involve the likelihood of
getting in a car accident in a variety of situations or the probability of contracting a
sexually transmitted disease.
The current experiment clearly illustrates that math ability influences decision making
ability. Math tasks usually involve a person attempting various strategies to solve a
problem. Therefore, it is logical that high math ability people are well practiced at
quickly finding strategies that result in correct answers. The current study indicates that
people that are better at math are also better at detecting effective strategies to make
decisions. Apparently, learning math in high school not only influences a person’s ability
to get into college but also influences their ability to make decisions throughout their life.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE PROBLEMS
Problem 1: A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45
babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day.
As you know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage
varies from day to day. Sometimes it might be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60
percent of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such
days?
-

The larger hospital

-

The smaller hospital

-

About the same (that is within 5 percent of each other)

Problem 2: There are two jars full of jelly beans. Each has 50% red jelly beans and
50% blue jelly beans. Jar A has a total of 1000 jelly beans while Jar B has 500 total jelly
beans.
For 10 days I pull out 10 jelly beans from each jar and then place them back into the
jar. Which of the two jars will record more days where at least 6 of the ten jelly beans
that were pulled out are red?
-

Jar A

-

Jar B

-

About the same
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Problem 3: In a small city there are two ice cream parlors. Each of the ice cream
parlors only has the flavors of chocolate and vanilla. Each parlor reports that they
typically sell 50% chocolate and 50% vanilla. Parlor A has an average of 20 patrons per
day, while Parlor B has an average of 40 patrons per day. Over the course of a year,
which parlor is more likely to report more days in which they sell 80% chocolate?
-

Parlor A
Parlor B
Both parlors are equally likely

Problem 4: A person is holding a typical six sided die. Half of the sides contain an
even number, while the other half contain an odd number. On Monday, the person rolls
the die 200 times and on Tuesday the person rolls the die 400 times. On which day is the
person more likely to roll the die and land on an odd number 70% of the time?
-

Monday
Tuesday
Both days are equally likely

Problem 5: There are two ice skating rinks in a city. Rink A has an average of 325
patrons per day while Rink B has an average of 728 patrons per day. In both rinks
68.84% of people fall while they are skating. Over the course of a year, which rink is
likely to have more days in which more than 85% of patrons fall while skating?
Rink A
Rink B
Both rinks are equally likely
Problem 6: There are two soda companies. It has been reported that 74.29% of
consumers drink diet soda while the remaining 25.71% percent of consumers drink
regular soda. Fizzy Soda has an average of 1374 customers per day, while Bubbly Soda
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has an average of 2347 customers per day. Over the course of a year, which soda
company is more likely to report more days in which at least 85.93% of soda sold is diet
soda?
Fizzy Soda
Bubbly Soda
Both sodas are equally likely

Problem 7: In a small town there are two different gas stations. Each gas station
reports that 89.94% of customers purchase unleaded gasoline while the remaining
10.06% purchase leaded gasoline. Smelly Gas has an average of 464 customers while PU
Gas has 967 customers. Over the course of a year, which gas station is more likely to
record more days in which at least 98.62% purchase unleaded gasoline?
Smelly Gas
PU Gas
Both gas stations are equally likely

Problem 8: Classes at UNLV average having 86.25% of students passing the class
and 13.75% failing the class. There are two Psychology 101 classes at UNLV taught by
the same professor. One has 73 students and the other has 32 students. Which class is
more likely to have 3% of students failing?
A) The larger class
B) The smaller class
C) Both classes are equally likely
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Instructions (Taken from Kahneman and Tversky, 1973):
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30
engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this
information, thumbnail descriptions of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written.
You will be presented with five descriptions, chosen at random from the 100 available
descriptions. For each description, please indicate the probability that the person
described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100.
Character Descriptions (the first taken from Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; the rest
will be created from results of pilot data):
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally
conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues
and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry,
sailing, and mathematical puzzles.
The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is
____ %.

Mike is a 48-year-old man. He is not married. He is generally hardworking, smart,
but quite a liar. He was on the debate team in high school and spends the majority of his
free time on his many hobbies which include playing softball and watching movies but
avoids any task that involves fixing or building.
The probability that Mike is one of the 70 lawyers in the sample of 100 is ____ %.
Pete is a 44 year old man. He is married with no children. He is generally hardworking, smart, and efficient. He enjoys working with his hands and spends the majority
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of his free time on his many hobbies such as bird watching, cheering for his favorite
football team, and watching movies.
The probability that Pete is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is ____
%.
Chris is a 37 year old man. He is married with one child. He is generally
conservative, laid-back, and organized. He avoids all political conversations and spends
the majority of his free time on his hobbies such as playing video games, spending time
with his family, and volunteering at a homeless shelter.
The probability that Chris is one of the 70 lawyers in the sample of 100 is ____
%.
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If you were to flip a coin 1 time which outcome is more likely (H=heads and T=tails):
1.
2.
3.

H (heads)
T (tails)
Equal

If you were to flip a coin 2 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
1.
TH
2.

TT

3.

Equal

If you were to flip a coin 4 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
1.
THTH
2.

TTTT

3.

Equal

If you were to flip a coin 6 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
1.
HTHTHT
2.

HHHTTT

3.

Equal
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Imagine that you were given a “trick” coin. This “trick” coin is weighted such that
60% of the time it will land on heads and 40% of the time it will land on tails.
If you were to flip the “trick” coin 4 times which outcome is more likely (H = heads
and T = tails):
A)
THTH
B)
THHH
C)
Equal
Imagine that you were given a “trick” coin. This “trick” coin is weighted such that
60% of the time it will land on heads and 40% of the time it will land on tails.
If you were to flip the “trick” coin 6 times which outcome is more likely (H = heads
and T = tails):
A)
THTHTH
B)
HHHTHT
C)
Equal
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The following questions will be answered in a discussion format. Please answer them
aloud. The researcher may ask follow-up questions based on your responses. You
responses are being recorded so that at a later time a researcher can categorize your
responses.
1. Earlier you saw the question:
In a small city there are two ice cream parlors. Parlor A has an average of 20 patrons
per day, while Parlor B has an average of 40 patrons per day. Each of the ice cream
parlors only has the flavors of chocolate and vanilla. Each parlor reports that they
typically sell 50 percent chocolate and 50 percent vanilla. When customers order ice
cream, the percentage of people that order chocolate ice cream can vary. Sometimes it
might be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of one year, each ice cream parlor recorded the days on which more than
60 percent of the ice cream sales were for chocolate ice cream. Which of the two ice
cream parlors do you think will record more such days?
A) Parlor A
B) Parlor B
C) Both parlors are equally likely
1a) What was your answer?
1b) How did you arrive at your answer? What strategy did you use?
2. Earlier you saw the question:
Al is a 46-year-old man. He is not married. He is generally good with numbers,
liberal, and sociable. He scored well on the math section of the SAT and spends his free
time on hobbies such as volunteering by building homes for Habitat for Humanity,
watching football and playing volleyball.
The probability that Al is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is ____ %.
2a) What was your answer?
2b) How did you arrive at your answer? What strategy did you use?

3. Earlier you saw the question:
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If you were to flip a coin 2 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
A)
HH
B)

TH

C)

Equal

3a) What was your answer?
3b) How did you arrive at your answer? What strategy did you use?
4. Earlier you saw the question:
Imagine that you were given a “trick” coin. This “trick” coin is weighted such
that 60% of the time it will land on heads and 40% of the time it will land on tails.
If you were to flip the “trick” coin 2 times which outcome is more likely
(H=heads and T=tails):
1.
TH
2.

TT

3.

Equal

4a) What was your answer?
4b) How did you arrive at your answer? What strategy did you use?
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An example of a trial with a different number of heads in each sequence:
Imagine that you were given a “trick” coin. This “trick” coin is weighted such
that 60% of the time it will land on heads and 40% of the time it will land on tails.
If you were to flip the “trick” coin 6 times which outcome is more likely
(H=heads and T=tails):
A) H T T H T H
B) H H H H T T
C) Equal

An example of a trial with the same number of heads in each sequence:
Imagine that you were given a “trick” coin. This “trick” coin is weighted such
that 60% of the time it will land on heads and 40% of the time it will land on tails.
If you were to flip the “trick” coin 8 times which outcome is more likely
(H=heads and T=tails):
A) T T T T H H H H
B) H T H H T H T T
C) Equal
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Examples of trials with the same number of heads in each sequence:
If you were to flip a coin 6 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
D) H T T H T H
E) H H H T T T
F) Equal
If you were to flip a coin 12 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
A) H T H T H H T H T T H T
B) H H H H H H T T T T T T
C) Equal

Examples of trials with a different number of heads in each sequence:
If you were to flip a coin 8 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
D) T T T T T H H H
E) H T H H T H T T
F) Equal
If you were to flip a coin 10 times which outcome is more likely (H=heads and
T=tails):
A) H H H H H H T T T T
B) H T H H T H T T H T
C) Equal
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APPENDIX B
FIGURES AND TABLES
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Figure 1a. The percentage of trials the Low Working Memory Span/Low Math Ability, Low
Working Memory Span/High Math Ability, High Working Memory Span/Low Math Ability,
and High Working Memory Span/High Math Ability used on the easy and difficult problems
in the control block of trials.
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Hospital Problems: Dual Task Trials
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Figure 1b. The percentage of trials the Low Working Memory Span/Low Math Ability, Low
Working Memory Span/High Math Ability, High Working Memory Span/Low Math Ability,
and High Working Memory Span/High Math Ability used on the easy and difficult problems
in the dual task block of trials.
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Figure 2. The percentage of trials that the representativeness heuristic was used on each
level of difficulty of the career identification task by each math ability group.
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Figure 3a. The reaction time on the career identification task for each math ability group as
a function of working memory span group on the control task trials.
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Figure 3b. The reaction time on the career identification task for each math ability group as
a function of working memory span group on the dual task trials.
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Figure 4. The percentage of trials that the representativeness heuristic was used in the two,
four, and six toss sequences on each task.
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Figure 5. The average reaction time for each math ability group on the one, two, four, and
six toss sequences on the coin tossing task.
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Figure 6. The average reaction time of each working memory span group on each sequence
length.
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Figure 7a. Of the low math ability participants, the average reaction time for the low and
high working memory span groups on each sequence length.
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Figure 7b. Of the high math ability participants, the average reaction time for the low and
high working memory span groups on each sequence length.
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Figure 8a. Of the low math ability participants, the average reaction time for the low and
high working memory span groups on the problems that had the same number of heads in
each sequence and on the problems that had a different number of heads in each sequence.
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Figure 8b. Of the high math ability participants, the average reaction time for the low and
high working memory span groups on the problems that had the same number of heads in
each sequence and on the problems that had a different number of heads in each sequence.
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Easy Problems
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Difficult Problems
51
225
144

109
165
146

Table 1. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult hospital
problems for all participants.

174

Easy Problems
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

21
113
82

Difficult Problems
52
76
88

Table 2. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult hospital
problems for the low math ability participants.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Easy Problems
30
112
62

Difficult Problems
57
89
58

Table 3. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult hospital
problems for the high math ability participants.

176

Control
Easy

Dual

Low Math Ability

2

Difficult
2

High Math Ability

2

2

Difficult

Easy
0

1

2

2

Table 4. Outliers for Each Math Ability Group in Each Condition of the hospital problems
task.
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Easy Problems
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Difficult Problems
204
421
206

209
469
153

Table 5. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult career
identification task problems for all participants.
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Easy Problems
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

102
207
107

Difficult Problems
107
233
76

Table 6. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult career
identification task problems for the low working memory span participants.
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Easy Problems
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

102
207
107

Difficult Problems
107
233
76

Table 7. The total number of each type of response on both the easy and difficult career
identification task problems for the high working memory span participants.

180

Control
Easy

Dual
Easy

Difficult

Low Working Memory Span

0

0

2

Difficult
1

High Working Memory Span

1

0

0

0

Table 8. Outliers for each math ability group in each condition of the career
identification task.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Two Tosses
144
51
13

Four Tosses
150
48
12

Six Tosses
146
49
15

Table 9. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss sequences
for all participants on the coin tossing task.
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Two Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

77
20
9

Four Tosses
78
21
9

Six Tosses

Table 10. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss
sequences for the low math ability participants on the coin tossing task.
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73
27
8

Two Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

67
31
4

Four Tosses
72
27
3

Six Tosses
73
22
7

Table 11. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss
sequences for the high math ability participants on the coin tossing task.
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Low Math Ability

Control
One
Toss
4

High Math Ability

5

8

Four
Tosses
0

Six
Tosses
2

Dual
One
Toss
4

3

4

1

2

Two
Tosses

Table 12. Outliers for each math ability group in each condition of the
coin tossing task
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Two
Tosses
6

Four
Tosses
2

Six
Tosses
4

1

6

4

Two Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

53
11
8

Four Tosses
41
14
17

Six Tosses

Table 13. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss
sequences for all participants on the weighted coin tossing task.
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67
3
2

Two Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Four Tosses
28
5
1

Six Tosses
24
4
6

Table 14. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss
sequences for the low math ability participants on the weighted coin tossing task.
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33
1
0

Two Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Four Tosses
25
6
7

Six Tosses
17
10
11

Table 15. The total number of each type of response on the two, four, and six toss
sequences for the high math ability participants on the weighted coin tossing task.
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34
2
2

Low Math Ability

Control
One
Toss
1

Two
Tosses
0

Four
Tosses
0

Six
Tosses
0

High Math Ability

0

0

0

2

Dual
One
Toss
0

Two
Tosses
1

Four
Tosses
0

0

0

0

Table 16. Outliers for each math ability group in each condition of the weighted coin
tossing task.
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Six
Tosses
1
1

Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Six Tosses
18
18
4

Eight Tosses
13
24
3

Ten Tosses
15
24
1

Twelve Tosses
16
22
2

Table 17. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin toss
sequences for all participants on the coin tossing task in Experiment Two.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Six Tosses
7
10
3

Eight Tosses
5
13
2

Ten Tosses
6
13
1

Twelve Tosses
4
14
2

Table 18. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin
toss sequences for the low math ability participants on the coin tossing task in Experiment Two.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Six Tosses
11
8
1

Eight Tosses
8
11
1

Ten Tosses
9
11
0

Twelve Tosses
12
8
0

Table 19. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin toss
sequences for the high math ability participants on the coin tossing task in Experiment Two.

192

Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Same Number of
Heads Per Sequence
34
40
6

Different Number of
Heads Per Sequence
28
48
4

Table 20. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the
same number of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of
heads per sequence for all participants in the coin tossing task in Experiment
Two.
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Same Number of
Heads Per Sequence
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

11
24
5

Different Number of
Heads Per Sequence
11
26
3

Table 21. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the
same number of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of
heads per sequence for the low math ability participants in the coin tossing task in
Experiment Two.

194

Same Number of
Heads Per Sequence
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

23
16
1

Different Number of Heads Per
Sequence
17
22
1

Table 22. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the same number
of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of heads per sequence for
the high math ability participants in the coin tossing task in Experiment Two.

195

Six Tosses

Eight Tosses

Ten Tosses

Twelve Tosses

Low Math Ability

2

2

1

1

High Math Ability

0

2

1

1

Table 23. Outliers/microphone errors for each math ability group in each condition of the
coin tossing task in Experiment Two.
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Six
Tosses
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

32
7
1

Eight Tosses
17
15
8

Ten Tosses
27
12
1

Twelve Tosses
10
21
9

Table 24. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin toss
sequences for all participants on the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment Two.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Six Tosses
16
4
0

Eight Tosses
6
11
3

Ten Tosses
13
6
1

Twelve Tosses
4
10
6

Table 25. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin toss
sequences for the low math ability participants on the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment
Two.
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Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Six Tosses
16
3
1

Eight Tosses
11
4
5

Ten Tosses
14
6
0

Twelve Tosses
6
11
3

Table 26. The total number of each type of response on the six, eight, ten, and twelve coin toss
sequences for the high math ability participants on the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment
Two.

199

Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Same Number of Heads
Per Sequence
27
36
17

Different Number of Heads
Per Sequence
59
19
2

Table 27. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the same
number of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of heads per
sequence for all participants in the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment Two.

200

Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

Same Number of Heads
Per Sequence
10
21
9

Different Number of
Heads Per Sequence

Table 28. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the same
number of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of heads per
sequence for the low math ability participants in the weighted coin tossing task in
Experiment Two.
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29
10
1

Same Number of
Heads Per Sequence
Correct
Representativeness Heuristic
Wrong

17
15
8

Different Number of
Heads Per Sequence
30
9
1

Table 29. The total number of each type of response for the trials that had the
same number of heads per sequence and the trials that had a different number of
heads per sequence for the high math ability participants in the weighted coin
tossing task in Experiment Two.
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Six
Tosses
Low Math Ability

1

Eight Tosses
2

High Math Ability

3

1

Ten Tosses
0

Twelve Tosses
0

0

0

Table 30. Outliers/microphone errors for each math ability group in each condition of
the weighted coin tossing task in Experiment Two.
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